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The Anglo-Saxon Zugzwang:

The Irrational Paradox
of the Enlightenment



Nadezda V. GOLIK
Arkady I. IZVEKOV

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Nadezda N. Golik, Arkady I. Izvekov

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The present work is the result of applying a novel methodology developed by representatives of Saint-Petersburg School of Cultural Philosophy. The monograph analyzes the major consequences of the Enlightenment era, revealing the mechanisms responsible for the incorporation of pragmatic culture-threatening attitudes into the encoding of globalization. Particular attention is paid to the USA and the West in general as regards modernization processes. A critical review of the current state of the main social institutions points towards forthcoming inevitable transformations of the unstable world order, with the potential of Russian culture remaining underestimated.

The book addresses philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists as well as those interested in modern humanities issues.

Translated by M. Popova and T. Sarganova

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Introduction

An overview that understands the major challenges of the modern world will reveal both combined and individual features in the cultural universe. In the meantime, there is an obvious need to seek some universal strategies for cultural creativity, which are to be modeled from the long route leading to the epitome of the rationally valued worldview, moving through the various stages of rational utilitarian intentions. In this respect, the analysis of the Enlightenment project, as the recent popular saying goes, appears both complicated and fruitful.

The 20th century relieved us of many delusions. One of them claims culture to be the greatest achievement of the human intellect, which happens to be *the gift of gratitude* in relation to nature: it is only due to culture that nature acquires a particular new appearance: it is culture that realizes opportunities concealed in nature and determines the mode of its existence. The reality is somewhat different, however: nature is being turned into a gigantic storehouse for resources and Man is, in a similar way, being turned into a means. Mind is supposed to know nature's needs (including Man's biological, physiological and psychological demands) as well as ways to change nature in order to adapt it to culture. This delusion stems from the views which emerged in Antiquity and were finally shaped in the 17th century. Bacon's famous saying "Knowledge is power" replaces the cult of God with that of Reason; it becomes the basic concept of the Enlightenment and heralds the dawn of scientific and technological progress and utilitarian ethics. The consequences of this substitution are obvious enough.

Paradoxically, the Enlightenment's investment in *Ratio* led to completely irrational consequences. The victory of *Déesse Raison* marks the beginning of "the general neurosis of the modern person, that is, the personality dissociation" [491: 240]. The soul appears to be divided by a barbed wire fence, one side being the precipice of instincts, cravings and passions, most of which, in terms of psychoanalysis, are controlled by the dark *Id*. The necessity to *match* the social and cultural microcosms is on the other side. It was a rare exception if an individual managed to cope with these constant contradictions and aimed his life at only one target. This happened, however, at the expense of the other side of his personality. Twentieth century psychology showed that "it is certainly possible to deprive people of gods on condition they are given other ones" [432: 239]. Sence and Utility cannot possibly be those *other ones*.

It is clear in this context that the current research methodology was built on the well-known principles of distinguishing between the moral and the ethical in a person. On the other hand, never before had this principle been turned into a universal approach to social rather than personal diagnostics. The dialectics of moral and ethical components in the self-development of social institutions is what allowed an undoubtedly novel way of tackling the issue of the modern cultural crisis.

The *disenchanted world*, standing in lieu of the wholeness of the divine, cannot unambiguously answer the questions of what people are and what they are for. However, deep in human nature, there is something irrationally endowed — some irresistible longing, the anticipation of a specific sort of experience, referred to in different ways in various sources, which evidently proves the necessity of the peaceful co-existence of knowledge and faith.

The modern person's *split* soul is a projection of modern culture being *split* — the problem commonly referred to as the "culture crisis". There is growing evidence that this disease has affected the whole of humankind. Today it has reached its climax — in an ideology which is suicidal for its followers. This is not the epistemologically tragic viewpoint of theologians and philosophers, but a well-observed and fixed reality. The presentiment and experience of the Apocalypse highlight the tragedy of the ethical as it is the existence not only of the individual person but also of the whole of humanity that becomes the highest value of being. Surprisingly, modern media pay little attention to the problem.

The evaluation of the fast and painful change in values formulated in the past century and the change in the fundamental basis of Man's ethical attitude to the world, resulting in the culture crisis, affected the way of thinking throughout the 20th century. The 1920–30s saw the first outcome of the crisis, revealing radical transformations of social structures, a principal change in the world image and stunning innovations in art. Somewhat later, virtually all symptoms of the crisis were examined comprehensively. In the last quarter of the 20th century, a set of notions related to crisis consciousness was eventually shaped, and this became a characteristic feature of the style of thinking. Even the intellectual movement of postmodernism, which crowned 20th century thought and proclaimed “the death of the subject”, indirectly interplayed with the “death of culture” theme.

However, the idea that European culture has been subjected to radical transformations and has gone through painful changes more than once has become something more than a mere commonplace in the Humanities. The latest crisis has been interpreted as a phenomenon similar to centuries-old events. Moreover, like the preceding transitional periods — the end of Antiquity and the beginning of the Middle Ages, the overcoming of the theological worldview during the Renaissance, and the establishment of the dominant features of Modernity, — the last transitional period is considered in modern theory not merely as exhaustively completed but as something insignificant.

This *rule* is, however, accepted by default only. Rather, there occurred something analogous to what we observe in everyday practice. A hundred-year-old fear of the Chaos to come and the suspicion that the medieval doctrine of the Apocalypse is going to be confirmed by the historical dramas of today, do not correspond to the modern consumerist worldview. There has emerged an unconscious belief that, unlike us, those who experienced the crisis just did not have time to adapt to its specific conditions, predetermined by the accelerating development of science, industry, and capitalist society as a whole. A combination of revolutions and two world wars moved the emotional experience of the transitional period into the refined decadent background as compared to the real horrors of the cataclysms. The notion “forgotten crisis” is fully applicable to the events in European culture at the turn of the 20th century.

Meanwhile, fundamental problems with the *Weltanschauung* of the 21st century can be traced back to the time when hardly anybody could conceive that Modernity — the period between the first bourgeois revolutions and the consumer society, between the onset of the transformation of Protestant ethics into the *capitalist spirit* and the painful crisis — would be considered completed and the start of a *supernova*, which is occasionally called “postmodern”, would be heralded. The conditions of the subsequent cultural crisis were shaped in early Modern Times, with a range of existential problems for the people of today to cope with. Moreover, a retrospective view shows that the first signs of the modern human problem became evident as early as the 19th century. This is one of today's axioms of social philosophical knowledge. Paradoxically, the methodology adopted in modern academic practice appears to be dissociated from the intellectual legacy of the European culture crisis.

Schopenhauer's words regarding the non-cognoscibility of “the will to life” heralded the crisis and, having passed its epicenter, were followed by Heidegger's statement treating the post-crisis conditions of the mid 20th century as the question of God and divinities being essentially unresolved. Today there is much more uncertainty about these issues than during the crisis proper. However, they have been virtually cut off from research practice and relegated to the status of a subject that has to be lived with. Modern approaches to the human problem merely consolidate the numerous side effects of the uncertainty that became evident more than a century ago. A preoccupation with material values, unprecedented transformations of traditional family institutions, and the broadening range of dependencies of various kinds are among the modern symptoms of the human crisis, to mention but a few. All of them were generated by blurred ethical principles. In the Humanities, the objectives are confined to the individual's inner world, beyond which there is an undefined and vague status of intellectual freedom. Accepting this *by default* does not make it possible to relate the symptoms of the cultural crisis to those of the modern human being.

Numerous features of the *supernova* age stem from “the forgotten crisis”, including the consequences of the so-called existential revolution. The transformation of the individual's inner world resulted in the individual gaining an unprecedented right to define his own nature. This quintessence of intellectual freedom was asserted as early as the mid 20th century but since then it has remained as a provision without any further development. The academic community accepts it, by default of course, as a legitimate provision with regard to the modern individual. However, the blurred

notion of intellectual freedom remains one of the main problem areas — both in terms of self-identification with regard to the meaning of life as such, and in the context of theoretical studies on this subject.

The acquisition of intellectual freedom is implicitly the next step taken by humankind in the process of *maturation*. During the *forgotten* crisis, due to intellectual freedom, a concept of the *adult* was formed — making a claim to an independent Weltanschauung. To allege that Man has managed to cope with the task would be to deliberately misrepresent reality. The search for a solution is one of the global challenges of the *supernova* age which, in its turn, is among the key research fields of human knowledge in general.

The problem of personal identity is first and foremost that of identifying the ethical meaning of the individual's existence. The value of a philosophical approach to the understanding of the given sphere of existence is self-evident. The questions within it are bound to remain unresolved in the foreseeable future so their academic potential seems limitless. Modern humankind is trying to solve its own historically-conditioned range of geopolitical and ecological issues related to self-preservation and an increasing level of consumption. The current scope of pragmatic tasks is unprecedented in history. To a great extent, practical efforts and theoretical studies are aimed at sustaining the global financial and economic systems. During the latest crisis affecting these systems, the development of correct responses to its challenges was the key focus of efforts overall. The search for approaches that would help to maintain the quality of life has been incorporated in the discourse of various disciplines. However, the assumption that, apart from the aforementioned, there is nothing more essential in the range of challenges to be answered by the modern individual is likewise accepted by default as it were.

Focusing on the financial crisis readily distracts people from the widest range of ethical conflicts concerning intellectual freedom — another neglected analogy from the early 20th century. Then, *everyday concerns* were as much of a pretext not to think of pressing intellectual problems as they are nowadays. But now, as before, researchers in the fields of philosophy, sociology, psychology, and pedagogy are identifying the signs of features of the crisis in numerous social institutions. Related issues have been observed with regard to national, gender, class, group, and personal identities, for instance. Directly or indirectly, this implies an identity crisis, which is likely to be interrelated with its source: the uncertainty in the indisputable characteristic of the present time, namely, the individual's intellectual freedom, an uncertainty that stems from the cultural crisis.

The cultural crisis shows the presence in culture of a special authority. The latter is the keeper of the values that are of vital importance to both culture and nature. The stability of these values was a mystery even for one of the most original thinkers in the history of ethics, Kant, who held in awe the “starry sky” above him and the “moral law” within him. Traditionally, this German philosopher was accused of formalism, which was believed to be “the done thing” during that period of time. In our view, trying to disprove his theory would be like attempting to refute Newton's laws. Goethe's words seem appropriate here: “A genius does what he must, a talented person does what he can, and the rest do as all do”. Kant was aware of the fact that each generation is trying to test, disprove and *re-discover* the axiom: ethics (including the differentiation between the moral and the ethical) is a foundation of culture, its source of energy, as it were. The law of culture conservation acts in the relevant sphere in the same way as the physical law of energy conservation does in nature. Ethics can be likened to the cultural potential — to what tends to develop on its own over the whole space of culture.

The culture crisis is intimately connected with the *ill consciousness* problem, and the latter — with that of language. All radical changes in peoples' lives are reflected in their language: any society is bound to collapse without *road signs*, i.e. without conscious speech. In the 17th century, French philosophers developed a fundamental concept of *the civilized* within the framework of the binary opposition of *civilization* vs. *barbarism*. This concept has become “the ontological basis for expanding European civilization and practicing re-division of the world without taking into account the interests of ...any non-European cultures”. Moreover, as the new millennium dawned, the notion of civilization was undergoing drastic changes: the former geographic constituent ceased to be the key one, and the final transition from the “blood and land” formula to that of “language and culture” was under way.

Thus, the boundaries shaping new units of human civilization go along the areas of languages and the related lifestyles, including Braudel's "collections of cultural characteristics and phenomena". The historical variety of the *collections* reflects the essence of the ethos that embodies the *spirit* of different national and social positions. It is these collections that keep the covert tension between *sollen* and *sein* which appears to be at the core of national consciousness.

The situation in the world is that the West is busy with military-political planning, "when the state/ethnos plays the role of a minimal tactical unit". However, if the latter is the US, the sought-after character of globalization can be easily predicted. The West uses all available resources to establish the Anglo-Saxon model as the means of self-preservation. As for the goal, it is paradoxically turned to the means, only slightly altered, since the goal of the West is to establish its own supremacy in the world. Linking up the goal and the means makes the idea self-justifying, so that it becomes *the painful nerve* of globalization, defining the essence of the modern ethical crisis. The indisputable reality of the crisis makes us continuously revisit the question of the ways and means of culture conservation. New challenges — the consequences of "the Arab spring" and the war in Syria — are aggravating the contradictions inherited from the projects of the Modernity. It should be conceded that not all of these have been completed. The Enlightenment is likely to be the most relevant and research into its modern processes reveals the true nature of *the human supernova*.

Chapter 1. The outcome of the Enlightenment

1.1. The modern crisis: an overview of the philosophy of culture

The culture of a society is an indicator of its *quality* and its ability to make *order out of chaos*. The dynamics of cultural transformation are development, improvement, stagnation or crisis... The latter is generally understood as transition from one stage to another. The theory of a cultural crisis first appeared at the turn of the 20th century, with the word *crisis* occurring in more and more works. There were also other, even more sinister definitions, such as *downfall*, *death* and *catastrophe*. Many scholars thought that Man had not become happier as a result of the successes of civilization, which is the opposite of culture. Such thoughts were expressed in essays on philosophy, sociology, history, literature and art and also in the memoirs of scientists, politicians and public leaders. The level of self-reflection in European culture is vast and in its entirety clearly indicates an awareness of the symptoms of the crisis.

According to the sociologist Karl Mannheim, the mechanism of transformation of modern culture is related to the forms of dictatorship that replace *free forms*, "when mass democratic society is left alone". In the non-economic, cultural sphere the same processes are under way. The parallel is not accidental: culture, as well as the economy is a production sphere; it generates cultural values, "with the only difference in the scale of the processes" [276: 419].

If we tried to single out one particular cause from the Gordian knot of the crisis, it would appear to be the unresolved problem of the Enlightenment. No matter how many times we might try to "bury the Enlightenment" [128], there still remains an unresolved fundamental issue of the time — the problem of the Enlightenment itself. Michel Foucault addresses this in the article *What is the Enlightenment?* [436]. Like a model student, the French philosopher analyzes Immanuel Kant's short article printed in 1784 in a Berlin newspaper as a response to Pastor Zollner's comment on the chaos called the Enlightenment.

According to Foucault, the question of *what is the Enlightenment* still remains unanswered by modern philosophy. But the latter has never been able to get away from it, repeating it in various forms for two hundred years. From Hegel to Horkheimer or Habermas, including Nietzsche or Maximilian Weber, there was virtually no philosophy that had not faced, directly or indirectly, the question: what is the event that we call the Enlightenment, the event that predetermined, at least to some extent, what we think and what we do today? Therefore, the answer to the question "*What is modern philosophy?*" can be formulated as follows: it is the philosophy that tries to solve the issue audaciously thrown at it two centuries ago [436].

The participants in the 19th century discussion about the causes of the confusion surrounding the word *Enlightenment* also failed to figure out to the full extent the meaning of two other words, *culture* and *education*. They thought that with these the situation was the same: not so much time had elapsed for the two concepts to diverge and their usage did not separate them. What was clear about this was the common denominator: “education, culture and enlightenment are aspects of social life and the results of people’s diligence and effort in striving to improve their social position”. In those days, an unstable compromise was reached: the nation was educated if it had harmonized the social position with Man’s mission, through art and diligence. The latter is a measure and aim of all our aspirations and hopes, and the starting point for all our thoughts, if “we do not want to lose ourselves” [287]. According to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, all this distinguishes civilized people from barbarians.

Kant complicated the problem considerably by adding a question about the difference between culture and civilization. The duality had already been noted by Augustine of Hippo, who distinguished between the city of the world and that of God. It is this ancient theory that Kant intended to bring to its logical conclusion. He regarded *the city of the world* as civilization, whose essence is utmost decency, a code of rules regulating human discipline. *The city of God*, or culture, is an ideal of the moral goal that makes the life both of society and people worth living.

In this connection, the discussion was bound to turn from the Enlightenment to *pseudo-culture*. One of the scholars, Mendelssohn, referred to the superficial sophistication and high gloss, that vanish at a closer look, as *politura*, or *polish* (from the Latin *politura* — polish), a substance used to varnish wooden surfaces. Mendelssohn explains the meaning of the term: true well-being can only be achieved by a nation whose polish is the result of culture and enlightenment, whose high gloss and sophistication have a high-quality basis. While noting different culture-enlightenment relationships in various nations (German, English and Chinese) he considers the ancient Greeks as a model of an educated society, with language being the best indicator of education and culture.

Mendelssohn particularly stresses the necessity to keep within measure in any sphere. Otherwise enlightenment and culture would *go wrong*, undermining moral meanings and leading to hard-headedness, egoism, atheism, occultism, anarchy, profligacy, debauchery and slavery.

In his article Immanuel Kant takes to a new level the answer to the question of *what is the Enlightenment*, by showing people how to become educated. His statements have long become clichés, currently seen in abundance on the Internet. However, the understanding of their essence requires increasing intellectual effort every time.

Kant defines the Enlightenment as “Man’s leaving his self-imposed status of not being of age. The latter is the inability to use personal understanding without external guidance. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause is not the lack of understanding, but the lack of resolution and the courage to use this understanding without additional guidance. *Sapere aude!* [Dare to know!] “Have courage to use your own brain!”— that is the motto of enlightenment” [206: 26].

We would like to emphasize the words *self-imposed* and *courage*. In the very first lines of his article, Kant noted the role of the individual’s personal Self-Consciousness: Man himself bears responsibility for his status of immaturity; therefore he can only leave it and enter the age of maturity by exercising his own free will, forcing himself, making an effort and giving up his customary guardian. In other words, Kant defines *coming of age* as accomplishing Man’s mission, i.e., as a moral duty that makes him not only be brave in knowing, which already presupposes courage, but also makes him ready for a deliberate valiant deed. The motto of the Enlightenment (*Sapere aude!*), like any motto, is also a self-directive and an instruction for others: “to refuse enlightenment for oneself and for future generations would be to infringe and trample on the sacred rights of mankind”. On the way to Enlightenment, people are not passive agents but active participants in the process. Concurrently, the latter is only possible insofar as they make their choices, opting to participate.

Coming of age, according to Kant, is considered by many to be not only difficult, but also fairly dangerous, for being immature is very convenient. “Immaturity” means paralysis of will that makes us rely on somebody else’s authority and power, rather than use our own mind. “If I have a book to serve as my understanding, a pastor to serve as my conscience, a physician to determine my diet for me, and so on, I need not exert myself at all. I need not think, if only I can pay: others will readily undertake the irksome work for me” [206: 27]. Thus, enlightenment requires only freedom, and the most benign one, for that matter, specifically the freedom of public use of a person’s own reason in all instances.

“By the public use of a person’s own reason I understand the use that anyone as a scholar makes of reason before the entire literate world. I call the private use of reason that which a person may make in a civic post or office that has been entrusted to him” [206: 29]. In other words, a scholar as a person is free in the area of reflection and leisure. He teaches freedom of thought about an object, as required by the essence of the latter (and not as dictated by an academic administrator or a state official). However, the scholar is not free as far as his civil duties are concerned (paying taxes, discipline at work, etc.).

When addressing Kant’s theory, Foucault reveals, in the Enlightenment an enrooted form of philosophical interrogation that simultaneously problematizes both relation to the present, Man’s historical mode of being, and the formation of the self as an autonomous subject. He thought it important to stress that indissoluble connection with the Enlightenment is faithfulness yet not to its doctrinal elements, but to a philosophical ethos, that makes us “permanently recreate a certain mindset for the analysis of “our historical era” (*the critical ontology of ourselves*) and a practical test for the limits we can go beyond, and thus as work carried out by ourselves on ourselves as free beings.

The Enlightenment is presented as a stage in the maturation of humankind as it began to live using its own reason. Foucault emphasized the relationship between Kant’s article and his famous *Critiques*, noting, “Critique is like the logbook of reason, which entered maturity during the Enlightenment, and conversely, the Enlightenment is the Age of Critique” [436: 221]. Based on Foucault’s comparison, it can be said that due to *the logbook*, all that happens in history is related to previous experience. It is necessary not only for moving towards the set goal with minimal losses, but also for defining the level of the individual’s participation in this.

Then the present is perceived not as the time between the past and the future, i.e. time mode, but as a mindset that includes a special attitude to everything that is under way at the moment, free choice, something which not everybody is capable of, a particular way to think and feel, or act and behave. This almost immediately brings us to the problem of setting a *task* for oneself; and only by resolving it can the individual determine his involvement in the present.

Performance of a self-imposed *task* is impossible without the *Copernican* revolution of consciousness when all *unique* ideas, wishes, passions and whims of self are replaced in the center of the world with the understanding of self-involvement in the common movement and responsibility for all that is happening. This leads the Enlightenment to the issue of *the culture of self-analysis*.

The culture of self-analysis presupposes the ability to *make a moral reproach to oneself*, which is by no means connected with the categorization or evaluation of people: *some are better, others are worse*. It means an ethical and political objective “to have courage in work to proceed to the end of what one sees in his soul, without looking back at democratic rituals of the milieu, or belonging to a team” [270: 371].

European culture and philosophy as an essential part thereof seem to have developed the universal characteristics of such a mindset, oriented towards the present, regardless of the time of events. Since ancient Greece, they have been manifested in concepts of eternity, heroism, asceticism, justice and freedom. However, it is the legacy of the Enlightenment that gave them a touch of uncertainty that had never been there before.

The issue of the independence of Reason has metamorphosed nowadays into that of its human origin. The unresolved issue of the Enlightenment is also related to that of the origin, essence and limits of consciousness. The Kantian view of the latter, and even to a greater extent, the limits of Self-Consciousness, opened up a completely new prospect for self-development. However, the concept of a responsible and morally independent subject, relying on Self-Consciousness, still awaits further definition of related categories and notions of modern thinking. As Elena Shulga noted, “it would be hard, if at all feasible at present, to suggest an adequate theory that would justify an integral (or for example, single) theory of consciousness, assuming its existence” [478: 198].

The Enlightenment has left us with a lot of unanswered questions. The only thing we can be sure about is that consciousness is an exceptional phenomenon that is extremely difficult to research. Nowadays psychology can, for example, make judgments about its states, identify the limits of its normal and abnormal conditions, correct some processes and even create models representing its likely structure. However, some details that were not thought of by the Enlightenment scholars still remain to be clarified. Although Descartes had done a lot of experiments with the brain, Kant seemed to take little interest in them. Only the 20th century posed the question of how exactly the brain and

consciousness interact. Generally speaking, there can be no detailed answer. Despite all efforts in neuroscience, psychology and some branches of philosophy, the study of consciousness has reached the methodological limitations of the heritage of the Enlightenment.

It is still not known how the consciousness processes empirical data about the world, nor do we know the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the resulting content, its volume and completeness. Consciousness cannot be measured; the existing models can only show a general potential for interpreting its structure and function.

A detailed analysis of the issue reveals its more profound aspects. German classical philosophy, first and foremost Kant, set Sense against Reason, referring to it as a higher *capability of the mind*. Sense can only be cognizant of earthly matters, which are relative and finite, whereas Reason can and must discover the essence of what is heavenly, absolute and endless. In other words, the former is oriented towards experience, pragmatism and utility (in this connection, it is worth mentioning the article entitled *Utility as the Main Concept of the Enlightenment* [59]). Reason uncovers another dimension in a person that is not pragmatically oriented to the cult of money, profit and adaptation to circumstances. It is Reason that makes the living being *Homo sapiens* become a supreme creation of nature, i.e., Man, while determining his second, intellectual component. The power of Sense can lead to *shortsightedness*, blocking the view of the strategic goal and transformations that might occur when putting a theory into practice; it results from “the madness of self-conceit”, with which Sense bravely attempts to justify plans to reform things. According to Hegel, “everything is reasonable” rather than sensible.

In contrast to that of the Age of Enlightenment, the prevailing wisdom of today is that consciousness consists of three components, that is, Sense, Reason and Self-Consciousness. It is easy to imagine conceptually that Sense describes a way of thinking that reflects the world through certain categories and concepts. Its criterion is consistency between the category-concept system and the world. Reason being conscious Sense in this context, formulates rules for the interaction of categories and notions, or logic, in a broader Sense, its criterion being the correct principle of the worldview via the *logical* connection of categories. Self-Consciousness is the area of general values of judgments that is constituted of the capacity of consciousness to make itself an object for reflection. The criterion of this component is the established correlation between the judgments that Reason produces and their meaning.

The meaning of judgments of Reason in terms of their purport is the quintessence of an Enlightenment problem that still remains unresolved. The Enlightenment raised Man to an unprecedented level of Reason, enquiring about the meaning of the phenomena observed. Today, however, the enquiry is even less likely to provide answers. The individual’s modern context of existential meanings is determined by the situation of uncertainty reflected in a wide range of *excessive* questions to which there is no answer whatsoever.

There are quite a few such questions. What really is the origin of Man? Is there an objective purpose for his living in this world? How does the social phenomenon arise? Are there universal laws of social dynamics? Are we in a position to ask about the purpose of society’s development? None of the questions formulated in this way has a clear answer.

Natural science has posed its own questions that cannot be resolved either. How did the Universe originate? Was there a Big Bang and, if so, what is its implication for Reason to appear? Is the Universe limited? What is the real structure of the *depths of matter*? There are also interdisciplinary issues of the kind. What is the relationship between the human brain’s capacities and its micro-structure? Does it influence our minds? What is the origin of the human psyche? Is it connected with basic processes in the Universe?

None of the answers that claim to be universal can be considered legitimate. For all that, in any related judgment, the degree of likelihood will be unclear.

This uncertainty allows us to draw at least one indisputable conclusion that everyone is free to judge about the *excessive* issues. The non-codified legitimacy of this right constitutes the basis of the phenomenon referred to as intellectual freedom. Its appearance is a sign of on-going maturation, as Kant was the first to observe, explaining it by the growing role of Self-Consciousness. However, the latter is still unable to identify the coordinates of freedom. The difficulty of the person of Modern Times who wanted to achieve real independence has long become obvious. He was facing three segments of non-freedom that made up a closed circle.

The first is empiricism, whereby natural science recognized only one significant question *What do I do with it?* It confined Man, together with the mystery of the world, to the thing in itself. The supremacy of this worldview only partially compensated for its limitations. Man had to admit that in terms of biology, he totally depended on nature and could only try to adapt to it in the best possible way.

Second, the empirical segment gives rise to laws that regulate social interactions. Laws inevitably *enslave* the individual because the guarantees of political freedom eliminate freedom in general.

Third, the *a priori* segment does not provide freedom in the proper sense of the word either. People did want to believe that, by taking empiricism for granted, Man could be free in the *a priori* sphere of the mind. However, it turned out that the *a priori* moral law of Reason is both *a priori* and universal. Therefore, all that is private and personal is to be subordinated to the universality of Reason, that is, to what it represents as freedom in the moral sphere. The representation of transcendent freedom emerges as a categorical imperative to consider a person's duty to mankind as a law that governs a person's actions. However, the universality of the imperative would then suggest only one kind of freedom, i.e. *free* submission to this duty. This would be impossible unless justified by something, for example by a common goal of mankind. The goal might have been associated only with God, but the *enlightened* Self-Consciousness had managed to take this role away from Him.

When left without a clear purpose, what social Man found in the hypothetically possible *a priori* sphere of freedom was only the dictatorship of Reason. According to Theodor Adorno, it was a continuation of the Protestant tradition, Kant himself being a proponent of discipline in bourgeois society. [9: 150]. The empirical sphere was likewise composed *a priori* of the integral space of non-freedom, which led to an antinomy or paradox between the demand for freedom and the inability to find it in either sphere.

Nietzsche did not resolve but eliminated this antinomy. The idea *God is dead* symbolized the *threshold* stage of the cultural crisis at the turn of the 20th century. Durkheim referred to it as an *anomie*, that is, a lack of social or ethical values [176–178]. When it was over, the individual found himself in a position that is absolutely different from the one he was in not only during the Enlightenment, but also throughout Modern Times. *Excessive* questions as to the origin, purport and perpetuation of mankind on Earth are translated by human subjectivity as questioning personal meaning, a personified version of the question *what for*. However, the key circumstance in our period of history is that Reason fails to find a clear and definite denotatum that is addressed by this questioning.

In this case, a denotatum is not merely an object perceived by the individual as something real, for which there is a word in the language. It is also the ultimate *Archimedean point* from which Self-Consciousness deduces the purport-related worldview. It is the ultimate point; Self-Consciousness does not need anything beyond it to build a system of meanings, and therefore does not intentionally orient itself towards anything else. It is modeled on Aristotle's concept of *primum mobile*, which is not only the source of a general movement that remains at rest itself, but also the prime cause, the source of all chains of causes that does not have any cause itself.

The original impulse of the Enlightenment resulted in the fact that, within its upper limit, modern knowledge deals with unidentifiable denotata. Scientific questions also address the elusive denotatum, no matter if it is about the causes of the Big Bang or the purpose of the Universe; neither of the two can be truly and completely defined as available, perceptible or visible. Astrophysicists have formulated the Big Bang theory about the origin of the Universe; some branches of theology continue to maintain that the latter was created by God, whereas various forms of metaphysics deal with the subject in many different ways. Although all the ideas have the same denotatum, nobody knows the latter or knows the true meaning of statements about it. Therefore, knowledge in the field of the natural sciences or humanities no longer had the right pass judgment on *excessive* questions.

The heritage of the Enlightenment has determined a unique disposition of mind where the target of *excessive* questions formulated by it is not a denotatum but a designatum, an ideal object also endowed with a name. It also denotes the ultimate *Archimedean point* for consciousness to form the sphere of existential meanings. The former also serves as the starting point, but is already not the ultimate point. The name denoting the *starting sphere* points at something conditioned and only

hypothetically admissible. Therefore Self-Consciousness permanently remains in a state of incomplete hypothesis of a meaning-related worldview.

Words like *God, the Absolute Spirit, the origin of the world, the meaning of human existence and the purport of mankind* are most often perceived as mere words that do not denote a concrete thing, but are clearly understood and grasped by thought. The designatum remains objectively non-verifiable and for a personality structure it is always a target of self-trust, in which and by which the path of an individual's existence can be validated. Whether such a designatum exists as an objective part of reality completely revealed by thought or whether it is solely a form of the latter with its actual content hidden from Reason, are issues to be resolved by forming only a personal and objectively non-verifiable hypothesis. What are meant in this case are references to *excessive* questions; these are of key significance. No scientific postulate, democratic regulation or religious doctrine can change the situation.

If Self-Consciousness interprets the sources of human purport as denotata with seemingly clear, indisputable and ultimate objective meanings, their names are *put outside the sign* of the functional operation, as a constant factor. This enables us to fix the meaning-related worldview deduced by Self-Consciousness and ensures its stability.

Pre-determinants of existence that we interpret by means of designata will never become a kind of fixing device for processes in Self-Consciousness. The fundamental non-definability of the ultimate form of the original designatum of meaning presupposes a possibility to construct its subjective hypothesis, rather than its non-reality. In this case, the only objectively true denotatum in meaning-related issues will be the very fact of the arbitrariness of Self-Consciousness in hypothesizing about the origin of the meaning of life. Then spiritual freedom in general is a transition from a fixed to an arbitrary basis for deducing the system of meanings.

As a result, the content of Self-Consciousness remains dependent only on existential experience and is structurally self-supporting; it becomes independent in personal meaning-related issues. In turn, discarding the *fixed factor* means profound changes in the personality structure, that is, a transition from an immature to a more adult status in the world.

The above interpretation does have a clear hint of Cartesianism. It differs considerably from the latter in that, in the individual's inner world, we do not merely observe the endless repetition of the processes, as noted by Descartes. Our interpretation is concerned with a most important outcome of Modern Times, i.e. the existential revolution, which was also inspired by the Enlightenment.

The subject's most recent disposition is combined with the transition from the static to the dynamic condition of the personal system of meanings. In this context, meaning is not only a conceptual content of judgment. According to Leo Vygotsky, it is the perception of an elevated subjective value of an object or phenomenon [108: 96]. As meanings are formed by Man and for Man, their systemic principle is formed According to the meaning of the cognizing Self, which equals that of the Self-in-the-world and that of the world-for-myself. The dynamic system of meanings thereby represents the utmost level of self-awareness and is accordingly equivalent to Self-Consciousness.

The dynamic system of meanings possesses some properties that currently have no ultimate explanation, if they are explicable at all. First of all, the system does not depend on the laws of the natural and social worlds, including the social and biological components of Man himself. Mindsets related to personal meaning may not concur with either social norms or even with the instinct for self-preservation. Second, there may be a discrepancy between components of the dynamic system of meanings and reality: the origin of some mindsets cannot be traced in the empirically known world. Moreover, some mechanisms underlying the choice of the course of action that comply with meaning-related mindsets have no reasonable explanation. For example, according to Viktor Frankl, conscience is pre-logical and extra-rational. However, it is conscience that makes the individual act in a way that may seem contrary to his interests.

To reformulate Kant's statement, although the meaning system of Self-Consciousness is filled with experience, it does not originate from the latter. However, it is unclear at the moment how exactly the system forms. All these circumstances enable us to assume that the meaning-related sphere of Self-Consciousness does not depend on its physiological substrate, the brain, or on reality. In philosophy, it means the most recent revision of the Kantian approach to the issue of the Enlightenment person. The modern theory of consciousness will inevitably face the problem of the legitimacy of the question about the transcendental structure of consciousness in general and about

Self-Consciousness in particular. In other words, the function of Self-Consciousness, whose value consists in the formation of the dynamic system of meanings, is in fact transcendental, because it cannot be reduced to physiological or gnosological processes.

Finally, the dynamic system of meanings itself has some special qualities, including its conditional duality. Regarding their content, meanings can be pragmatic (related to self-preservation and well-being) and existential (mental or those pertaining to the meaning of life). Here we face the most intriguing aspect of the consciousness issue. All meanings, including those mentioned above, can be true or false. Among other important needs, explicit or implicit, an individual needs to be sure that his dynamic system of meanings is true. However, for the two different spheres, the pragmatic and the existential, there are different ways to verify the meanings. For the former, there are relatively simple mechanisms; for example, it would be enough to be satisfied with a certain level of material wealth or at least, to be sure of the prospects for a person's related aspirations. In the latter case, there must be some external coordinates that Man would recognize as intersubjective and true in order to validate meaning-related mindsets of his own.

The newest qualities of the Self-Consciousness structure directly influence the interpretation of the concept of personality. Just as the consciousness reflects the world, rather than the condition of the brain, personality is not constituted only of the body. As Frankl maintained, "Personality is intellectual. Therefore, opposing it to a psychophysical organism would be heuristic" [421: 5]. Although the personality is manifested in the moral relationship with society via the socially relevant qualities that have formed, this happens only because of the individual content of consciousness.

The latter is most important for today's concept of personality, because it is consciousness that constitutes Man as a personality. Therefore, it is both a transcendently and socially determined quality of an individual. First, it consists in the internal way that the meaning-related sphere is filled and in its content. Second, it is about how a person's inner world is reflected in social interactions.

The historical dynamics of Sense and Reason change Man's worldview, supplying more and more options for adapting to the world and means of adjusting it to human needs. Historically determined transformations of Self-Consciousness alter a person's attitude to the world; it is this evolution that ensures not only that better provision is made for a new lifestyle, but also for a new position in the world. The existential revolution, that is the key phase in the transition to a new type of subject of intellectual freedom, is also the heritage of the Enlightenment. And it is a not merely quantitative but also a qualitative step change in the content of the dynamic system of meanings. At the same time, it is an alteration in the personality, but of what kind?

The meaning of life can be verified only in a person's own hard-gained narrative interpretation thereof. Moreover, a morally independent person may be formed exclusively by the person's becoming aware of his responsibility for his narrative about the meaning of life, and his participation in it. Such a determination and implementation of a person's human mission may take various forms.

The above-mentioned qualities are best reflected in the individual experience of artists, poets, writers and thinkers. For Foucault, the most effective example was the life and poems of Charles Baudelaire, whom he considered to be one of the most acute thinkers of the 19th century. As a true artist, he was always driven by the *captivating madness of never satiated* work to transform the world, whereas the latter itself was sinking into sleep. With all this, the desire for transformation did not destroy the existing world, but grasped its essence as it was. However, modernity for Baudelaire was not merely a form of attitude to the present. It was also the relationship that he established with himself, for to be modern meant to follow willingly the *categorical imperative* of asceticism, without accepting yourself "as you are in the flow of transcendent moments" but "considering yourself as an object for long hard work". In case of Baudelaire, the entire theory of *dandy elegance* was deployed. This imposed on its followers a discipline more severe than that of religious fanatics. It would turn their frail bodies, their deeds, feelings and passions into works of art. According to the theory, the modern individual is the one who is trying to create himself, invent himself, but it is not the one who tries to dig up his own *secrets*, the *concealed* truth of the inner Self, who demands a reward for his own uniqueness and seeks signs of creative work solely in theory. The example of Baudelaire will certainly bring to mind a whole range of artists of all times; however, as far as dandyism in concerned, Oscar Wilde deserves an initial mention.

There are also earlier examples of the sort. As is well known, in ancient Greek culture there appeared a new kind of time, *scholē*, spare time, when Man was free from customary mundane duties and acquired a special *topos* of existence. During a person's spare time, he can think abstractly and freely, make mistakes and indulge in illusions, while assuming that a person could be engrossed in thinking in any place at any time and address everyone and all (an addressee in general), remaining absolutely unselfish and unpunished. Such space can only exist provided there is a special system of human relations without fear and care for a person's own gain, when the birth of a thought brings overwhelming joy from the very process of reflection, thought for its own sake, the thought that seeks for what is Good and Fair. By exerting a mental effort and overcoming resistance to the thought, Man *rises* and *soars* above the earth, as if on a creative mission [355].

Philosophy in this case is not an exclusive esoteric area, but worldly wisdom: a wise Man does not only think in a particular way, but also applies his conclusions to real life. His practical philosophy is in fact a project for self-actualization and for fostering the ability to exercise intellectual freedom. The sources of ancient Greek *idealism* do not interpret the word in its profane, everyday meaning of dreaminess, naivety, quixoticism, building castles in the air, inactivity and meditation, but as the will for self-improvement, as the establishment of a person's moral right to life in this world and to accomplish his human mission in history. This is the thrust of the ancient requirement *cognosco te ipsum* that has the status of a moral imperative. That is the subject of Plato's dialogue *Alcibiades 1*, where the identification of life principles is knitted into a sermon.

The evolution of meanings of such Greek terms as *ριστεύς* (best), *παιδεία* and *καλοκαγαθία* showed that Man should strive to harmonize his emotions with reason and that he could improve his natural abilities and behavior. For example, the word *παιδεία* initially meant bringing up children and their education (*pais* meaning *child* in Greek). However, the word later stood for Man's harmonious development, the unity of physical and spiritual components that would help realize his abilities and opportunities. According to Aristotle, *παιδεία* distinguishes an aristocrat from other people.

Hence the modern meaning of the word *aristocrats of the spirit, intellectual elite* as the best, privileged layer of society or community, that produces and upholds fundamental values. It sets a strategy to create culture and ensures the work of the cultural *mechanism*, which raises a subhuman to the status of *humanitas*. The concept appeared in medieval culture [See 245]; combined with the *παιδεία* of the Hellenistic period, it covered a wide range of meanings that included human nature, the human race, mankind, human dignity, kindness, benevolence, sympathy for all human beings, politeness, intelligence, spiritual culture, sophisticated taste, refined behavior, charming manners, eloquence, and urbanity.

However, before the intellectual repository of European culture was imbued with all the above-mentioned meanings, philosophy — together with the related social and historical background — had traveled a difficult path, while *fertilizing* historical and cultural memory with a fantastic mosaic of biographies of philosophers, writers, poets and artists.

Beginning with Socrates, it was life choices and existential preferences [6: 18] that determined the specifics of the discourse of most ancient philosophers. In philosophy, life and its image were independent yet closely connected values [See 5]. Philosophy mainly appeared to be an experience of *constructing or designing* one's own life. Ancient philosophy presupposed an obligatory *laboratory* experiment which was one's own life, and the search for appropriate literary forms to speculate about it. No matter how interesting, complicated and consistent the logical constructs were, they had to be sustained with personal experience and efforts.

If there are no people in culture to constantly keep the bar high and not merely declare ideals, then the masses, together with the would-be elite, will inevitably live in the *self-digesting* mode. In this case, all talks about *self-discipline* may turn into fancy, but empty, rhetoric.

However, as for the *categorical imperatives* of a thinker, their indispensable component would be the same as that of a poet, writer or artist, i.e., the unity of their doctrine and their own life, in the entire flow of existence. One of the vivid examples of this is Hannah Arendt's work. Her Cassandra-like intuition grew more acute as her own existential experience of living in the 20th century merged with that of intellectual cognition, i.e. the recovery of mental vision. Real and intellectual lives become an inseparable whole, therefore it can be said that the life of the consciousness is life proper.

The fundamental problem studied by Hannah Arendt is traditional in German humanism; it may have been first formulated by Goethe as retaining the ideals of humanity. In her remarkable book *People in Dark Times*, Hannah Arendt is trying to understand how in a time of social catastrophes and the horrifying crimes of the 20th century, with all their symptoms, including chaos, famine, mass murder, executioners, injustice, despair, impotent indignation, righteous hatred and fury, Man managed to keep in himself the glow of genuine humanity, that has nothing to do with sophisticated rhetoric or *idle talk* (Heidegger).

Any biography is always an autobiography, with the authors themselves telling of their own lives. The hero of her essay *Waldemar Gurian, 1903–1954*, a journalist, a writer and a student of M. Scheller, a philosopher, and of K. Schmitt, a professor of constitutional and international law, appears to be a personification of permanent values or in terms of classical ethics, of moral virtues. The basis of their hierarchy is faithfulness to memories of Gurian's childhood, i.e. to all he knew and to everything he once loved. Spiritualized by faithfulness, his memory was no longer a mere mental ability or a lifeless tool of his erudition; it became an *enchanted place*: anyone who got there would remain there forever.

Gurian's "loyalty made him follow the writings of every author who had ever aroused his interest... even though he might never have met him". The loyalty also *materialized* as a practical obligation to help his friends when they were in need, and even their children, without any conditions or reservations. "The virtue of faithfulness became so much the dominant note to which his life was tuned that one is tempted to say that the crime most alien to him was the crime of oblivion, perhaps one of the principal crimes in human relationships".

In the classical system of virtues, courage was considered a *political virtue* "par excellence". In the full sense of this polysemous word, it is courage that made Gurian enter politics. His choice might seem strange to anyone not connected with politics, for Gurian's deepest and most passionate interest was ideas and "conflicts within the human heart". However, Hannah Arendt perfectly understood this, because politics for her was not "the battle of bodies, but the battle of minds and ideas, and the only sphere where the latter could assume an image and shape to be able to fight, and while fighting, manifest themselves as the true reality of human destiny and as secret powers of the human heart". Interpreted in this way, politics turns out to be "a kind of materialized philosophy or to be more precise, a sphere where the flesh of the material conditions of human life is devoured by the passion of ideas".

The phenomenon of kindness gets special attention in Arendt's book. As can be seen from the text, kindness as a specific attitude to the world, as well as to Another Man's world, reveals itself in the ability to do good things for their own sake, which endows a person with genuine greatness. Possessing this ability is a criterion of humanity, though as a rule, it makes the person vulnerable. Hannah Arendt familiarizes the reader with the nature of morality, with the search for the meaning of existence and for a special kind of intellectual experience as a way of life. While understanding that the most subtle analysis fails to convey what can only be experienced as a quality of a person's being, life, perception and Self because the mysterious power of kindness that governs people cannot be put into words, the author turns to art and literature, and first of all, to the works of Dostoevsky.

Like a brilliant optician who has invented a complex system of *mirrors* that reflect and reveal what does not lend itself to a cold logical analysis, Dostoevsky "shows in a most indisputable way" Prince Myshkin's *kindness* (when he first met with the Epanchins, he accidentally broke a precious vase). Hannah Arendt believes that the scene *discloses* Myshkin's nature and proves that he "is kind and cannot be otherwise", his kindness being superfluous for this world; he is too kind for it. It should be noted that moral qualities in general and kindheartedness in particular are difficult to capture and put into words. Maybe it is kindness that is most often simulated, as a fascinating and beguiling fake, like a portrait of Jesus Christ with a fiendish face (the Devil). Real kindness never wants to be recognized, disguising itself as contrived rudeness or occasional awkwardness, like Dostoevsky's character.

Having studied a variety of personality traits, Hannah Arendt predictably concludes that the mystery of what is "human, too human", will never be unraveled. It confirms Karl Jaspers' famous statement *there is always more to us than we can know about ourselves*. According to Hannah Arendt, "True greatness, even in works of art, where the struggle of the greatness of genius and the even greater greatness of Man, is most acute, appears only when we sense behind the tangible and

comprehensible product a being that remains greater and more mysterious because the work points to a person behind it, whose essence can be neither exhausted nor fully revealed by whatever he may have the power to do" [15: 24].

The above view is naturally in full accord with the basic mindset for awe and genuine deep respect for Another Man, Another Culture or Another World. In the socio-political aspect thereof, all the horror that persisted since the last century not only presents us with a succession of variations in cruelty: imperialism (more than conquest), totalitarianism (more than dictatorship), anti-Semitism (more than hostility against Jews), but turns out to be a human catastrophe. Man has unwittingly lost himself and created a "totality of callousness" and the "realm of black malice that does not know humanity" (Jaspers).

Then the urgent task of philosophy will be to demonstrate the *imperialist* nature of the elements that make up the mosaic of the modern crisis; even more so since Hannah Arendt has already completed part of this important job by formulating the "basic axioms" [16] of the ideology behind the creation of modern culture, that may help us to build a system of coordinates for critical analysis. Some of these are set out below.

First, the value of Man has become the price set by the buyer According to the law of supply and demand. Second, Man's major passion is the will for power. It is the latter that regulates his relationship with society and drives his craving for wealth, respect and knowledge. Third, human equality is the equality of *potential murderers* because everybody has enough physical strength to kill another Man. Fourth, there is no longer the issue of injustice because the state "gets a monopoly on murder" and there remains only "absolute obedience, the blind conformism of bourgeois society". Fifth, power has become the purpose rather than the means; therefore, a society based solely on power will try to expand it by all possible means [338].

Likewise captivated by power is the intellectual, who becomes a *cultural* being (Valery Savchuk). As a result, the intellectual turns out to have the bourgeois consciousness of the early 19th century that had been *infected* by social Darwinism and had taken over from the old nobility all the ambitions of the *leisure class* (Thorstein Veblen), with its ethos of conspicuous consumption and adaptation to power. The intellectual thus moves to the sphere of material interest (interest — *interesse*) and voluntarily leaves the *clan* of the intellectual elite, while betraying his original mission to exist not to play with thoughts and expose the *muscles* of his mind and talent, but to find ideas that would help other people to live (José Ortega-y-Gasset). Culture has lost its role of an unbiased *judge* capable of rising above his own feelings as a participant and observer of events. Then the time comes when "anyone can lay claim to anything", according to Gilles Deleuze.

What is the mechanism behind the transformation of an intellectual claiming to possess a non-trivial mind and care for nothing else except free thinking, into one who begs for his share of power and unites with it, as Deleuze puts it? In his Marxist interpretation, an answer that includes the words *vested interest* would only partially clarify things. The fact is that the interest happens to lie where Man's wish has sent it; however, it is a wish that is determined in a *more profound and dispersed way* than that directly connected with interest. The key word here would be *investment* [436: 68], a term not only used in relation to economics, but also to the language of the subconscious. There are investments of wish addressed at the world of power. The latter creates in the body of society a parallel space of understanding that seems ideal, a space where one can remain unpunished, where one can get a wide range of impressions and emotions and quench one's thirst for adrenaline and for self-expression. When trying to satisfy these wishes, the intellectual becomes infected with a passion for power and everything political and makes his occupation subordinate to this. Thus, from a keeper of wisdom and non-material values, he turns into an advocate of pragmatism. As early as 1927, Julien Benda referred to the transformation as "the betrayal of the intellectuals" [507: 11].

What is the crisis or catastrophe to them? Both in its direct and transferred meaning, it is an indicator of the *cancer* of culture, with the proliferation of the body's own malignant cells suppressing the viability of healthy ones and tuning the body to death. It was so-called conspicuous consumption that acted like *cancerous cells* in the development of the modern financial crisis. By the early 21st century, the *virulence of the cancer* had reached epidemic proportions, conspicuous consumption becoming a kind of universal addiction that characterized the health of individuals and society. The conspicuous consumption model is constituted of a logic of symbolic analysis that shifts the center of gravity from the utilitarian value of an item to its prestige, high-status value. The main symptoms of

the disease include a craving for adrenaline and the illusion of power, freedom and control over one's own life. It is obvious that the self-destructiveness of conspicuous consumption leads to resentment, greed, and aggression. However, the causes of the disease remain unknown and in order to develop a diagnostic method, we should continually revisit the problem of the Enlightenment.

1.2. The “Self-Conceited Madness” of Rationality

According to Erich Fromm, the Enlightenment is just one stage in a large-scale process of individualization. According to Maximilian Weber, its origins can be traced in the The Reformation, which gave rise to *the capitalist spirit* and caused the range of negative consequences of the latter in the long term. These affected the *desperate* state of 20th century Man, who is swayed by civilization's institutions, a product of his own making. The Frankfurt School of Critical Social Theory shared similar views, although those mentioned here are only a few constituents of the process of individualization and the role of the Enlightenment in this.

Extracts from the works of Adorno and Fromm allow us to conclude that, *phylogenetically*, history as a process of individualization is that of Man's capability for thinking and being conscious of himself as a unique being. In this context, we should start with the classical culture of Greece and Rome, where the indubitable *first step* was taken — the awareness of the fact that the nature and the results of human purposeful activity are far from being the same. The phenomenon of consciousness was only indirectly recognized, and remained counterbalanced with the *original* feeling of the human *being derived* from the general world order. According to Adorno, a “natural secular religion” uncompromisingly treated the empirically understood order of objective reality, which was interpreted as a result of the spontaneous activity of meta-individual instances of the supreme world being regarded by the subject as undoubtedly real.

Fromm thought similarly of the Man of Antiquity: “he is aware of his being involved in a terrible conflict — although he is a captive of nature, he is free in his thinking, he is a part of nature and its whim, and he is not here and not there, in a way. This knowledge made Man an alien in the world, isolated from the rest, alone and full of fear” [431: 84]. The endeavor to overcome this fear suggested avoiding the responsibility through creating “systems of orientation and devotion” [430: 428], which appeared to be comprehensive quasi-objective systems of coordinates, and which helped to define the position of Man and his vector of activity.

In the Middle Ages, the contradiction was not only sustained but aggravated. Pierre Abelard was one of the first to articulate the idea that not only God but Man also is a person. It is impossible now to imagine that the thought was once heretical. However, before Abelard it was only natural to believe that although Man is the lord of creation, he is on a level with other phenomena in the universe. It was faith in the Apocalypse and the Last Judgment that led Abelard to the formula because this extraordinary event allows no advocates; one can only be personally responsible for one's deeds. However, in return, Man experienced freedom of choice between vice and virtue, which was also a great step forward in the process of individualization. Nonetheless, increased individualization was correlated with the class society, the church and, last but not least, with the human inclination to yield to the unconscious impulse of trust in God's world order.

When the *dark* ages of crusades, knights and their impregnable castles gave way to the Italian Renaissance, the scope of the divine world order shrank drastically. In this liberated space, Man, sensing himself a person, conceived the idea of relying upon himself in his life and actions. The process of individualization led to the dawn of intellectual freedom and, simultaneously, to a fairly painful problem. Although everybody still believed in divine creation, it remained unclear what should be done with it as far as ethics was concerned. In other words, there emerged a vacuum around the meaning of life, along with mistrust in God. There were attempts to fill the vacuum with Machiavellianism (his famous “the end justifies the means”) or with the Puritan demand, even more rigorous than that of the medieval times, to trust in God (which Protestants interpreted as “the Divine predetermination”). Neither brought the expected results to those striving to find a middle path between the two extremes. Whatever their middle place was, they needed a means to suppress the doubts that were arising.

Those who stayed in the center — between the cynicism of the pragmatists and the fanaticism of the reformers — lacked confidence as to whether the divine idea of the world was true. They faced

the insoluble issue of the search for the meaning of existence. Giovanni Boccaccio's characters are a brilliant example of the behavior of those who turned into free people but still were unable to become responsible for their new intellectual state.

At the end of Renaissance, Roger Bacon and René Descartes left a record of what happened to people in their times. Descartes substituted God with the subject's thinking. With Bacon's motto "Knowledge is power" as the backdrop, it implied that the Man of the Middle Ages moved God so far aside that the world was going to be considered as a tool designed to make people's existence as comfortable as possible.

The pragmatic perspective led to even greater moral confusion. Shakespeare expressed this uncertainty in Hamlet's words: "What a piece of work is a Man! How noble in reason! how infinite in faculty! in form, in moving, how express and admirable! In action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals! And yet, to me, what is this quintessence of dust?"

Moving further along the road to individualization, Man was tormented by the question "*What for?*", which remained unanswered. The way to solve Hamlet's doubt was supposedly found by Blaise Pascal. It was obvious to him that neither Machiavelli's cynicism nor the rigor of the reformers clarified the intellectual purposes of existence. Pascal understood that the majority prefer to *bury their heads in the sand*, to get away rather than cope with an uncomfortable question. The antidepressant that Pascal suggested was simple, and relatively easily achieved: "A person's only blessing is to distract himself from thoughts of his fate; it may be a pursuit that channels thoughts in another direction or some passion occupying the thoughts; gambling, hunting or some interesting event, anything that is called entertainment" [326: 140]. The idea was unlikely to be grasped in full in the 17th century and only become comprehensible much later.

The inability to justify death and suffering, the complete ignorance of the purposes of existence led to the search for an alternative — pursuits that help people to avoid thinking. It is in this context that Pascal's words were *reiterated* by Fromm. The feeling of alienation from the meaning of existence needs either to be overcome it or blotted out. The latter is much easier, of course, and one readily plunges into an everyday routine which is crowned with all kinds of happy distractions. It is no wonder that the entertainment industry thrived in the 20th century.

The Enlightenment, one of the brightest forms of culture of the new era, located between the *boldness* of the Renaissance and the irrationalism of the 20th century, reflected the individualization process in a most instructive manner. It was then that the demand for an individual's social emancipation was formulated, a natural consequence of the increased pretensions of a person who has parted from the child's recollections of the Middle Ages [450; 451]. However, the expectation that *universal Reason* would illuminate the way to liberty, fraternity and brotherhood was still a fading hope.

Dialectic of Enlightenment by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno interpreted the Enlightenment as the total opposition to myth, and aimed to deprive myth of its power. But *demythologization*, which turned into a rational demand to subordinate one's outer nature for the sake of self-preservation, resulted in the suppression of a person's inner nature. Despite the positivist ardor [228; 229], the nullification of the religious metaphysical world image discredited the ability to freely justify the meaning of individual existence. The hope for the transfiguring power of Reason led to unpredictable contradictions that could be resolved neither by the *categorical imperative* nor by the advance of the concepts of social justice.

The problem of tolerance is the most illustrious example of an Enlightenment idea that turned to its opposite when it was put into practice. In the works of Samuel Pufendorf, Giambattista Vico, Johann Gottfried Herder and Immanuel Kant, the notion of culture is inseparable from that of human freedom, both in nature and society. An appeal to Reason, and confidence in the limitless possibilities of science and experimental knowledge went hand in hand with an understanding of the necessity to shape an autonomous moral individual. Indirectly, the question is of the ultimate individualization — of the creature that has parted from its infancy, is thinking and acting independently, is responsible and knows what to hope for.

The Enlightenment, which claimed Reason was the universal basis of people's interconnection, the foundation of humanity, proposed that the ideal of the human should be based on the reasonable, i.e. on the demand for tolerance. The tolerance imperative appeared a *sine qua*

argument in debates of equality and faith tolerance and raised the question, which would later run through the whole history of European tolerance like a red thread, the so called *Jewish question*. “It also emerged in the Enlightenment; it was put forth by the Enlightenment, that is, by the non-Jewish world. The wordings of the question and answers to it predetermined Jews’ behavior, and predetermined their assimilation” [16: 139].

The works of two key figures — Lessing and Herder — essentially help us to comprehend the German Enlightenment. The former’s ideas anticipated *the credo* of existentialist philosophy, which put truth (knowledge) on one side and the existence of a particular individual on the other. To quote Kierkegaard, Man is not what he knows but what he is; to quote Jaspers, Man is always more than he knows. Lessing understood that it is impossible for tolerance to develop “solely from the universal significance of reason as a bare formal quality”. “The respect for everything that bears a human appearance” is quite a complicated task, which requires us to overcome our natural rejection of the Other’s beliefs, behavioral norms, manners and habits. The Enlightenment is devoted to its own creed: all are brought onto the same level by the universal human opportunity to become reasonable. Horkheimer and Adorno will later note that where the emotional sphere is *living* independently, it is often able to bring reason to the state of eclipse, which then begets monsters. Not thinking of this literally, Lessing questions the priority of truth, which is not essential. What defines the *worth* of Man — he himself and his pains to attain the truth — is of real significance.

This viewpoint became the sound basis of a possible and legitimate assimilation expressed, for instance, in the access that Jews had to German Christian culture. Lessing frankly presumed that *the Jewish question* would be resolved automatically in the course of natural social evolution, for one of the fundamental requirements of human progress is equality, which means improving the status of Jews. Thus by default, Lessing considers the status of Jews in the world to be one of the criteria of progress.

This standpoint precipitated a dual reaction from intellectuals, many of whom were Jews. Moses Mendelssohn, a friend of Lessing’s, who actively participated in the polemic on “*What is the Enlightenment?*” was a zealous opponent of assimilation. His solution to the Jewish question presupposed that Jews should acquire a dual identity in order to become Germans of the Jewish religion. Kant regarded Mendelssohn as a herald of a great religious reform, which would unite each religion with the maximum degree of emancipation of consciousness.

While Lessing advocated the thesis of everyone being equal, believing that the view of Jews as the oppressed stratum needed to be *reformulated* in order for them to enjoy full rights in German culture, Herder on the other hand emphasized the uniqueness of each nation in general and of Jews as the most ancient European race in particular. In contrast with the ideal of equality, he accentuated the phenomenon of the *otherness* of the Jewish Diaspora but insisted on its radical assimilation, which should be implemented through governmental regulation of the emancipation issue. The task was far removed from unlimited attempts to change a socially unfavorable situation. Germany should *embrace* the other nation and not merely tolerate the alien religion in the way that numerous whims and prejudices have to be tolerated.

These conceptions seemed feasible through the creation of a specific educational system. Its hypothetical outlines were inspired not by *ideal* autonomous thinking that would be based on models; nor was the search for mystical messages of Holy Writ its purpose — blind faith cannot govern learning. On the contrary, the reality as such, without any *aims* or *ulterior motives*, is tolerance *sine qua non*. It is guaranteed by the past, as any human being and any era have their unique fate which nobody can condemn. The inexorable force of history itself becomes a judge as it performs a certain educational function that consists of understanding as such. Tolerance as “the advantage of rare, heavenly privileged souls” does not open up human nature as such but shows the difference. It achieves this through all disguises and changes; it comprehends its being unique, its being transient. “Tolerance corresponds with the comprehending distance maintained by an educated person” [16: 158].

The *blindness* of the Enlightenment prevented it from predicting a relatively near future. Heine’s words “where they burn books they will burn people” appeared prophetic. He uttered them with reference to the antipathy of the higher classes to and the hatred of lower ones for Jews in the 1840s. Hegel’s phrase the “self-conceited madness” of rationality is also apposite; in its overconfidence, rationalism believed that all social projects could be somewhat magically realized

with only small losses. History, and likewise nature, uttered its *last word*, turning Germany — the non-Jewish motherland of *the Jewish question* — into the Hell of the Holocaust.

Gustave Le Bon's idea of the need for many generations to change before people will part with their deeply-rooted clichés of thought and behavior was repeatedly confirmed. It was formulated, however, as late as the 20th century when numerous special studies on the social psychology of stereotypes, hostility and prejudices appeared in abundance. In particular, the suppression of stereotypical thinking was shown to be effective only in the short term; clichés may later return to increasingly affect thought and behavior [311: 123].

The key results of these studies indirectly conceded that there is “a stable potentially fascist mental structure” deeply rooted in human nature [302: 346]. When concrete historical events coincide with a certain set of personal features, the structure in question can be re-activated so the personality of *ultimate individualization* may tend to become authoritative.

It is worth remembering that the concept of an authoritative personality developed by the Frankfurt School proved the dependence of ethno-hostility (anti-Semitism, in particular) on a complex of personal features. In other words, a xenophobic attitude should be sought first and foremost in its bearer's personality [7: 9]. An authoritative person is characterized by conformism, rigidity of thought, intolerance, an inclination towards stereotypes, the absence of critical reflection, sexual suppression, fear and aversion of the *non-identical*, a lack of imagination, and the inability to have an autonomous critically cognitive experience. All the above-mentioned is the phenomenological aspect of the problem, that is, the way it is manifested in reality.

The attempt to describe an authoritative personality ontologically requires other parameters, which are expressed by three essential constituents. These are conventionalism (orientation around generally accepted rules), authoritative servility (a masochistic component), and authoritative aggression (a sadistic component). In reality these characteristics are mixed; the proportion of each of them in a concrete individual may vary. However, in all the variants, the authoritative type is regularly distinguished by poor integration of moral laws into the personality structure.

The interactive dynamics between the ego (the whole range of self-control and self-expression functions), the super-ego (the conscience) and deeper layers of the character structure are ruined. The poor integration of moral laws or the lack of integration thereof results in the ego *dying*, “turns the ego into an alien body” as the fundamental self-control function is eroded. The weakness of the ego, which is characteristic of the authoritative personality, is displayed in anti-intracception, that is, intolerance and repugnance for the subjective sensual and emotional world based on imagination, reflection, and wishes. The culture of self-analysis is substituted with the cult of *the current emperor* (the *true* leader of any origin). All this easily turns a person into an object to manipulate, and the object of worship is endowed with the features of a *superhuman*. It was no wonder that in history itself, a similar range of bans was imposed on cultural creativity of the *know oneself* type: from the oppression of genetics and cybernetics to the oppression of whole areas of ethics, with esthetics, psychology, psychoanalysis, sociology etc. topping the list of fields that were outlawed.

The dynamics of the authoritative personality includes two more phenomena: the *cult of force* and the *cult of power*. In their *ultimate* form, they are displayed “through over-accentuation of the power motifs in human relations, in the proneness to consider them in categories such as weak — strong, dominating — yielding” [7: 61], the “great teacher — disciples/ followers” etc. When submitting to power, an individual believes he is participating in it, for *intimacy* with power, *the leader's friendship* not only creates an illusion of being involved in events of great significance but also produces a feeling of belonging to an elite, to the leading team, and consequently, to a sense of supremacy and scorn for others. The main side-effect is the spread of hostility [179; 180], based on a seemingly *ontological* scorn for people, which eliminates the necessity “to feel responsible for the aggression” and be ashamed of it.

Adorno's viewpoint is essentially close to the theories that Fromm formulated. He emphasizes two aspects in the authoritative personality: sadism and masochism. Sadism, the longing for limitless power over others, and masochism, the wish to dissolve in the overwhelming mightiness, help the individual who is incapable of an independent existence to overcome his loneliness.

Psychoanalytically, authoritative aggression may be interpreted, according to Lacan, as a “firm nucleus resisting symbolization, not subject to dialectics, always stubbornly returning to its place” [182: 163] and as being delight par excellence. It is obvious that this sort of non-differentiated

aggression is readily manipulated, the aggressive energy being channeled against those out of favor or ethnic minorities. Thus, the characteristics of the consciousness of the authoritative personality are reduction, destruction and cynicism, depriving the individual of the condition of *culture*.

The positive aspect of individualization, with the Enlightenment as its crux, is the formation of the modern type of personality; however, it is clouded by the autonomous development of the contradiction sensed as early as Antiquity. A 20th century person could rationalize it by using an utterly uncompromising formula. On the one hand, Man is an animal who lacks instincts, as compared to other creatures, and so has to produce a means of subsistence to satisfy his material needs. On the other hand, Man possesses an intellect that considerably surpasses that of other animals. The possession of an reason implies enjoying sense, self-consciousness and imagination, all of them turning Man into an anomaly, a sort of whim of the Universe. The comprehensive capacity to reflect upon his past and consider his future inevitable death, that is, Self-Consciousness in general, forces the individual to view himself as a unique creature who was originally separated from nature and who has eventually lost his identity with other people.

The loss of identity was a powerful negative factor that increased fear and the feeling of being unprotected. A person of the era of ultimate *individualization* was released from the sway of old authorities, but preferred to avoid independently defined existential meanings [366; 367]. The Enlightenment led in some ways to a paradox: inner individual freedom was gained only to be delegated to others. A person became subject to ideologically charged over-individual authorities willing to control and manipulate him. Thus the Enlightenment opened the door to totalitarianism.

It should be borne in mind, however, that the analysis of totalitarianism, or of the authoritative personality, or of aggression is not restricted to the *classical* patterns of these in the form of Hitlerism or Stalinism. Despite the huge outward differences between them, the totalitarianism of Marxist or Nazi ideology and that of bourgeois values are essentially comparable. Rampant consumerism generates the same medium as the rampant self-assurance of a tyrant *who knows the way to go*. Both affect weak spots in the personality structure, which when further exploited turn a Man into a means to achieve goals that have nothing in common with this Man's own personal value. The beneficiaries of consumerism and the sacred figures of totalitarianism have an eye to the main chance.

Totalitarianism is not the only tragic legacy of the Enlightenment. Heidegger points at another consequence of the extreme rationality of the subject in the interpretation of history as a process of individualization. He writes of the "self-certification" of the subject, the features of which gradually emerge through Modernity metaphysics. Descartes, Kant and Nietzsche are its seminal figures.

Descartes' "cogito ergo sum" was the starting point, shaping the metaphysics of the Modernity. The human ego being the *subject* of the latter certifies the new state of Man in general; the thesis proclaims the axiomatic ultimate truth that precedes any truth whatsoever. The initial point of any representation of the world is the indisputable statement, to wit: the ego is able to certify the fact of its existence because the ego thinks. Thus, the priority of the world represented by the subject is substituted with the thinking subject representing the world. Such a revolution is the primordial truth that allows the *I and God dialog* [445].

Heidegger notices that "in key points", Descartes uses '*percipere*' (to grasp, to catch, to make a thing a person's belonging) instead of '*cogitare*'. According to Heidegger, Descartes thus emphasizes that the subject in his metaphysics treats objective reality as something given or granted. Instead of the entirety of being where Man searches for his place, pre-established by something or somebody, reality is now viewed as a kind of *given*, that is, something which has been presented to thinking, to the subject, to Man.

Second, something is given, presented or granted to the subject only if this entity that has been granted has been safely secured as a sphere that the subject undoubtedly administers and commands. This means that, having discovered the primordial truth, Man himself claims to become the core of being as a whole; he is endowed with the right to decide what can be established as being altogether. Thus, being turns into a circle of calculation and control. What is now real within reality as a whole is what the subject has taken stock of, or testified as of being real in reality.

Third, '*cogitare*' is always a sort of considering, in the sense of double-considering, or doubt, which, as doubt, processed as indubitable *doubtless*; this may only be what is represented per se, that is, what is arbitrarily formed by the subject. Thus, only what has been formed from the subject himself can be meaningful.

In this case, *the arbitrary formation* needs a method through which it becomes true. “At the beginning of the new European philosophy, the traditional leading question of metaphysics ‘what is being?’ turned into the question of method, of the way whereby an absolutely safe and sound basis has been found by Man and for Man, whereby the essence of truth has been described. The question ‘what is being?’ turns into that of ‘*fundamentum absolutum inconcussum veritatis*’; that is, about the unconditional basis of truth. This in turn inaugurates the beginning of the new thinking, through which the era becomes new and the period to follow becomes the Modernity” [445: 118].

Doubt is the key feature of the new thinking; not an overall looming doubt, however, but one that is correlated with the indubitable and aimed at its validating, reproduction into the obvious for the subject and turning the representation into an ensuring ascertainment. Thinking which is essentially doubt does not consider to be ascertained and certified (i.e. true) anything that has not been certified by it as being essentially indubitable, which thinking as doubt seemed to “cope with”, which has been calculated [445].

Thinking can *cope with* or *complete calculations* if it is *correct* or logical. Heidegger quotes Descartes literally: “This cognition ‘I think; therefore I exist’ is (ranked) first and most true and brought to those who reflect metaphysically in an orderly (essentially true) way” [445: 126]. The early Modernity determined the core of any knowledge as the ascertained representation, in the trustworthiness of which the Self is represented to itself. Such credibility and ascertainment are achieved via mathematics — a cognition-grounding instrument. As Man is not a separate egoistic I but is identified with “the subject” he can freely discover Being in a representation-and-calculation way. Taking into account that the whole of non-living nature, the whole of the reliably calculated part that is not the subject is “*res extensa*”, *the extended thing*, and the new European machinery becomes metaphysically possible. There is a revolution in the representation of the subject, which makes him not merely an authority that validates the trustworthiness of the facts presented to him and represented by him. The subject validates himself in the act of representation; thus, there is a drastic turn to the representation of the subject as the measure for the being of all that is represented as such. It means that, at the beginning of the Modernity, Man changes his worldview decisively. The Christian *trust in salvation*, which was only conceived through obedience to the truth of Revelation that was, in its turn, expressed by means of ecclesiastic authorities, is substituted with the trustworthiness certified by the subject himself.

In other words, the measure of any truth is now not *the trust in salvation* but that through which the subject is validated in himself as in the creature that exists relying in this way on himself. What stems from this fact is a *new freedom*: Man is released from the belief in the Revelation; Man receives the freedom not to follow a predetermined law but to set the law by himself; not to obey the obligation set by authorities but to establish the obligation by himself. According to Heidegger, Descartes justifies the basis for self-legislation, and the human consciousness appears as Self-Consciousness.

Man consequently becomes the focus of being, capable of an offensive approach to world supremacy. The means is a mathematically ascertained trustworthiness; the requirement for transformation of reality by machines is the next step. In this way, metaphysics makes possible the grandiose Modernity project, namely, total machine calculation of any plans and actions.

According to Heidegger, Kant’s philosophy is the next stage of self-ascertainment, i.e., his grounding of the statement that being in Man’s eyes receives an irrefutable inherent existential attribute — to be solely the condition of the possibility of existence. Heidegger shows that, from Plato’s times, being was interpreted ambivalently: as the condition of the existence of being, that is, as something which makes being fit to be in existence, and as something which “makes being to be a visible presence”, which reveals an openness for human cognition; existence as *φνσις* — as self-emergence, self-expanding, and consequently, an essential self-exposition; and existence as *ἰδεα* — as coming to presence in non-concealment. Existence as an idea receives an *a priori* character in the sense that it is something conditional, previous, approaching us beforehand. In other words, *a priori* is not an existential characteristic but it itself as preceding the existence of being. This order is determined as the distinguishing of Being and existence. In the aspect of this distinguishing, if to look from Being, the latter is earlier for Being as, being an “idea”, it is conditioning [445: 161].

In this sense, Heidegger’s statement whereby “being receives an irrefutable inherent existential attribute — to be solely the condition of the possibility of existence” means that, in the

Modernity of European metaphysics, Being as the presence of things which Man allows himself to see becomes the only possible kind of Being. Kant defines “a priori” as the category of Reason; at the same time, Being as an idea acquires the character of an illusion. This also means that “now the essence of an ‘idea’ results in not the visibility and presence but the thing that is re-presented for the one representing it and via him” [445: 162]. Idea becomes not a kind of Being but the name for *representations* which we have in our consciousness as subjects. In this case *a priori* appears not the fore-going, not what is introduced in the distinction between what was before and what happens after in cognition but the condition of the possibility of representation which is at the same time the condition of possibility of the thing that is represented, i.e. an object. Thus “the condition of the existence of Being” and “the condition of the possibility of Being” turns to be of principal, explicit, and categorical distinction.

Within Modernity metaphysics, this distinction-transition is established by the statement of Kant’s transcendental idealism which holds that “the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time those of the possibility of the objects of experience”. Heidegger emphasizes that “the conditions of possibility” are defined as “ideas” by Plato and named as categories of Reason by Kant. Consequently, the Greek “a priori” and the New European version thereof — which dates from Kant’s times — are principally distinguished as well as the interpretation of Being is.

Man, seeking individualization, ultimately reduces Being from a general property of all things that are existent to the immediate existence of an existent thing. The distinction of Being and existence remains, if it does, only as the method of constructing *abstraction* while reproducing and reasoning out any things and relations of things. Being becomes the represented: “The re-presented is the presented in such a way that the representing may be sure in what is pre-established and kept by him in such a way. The assurance is found in trust. This latter determines the essence of truth. The ground of truth is re-presentation, i.e. ‘thinking’ in the sense of ego cogito, i.e. cogito me cogitare. Truth as the re-presented of an object, objectivity, has its base in subjectivity, in the re-presentation presenting itself; this is because the representation itself is the essence of Being” [445: 163].

According to Heidegger, Kant’s fundamentally new position expresses an unprecedented moment in New European history: Man addresses himself as such an existent that appears a specific *representing* authority, which represents the world as something presented to this authority in order to certify the stability of everything. At the same time, Being as the condition of the existence of an existent thing becomes not merely something which has to be considered in the way that conditions in general have to be taken into consideration; being is now a condition which the subject commands and must command. Lastly, the conditions, which are commanded and should be taken into consideration, inevitably become values. Kant does not think of Being as a value, yet he paves the road for Nietzsche to do so.

If, in Descartes’ metaphysics, consciousness turns into the subject and the latter in his judging the world trusts only himself, i.e. with Self-Consciousness *depicting the world image*, Kant’s world image *depicted by Self-Consciousness* becomes the world itself; in other words, it appears the principal decision about the world. Man, understanding the world as such a picture, prepared himself to develop and demonstrate new qualities: being competent, well-equipped and purposeful, the latter implying an aim that was independently and subjectively set, putting aside his faith in dictated and somewhat irrational goals. In setting himself a goal, Man must consider the conditions which make its achievement possible, that is, evaluate them; consequently, value is *another name* for the condition of possibilities.

Heidegger calls attempting, yet completely *de-thinking* everything between Plato and Nietzsche, the attempt to equate Plato’s ideas and medieval God with values. This is because it is only at the beginning of the Modernity that Descartes justifies the possible right of the subject to rationally value something, Kant develops the rules of evaluation to be fulfilled, and Nietzsche will be the one to determine what is subjected to evaluation. He will call existence the maximal, ultimate total of being, which is the condition to exercise the will for power; the total of being does not have any value; it is only parts, not the total that can be evaluated. “The total value of the world cannot be evaluated, to wit: it is beyond any evaluation because this would only make the whole and absolute dependent on parts and conditions which only due to the whole are what they are. Becoming is the will to power that is unconditional” [445: 101].

Nietzsche states that being in general as the condition of existence is not merely the only one that is unconditional. The totality of being is also ultimate being, all that is really being. To put it more clearly, there exists nothing but reality before Man. The two resulting consequences are of utmost importance to understand the consciousness structure of Enlightenment Man. First, reality is posited as becoming where the will to power is objectivized. This philosophy of life views the real not merely as the primary one, but as the only one within becoming of which there exists the will to manifestations of power, the only ones that can be values. Second, any *values* beyond becoming, beyond the totality of the whole, i.e. values as something in itself, are disclaimed.

Essentially, this is how the wording *God is dead* goes: the transcendent is the illusion of the naïve. Interpreting Nietzsche, Heidegger states: the matter is not that “all the past values fall victim to de-valuation but that the need for former values is uprooted in their former place, to wit, in the pretersensual <...> ‘The reappraisal of former values’ is first and foremost the change in the former positing of values and ‘growing’ needs for new values” [445: 65]. For the first time in the history of culture, Nietzsche views in this aspect the theme of disappointment in all the world’s transcendent as the becoming reality. Only in the beginning Man would seek the meaning of everything happening *in a priori pre-determinants* and find it, considering the *accomplishment* itself to be the realization of some *supreme moral canon*. According to Nietzsche, this human being is *hyperbolically* naïve: he does not even suspect that it is not the *supreme ethical canon* dictating the aim from itself that acts as *the higher value*; what does this is the false morality of the naïve human. The main condition of naivety is the unconditional acceptance by default of the existing world canon, which is supreme in itself, i.e. absolute.

Self-validating presupposes distrust, nihilism being its initial form. “There is nihilism and nihilism”, Heidegger says. Nihilism is not only the process of devaluation of higher values; nor is it a mere process of extracting these values. Projecting these values into the world is nihilism. Projecting the former values into the world occurs as soon as one surpasses the sense of everything being devalued. Acknowledging this psychological state, one recognizes that pretersensual values have been invented by Man “solely from psychological needs and <...> he has absolutely no right to it, so the last form of nihilism comes into being: it includes disbelief in any metaphysical world and forbids itself any belief in a *true* world. Having reached this standpoint, one grants the reality of becoming as the only reality, forbids oneself every kind of clandestine assess to afterworlds and false divinities...” [314: 40].

Some of Heidegger’s statements seem to be controversial. Proclaiming that thinking in the categories of value becomes the fact of Self-Consciousness in Nietzsche’s philosophy only, he repeatedly formulates statements like “all former values fall victims to devaluation”; “the need for the former values is uprooted”; “new value needs growth” etc. Heidegger calls the unconscious dedication to *former* — pretersensual — values absolute self-indulgence and passionate immersion in traditional cognitive material. Being absorbed in this self-devotion, Man does not fully belong to himself; he always sees himself “in the field of metaphysical tension; transcendence keeps him from (entering into) a pure human relationship with total activity” [445: 415]. Although this was said about the Middle Ages, similar conclusions can be made concerning the cosmological values of Antiquity and other traditional pre-Modern Age cultures, when Man saw himself through the prism of the Absolute. In other words, values existed *before Nietzsche* as well. What does it mean? The only interpretation is: what was not called a set of values but unconsciously considered as such is rationalized by the European Self-Consciousness as values with their immediate forced devaluation.

The doubts that emerged were only natural. Metaphysics, as an obsolescent *Weltanschauung*, lost its legitimacy. In a traditionally interpreted world, Man viewed himself as a specific creature equated with the rest, the predetermined state in the world being the *common denominator*. Universal forces originated from without, from beyond all available reality, from the transcendent. In Antiquity these forces had allowed Man to observe their manifestation in the existence of Being, in the non-concealed; during the Middle Ages they led to a belief in the truth of God’s thoughts, which was *summed up* by ecclesiastical authorities. Even in the Modernity, the pre-determinants of Being were considered from a metaphysical angle, in spite of the splintering process. These were either the idolized Reason of the Enlightenment, or progress in science, or art, promising salvation through beauty. However, it is thinking in the categories of values that leads to the undoing of the Christian God and *splinters faith* into Reason.

The former *supreme values* allowed thinkers to posit the world — *φνσίζ* — not as something that is continuously changing, flowing, becoming and seeming, as it were, but as a unity, originating from the a priori source of the being of the existent. The origin of the world — *ἰδεα* — directed everything changeable to the transcendent aim, to the implementation of the global meaning of everything becoming, transient, and itinerant. This was the only way for Man to become aware of his unconscious value as such. The aim for such a person is obvious and gives him an opportunity to see more than is manifested by the process of development. The supreme values being dethroned, the world turned into the “process of the totality”, into continuous becoming and endless changeability, which cannot be a value. The categories “purpose” and “meaning” were the result of this.

Heidegger quotes Nietzsche: “Value is the highest quantum of power that a man is able to incorporate — a man: not mankind! Mankind is even a means sooner than an end. It is a question of the type: mankind is merely the experimental material, the tremendous surplus of failures: a field of ruins” [314: 101]. All the meanings attributed to human existence “are hewed out of human needs”; they are ultimately subjective and thus have no relation to truth. What Nietzsche said about the *new man* — nihilism is found in his contemporaries’ writings directly or indirectly: in the works of Simmel, Bergson, Dilthey, Spengler, to mention but a few. This philosophy of life formed the principles of the world outlook of a person who refutes the transcendent idea and believes that one should live in order to live; that is, to be born in the flux of becoming, to survive and pass away, without answering the question “what for?”. This irrational doctrine of life, devoid of meaning, puts forth its own interpretation; the immediate relation to living is unfolded through intuition or flair.

If we remove numerous but inessential extraneous features developed in the philosophy of life, four key stances of crisis consciousness become apparent at the time of its most evident manifestation. First, self-validating in the act of representation is perceived as an exhaustive attitude, the rest being inessential in relation thereto. Second, in the act of representation, the total of being is perceived as nothing but the sphere of calculation and control, granted to the subject. Third, the subject himself defines the meaning of calculation and control, the implementation of which ensues from the fundamental state of self-validation by the very fact of representation. Fourth, there is a rule confining its meaning: it cannot exist beyond the sphere of calculation and control.

These stances can be considered as the signs of a really deep crisis of consciousness as they reflect some intrinsic contradictions arising inside the consciousness; they point both to the incomplete transformation of personality meaning dynamics and to a significant distortion of the inter-subjective perception of meaningful context. The truth of human judgment of the meaning of the universe is substituted with the search of some categorial-notional apparatus which would not contradict objective world phenomena. Thus, the ability to distinguish the statement of the meaning of life with that of the meaning of something else, the ability inherent in a human being — this ability appeared to have been lost.

The Enlightenment, whose aim was a sensible comprehension and *just* transformation of the world, eventually admitted the insuperable dependence of human rationality on its animal origin, and of morality on well-being. The reaction which followed was threefold. The above-mentioned first variant led to the totalitarian type of personality and to the artificial construction of meta-individual systems of worship.

The second variant was constructed through the rejection of the search for meaning altogether, for there is no meaning in what is immanent to the biological nature of the *new Man*, whose tragic state seemed overwhelming. If *God died* any mythological representations of the transcendent become untenable for the meaning of existence to be sought. The freedom from *supreme values* seems to clear the pathway to the superhuman. However, the metaphysical intention to become the lord of the place where Man dwells as part of the will for material power was far from optimistic. There is no human value in such *domination* for the total of existence is of no value. Therefore, humanity as the total of individuals does not have any meaning while moving towards the superhuman and this existence is devoid of purpose, having only particular tasks in the process of existence as such.

Since biologically determined survival was of primary and even exceptional importance, it appeared futile to attempt to define the overall meaning of existence. In Man’s eyes, the Earth was dramatically transformed into his temporary dwelling place and intuition — the only *reliable* instrument of cognition — was turned into “the assurance of the animal instinct” which related to the

meaning as to nothing but “the blind enclosing of an animal creature within the area which it uses”. Thus, both the human and the animal instinct were virtually identified: people were viewed as biological material for the will to power, which is almost the same as individuals in Darwin’s evolutionary theory. However, the meaning of survival is reduced to ashes because all people are mortal. In this case, even the thesis “A man is mortal but the mankind is not” is untenable, for it is false.

No wonder that soon there appeared the idea that “the aims of existence have been shaken” which was uttered repeatedly; the aim vanishes with the devaluation of supreme values, and so does the answer to the question “for what”; the world becomes both devalued and meaningless. In actual fact, Man — a future *superhuman*, indeed! — appeared to be nothing but a miserable creature who conceived the idea of the free search for the meaning of being and found no clear answer. Heidegger recapitulates: “Thus a kind of intermediate state appears: 1. The becoming world, i.e. life with its changeable shapes passing here and now cannot be negated as real. 2. This only real world per se is now devoid of its aim and value and in this state is untenable. It is not merely the feeling of the valuelessness of Being but that of despair within all that is real; the basis of satiation and the possibility to surpass it are but vague” [445: 82].

Then even nihilism disguises the meaningless. Having rejected the opportunity to penetrate the mystery of being, Man appeared to be a laboring animal left to be intoxicated by its achievements. These, although not always, are a comfort; why not use them? Those who dared to and were disappointed in the attempt to become *super humans* raced towards the diametric opposite of nihilism. *Carpe diem* became their slogan. The search for oblivion came into being as the best counterbalance to shrinking nihilism.

Even here it has to be admitted, however: *homo unthinking* faced bankruptcy. No instrument can help facilitate the lot of a man who has become mortally immanent to the world. The only exception is some drug that cuts short the thoughts of an existence devoid of any transcendent meaning or aim. This lot is even worse than a biological existence proper; the gloomiest warnings of Dostoevsky about a horrifying conscience without God cannot be compared to it. There is no conscience, no metaphysics, only bare meaningless human physics, reliably forecasting reality in order to use it.

The third variant of the reflections on the crisis seems more optimistic although it occurs under the same conditions. *Bare* physics receives a new metaphysical shell. Heidegger suggests that the completion of the essence of metaphysics may in its accomplishment be quite imperfect and may not exclude the former fundamental metaphysical positions in order to exist. There is likely to be an approximating revision of various metaphysical positions, or their particular theses and notions. This revision is far from being random, however. It is directed by anthropologic thinking which continues new European metaphysics making it primitive at that. Anthropology as metaphysics is the transition into its last form, world-outlook [445]. In a word, this is still not the end of metaphysics.

One of the fundamental principles of the *last form* of metaphysics was also the idea of the *liberation* from myth — which was interpreted very specifically, though. This develops the field of the never existed, which emerged after the *big metaphysical narratives* that appeared before and during the self-realization of the Enlightenment had been nullified.

Due to its origin in a scientific rationality, this *novel outlook* is utterly rational. Its principle, however, is absolutely free as related to former experience. In the *novel outlook* nothing is taken a priori as true because nobody but the subject is competent enough to have his say on the truth. For instance, Kant’s transcendental idealism, one of the closest to the metaphysical notions inherent in the *novel outlook*, is *easily* surmounted with a seemingly exhaustive statement of materialism: the criterion of truth is practice. In time this stance, turns into a more categorical directive, to wit: the really true is what has proved its being true via practice to the subject of cognition.

The statement of the nature that limits the subject’s freedom and all the pessimistic conclusions that follow are of no interest for the *novel outlook* as it is, like science, indifferent to the problem of existential meanings and purposes. However, having the need to prove the truth via practice, the *novel outlook* is forced to define the criteria of the human correctness of the proof. The truths of the circle of calculation and control contain no signs of what they are for except their own purposes. The solution of epistemological problems could result in the greater effectiveness of knowledge but could not clarify human perspectives as such. In the conditions of the uncertainty of

meaning, the most burning issue was to discover its new variant of the legitimacy criterion, which in the eye of the subject would possess undoubted certainty.

The evaluation of the effectiveness of *physics* became the criterion in question. In other words, not *physics* proper but the effect it may have in relation to human well-being, substitutes the futile hope of the Enlightenment for the transforming role of Reason. As a consequence, the means of existence are conferred with a sacred meaningful content, and the paradoxical *new metaphysics* emerges.

The *new metaphysics* considered its main task to be the solution of the issue which the Enlightenment was never able to cope with: the formation of existential meanings that apply pragmatic hedonistic categories. The thesis that “the subject is the measure for being of everything represented as such” turns into its fundamental state; according to this view, Man is also the only authority which possesses enough competence (or legitimacy) to pronounce dicta on aims and meaning, evaluating the effectiveness of knowledge that has been scientifically and technically formed.

This newly-acquired right had no principles to be commanded properly from the very beginning. The original method — doubt — was useless for it had completed its task. The *new metaphysics* appeared just where the abandoned categories of “being”, “unity”, and “purpose” were substituted by nihilism which, in turn, was supplanted by the attempt to realize “the intention to self-validate”. Accordingly, the objective reality is viewed not only as the total of existence or the conditions to be taken into account. It is believed to be the condition which the subject can and must command according to independently proclaimed purposes.

The great goal of the Enlightenment to practically use the achievements of science in the name of social advance degenerated into the principle “what effectively provides maximal security of the subject is true”. It is Reason that won, not Mind. Metaphysics, which had earlier posited being as the idea, managed to state that Man freely and independently creates the idea of being. This statement, metaphysical in its essence, was supported by the belief that the meaning of Man is established within the circle of calculation and control i.e. in the immanent, and not in the transcendent. Both illusions granted the subject with a paradoxical legitimacy to free dicta, considering not only aims and meaning but the justice of *physics* as well. The latter appeared to be established in the everyday effectiveness of care.

This statement of *new metaphysics* considerably overlaps the bases of pragmatism. But it is in this way that the latter becomes more a structural basis of a new world-relation than a philosophical notion. The statement in question emerges when a triple transition is effected in the human consciousness. First, the question “what is being?” finds a distorted answer in the method used to totally view, calculate and control everything that one needs to take into account. Second, the universal problem of truth is no more Pilate’s question “*What is truth?*”; it is formulated According to the new European value system: “*What is truth for?*”. Third, the transcendent criterion of the answer about meaning is replaced by the immanent principle “the meaning of truth is in well-being”. Wilhelm Windelband noticed in this connection that, while acquiring the meaning of life in the pretersensual is the implementation of moral law, i.e. virtue, well-being is the major principle for the sensual [101]. Thus the metaphysics of “the will for wealth” emerged.

Its grounds are much less illusory than any mythological transcendent justifications. Although the ultimate truth is constantly lost in the unfolding perspective of science and technology, these advances are still quite convincing. The belief in the future might of discoveries triggers “the will for wealth”, and the latter, in turn, confirms the assuredness in the way chosen. This vicious circle underpins the legitimacy of the *new metaphysics*, cutting short a simple consideration: if so, its objectives happen to be means of survival.

The *new metaphysics* endows the conditions with meanings really formed by Man from himself. Whatever these may be, they are the meanings of means of existence that are indifferent to the problem of the moral aim [350; 351]. So the critique of the new metaphysics first sounded when it had hardly started to establish its grounds. A pragmatic’s *religion*, Rickert notes, is not piety which is referred to as faith if it has its object but “sensing into” the life process, into each beat of its pulse, which is the way life occurs [353]. This new viewpoint on the meaning and purposes of life, interpreted now as the most successful living, requires the complete revision of cultural experience in general [352]. As a consequence, science and technology eventually gain their own peculiar

metaphysics that interprets them as “almighty”. However *the will for wealth* conceals the problem of existence sense, leaving it unresolved.

One may call this outcome, which led to the anthropological catastrophe, the self-conceited madness of rationality. The anthropological catastrophe is an event that happened to Man and was reflected in culture. It implies a possible irreversible break away from some vital essentials of human nature, “in connection with the destruction or mere absence of civilized bases of life”. It should be noted that the catastrophe is on its way due to the violation of ontological laws which shape human consciousness and the related “extension” referred to as civilization.

In the 20th century, both culture and civilization became noticeably endangered as they happened to be quite feeble constructs. It is not a question of diagnosing *the disease* of Man and human culture. Since the beginning of the active polemics on the so-called *culture crisis*, this has been repeatedly described as a well-observed and clearly fixed reality, rather than as an epistemological tragedy conceived by theologians and philosophers [328]. Nowadays the *disease* is going to achieve its peak, with numerous variants of the suicide ideology.

One may interpret the situation in terms of geological processes happening deep in the earth’s crust when subterranean tremors signal an earthquake to come or a volcano to erupt. One may also suppose the *culture crisis* to be a natural social disease, a good in a way, reflecting the state of the organism in general. And the organism as a complicated self-assembling system is bound to find a treatment...

Whatever the metaphors, a question naturally arises: what is causing the *culture disease*? Why is the culture tissue, as Baudrillard once put it, subjected to the formation of “cancer tumors” the spreading of which threatens death to mankind? Why do *situations of uncertainty*, or, as they are commonly referred to, absurdities, occur in the world altogether?

One of the variants within modern philosophy suggests thinking in terms of the so-called “three K principle” (This is rather a phonetic coincidence in English. — *Translator’s note*), which in a way helps to characterize these processes [270].

The first *K* (the Cartesian *cogito*) is not only the point of absolute credibility and the immediate manifestation of *I am* but the establishment of “the dependence of everything happening in the world (including changing knowledge) on Man’s own actions”. Man then appears to be a creature capable of saying “I think, I exist, I can”, who is the possibility and the condition of the world. In other words, a traditional abstract-gnosiological interpretation of the *cogito* focuses on the ethical aspect: the *I think* principle becomes the image and the form not only of free thinking but also that of moral, and consequently, intellectual capacity.

The second *K* (Kant) emphasizes the necessary conditions for Man, a finite mortal creature, to be able to “consciously accomplish empirical acts of knowledge, moral activity, and evaluation and to take satisfaction while searching. Otherwise nothing would have any sense –infinity is both in front of and behind us”. An understanding of how the world and human life are organized is one of these conditions. Essentially, Man enters the world where particular hypothetical preternatural dimensions (objects) have already existed; these are the indecomposable images of the wholeness, plans and development projects. These comprise some primordial synthetic fact so they serve as ‘thing metaphors’ of visibility of the wholeness, its style, or tone of existence; they seem a specific stable matter of the inner form of consciousness (‘inner knowledge’) and help living creatures to orient themselves within the system. In other words, it means that some conditions are realized in the world which are additional to the content in the field of the rational apperception of the I and which make the above acts generally meaningful, and the meaning is always discreet and local. Consequently, for a finite creature, everything depends on the sole condition: whether the primary synthesis, the really accomplished synthetic fact was or was not. The accomplishment of all specified by the above mentioned principles fulfills the program for the maturation of *homo sapiens*. If Cartesian and Kantian principles happen to be broken, regressed or degenerated, there emerges a quasi-human, man-mimicking creature. There are no adequate words to describe this creature’s *personal* qualities. *Weird, odd, indescribable* — a man, creating the world of continuous *zombie-situations* which draw and swallow him up into the *sleepy bore* of endless nonsense. This is the third *K* (Kafka).

The three *K* principle puts the problem of a human being into a certain regime; it implies that “something is to be continuously turned into a situation, which is subjected to a meaningful evaluation and solution in existential terms of ethics and dignity, into a satiation of freedom or its renunciation as

one of its own possibilities". Thus, morality is not the triumph of a certain moral precept but the ability to reproduce situations, whose uniqueness and plenitude can be described with moral notions. The *cogito* appears here as the beginning of the new European ontology that implicitly includes a metaphysical grounding of personality and morals rather than the basis of the rationalistic method.

In spite of all these factors, a modern person inconsiderately interferes with the balance of the initial dynamic harmony of the system of meanings. Man having focused on its pragmatic constituent, the neglecting of the existential sphere can be termed as the catastrophe of the Enlightenment, the triumph of Sense over Reason. Civilization becomes the super-meaning which culture no longer feeds.

This paramount aspect is being ignored by the major powers in the world, which seem to profit in full from this heritage of the 20th century. It is common knowledge that ideas from the Enlightenment inspired *de jure* the basis of the American Declaration of Independence. Few are aware, however, that a state formed on this basis has *de facto* the will for wealth metaphysics as its state ideology. The history of this question is far from being unambiguous; still it is worth examining.

1.3. The Irrational Branch of the Enlightenment

After the French Revolution of the 18th century, when the hopes of the Enlightenment for the transformative power of the mind seemed to fade, all major metaphysical systems based on the rationalist worldview were revised in depth. The mind was losing credibility when trying to substantiate this worldview by its utmost achievements, mathematics or logic. Descartes' deduction, Spinoza's geometrical method and Leibniz' mathematical logic were increasingly called into question, due to increasing obvious logical contradictions and problems with their applicability to data from the natural sciences. The same would happen later with Hegel's metaphysics. Concurrently, the scientific worldview began to transform things. Rationalism shows more significantly itself in the scientific outlook, while becoming a basic component of a scientific ideology. One century later, Edmund Husserl would describe this as a *failure of rationalism* manifested in its *externalization*, its materialization in technology and its interest in *naturalism* and *objectivism* [146 — 149].

Not everyone agreed that the meaning of life could be derived from *academic* reasoning. In Europe, Jean-Jacques Rousseau marked the birth of a romantic opposition to the pragmatic rationalism of civilization. The thoughts of Novalis [316], Chateaubriand [460], Niebuhr [312] and Hölderlin [117] gained an unprecedented influence.

Protests against the pragmatic rules of the new time brought about irrationalism, the paradoxical opposite to the rationalist basis of a worldview that was increasingly reduced to scientism. Irrationalism is similar to the romantic opposition of the 19th century, in the sense that it explains reality while considering it meaningless. Not fully understood by their contemporaries, the two scholars Arthur Schopenhauer and Søren Kierkegaard not only foresaw the future crisis but also specified its symptoms.

In the well-known pessimism of Schopenhauer, one can clearly see the negation of once universal faith not only in the mind but also in its product, i.e., science, which is bound to bring evil. Moreover, Schopenhauer expressed another important leitmotif of the time. It is neither Arche, nor the Cosmos, nor God, nor Reason nor bourgeois morality with its care for everyday needs, for that matter, but world will, "a blind impulse, beyond any direct cognition" [474: 32] that is pushing the world—through a series of purposeless, senseless events.

However, the well-known pessimism of Schopenhauer's view of the world is dual in nature. More than once has the part of Schopenhauer's ethics that individualizes a person's connection with the worldly spirit attracted attention. Although brought to the world by the will to live that is blind, pointless and purposeless, Man is capable of unselfish sympathy that is no sacrifice at all. It is sympathy with other senseless people, sympathy for its own sake, with no reward expected from the forgiving divine force. It is in sympathy that is not interested in subsequent salvation, that the will to live is *converted* into a negation of life. It grants forgiveness of personal guilt for everyone's meaningless existence, without improving the world or driving it gradually to an utmost ethical goal. Such sympathy is both a person's moral mission and freedom or as it is sometimes suggested, "the essence of the world concealed from direct cognition" [459: 11]. Therefore, the ethical world order

will reveal itself only when the individual's will to live is *converted* into the self-negation of life via sympathy.

According to Schopenhauer, on the one hand the aspect of reality that is cognizable via external experience (science) helps to reveal neither the primary cause, nor the ultimate purpose. It was only in previous times that the latter could be determined and it was done only through a *non-academic* concept of some external causative force *responsible* for all causal chains and the final goal [473; 475]. On the other hand, one can still find some meaning in the world that is *left* without a primary cause and therefore without a purpose, that one can obtain only through the experience of purely individual intuition aimed at the negation of a person's own will to live. However, personal experience of the kind has no objective criteria for its *verification*; that is why Man is left with a categorical uncertainty of hope for irrational sense. Kierkegaard describes it in a similar way, as a state of *courageous despair*.

The purpose of life found in sympathy that arises from intuitively felt universal meaninglessness will inevitably lead to a discrepancy between a person's own life and that of other people. The purpose of life cannot be logically identified or extrapolated to established life practices, nor does it comprise a single moral criterion. This "meaning of sympathy" arises from a person's feeling of alienation, loneliness, hopelessness, anguish and senselessness of the future. Schopenhauer's philosophy had become a quintessence of the newly-emerging crisis consciousness that originally was dual in nature; the feeling of senselessness here is combined with the subconscious hope for a purpose [473]. This duality exhibits a unique major symptom of crisis consciousness, which is the overall uncertainty about the meaning of life.

Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy also reflects a certain duality; his thoughts about the "death of God" and the *revision of values* even more clearly demonstrate the quintessence of crisis consciousness, by adding the feeling of vagueness of meaning to that of absolute purposelessness [313]. In some cases, one of the key issues of his works, specifically nihilism, is presented as a demand for freedom from any kind of meaning. According to Valery Podoroga [332], Nietzsche is a suffering human being who lives between the boundaries of life, in the exterritorial cultural space, i.e. before and after the boundary between the old culture and the new one that may come to replace it in the future. In this context, *exterritorial* means not only borderline, but also *pure* space. In the latter, nihilism is a psychological state where the feeling of the senselessness of everything that used to be valued, is constantly replaced with a vague presentiment, an uncertain hope for new values.

The Nietzschean demand for the revision of values was formulated particularly in conditions of uncertainty and therefore remains not fully understood. It can be perceived intuitively, but not rationally explained. In a psychologically hypostasized condition of the uncertainty of purpose, classical philosophy became for Nietzsche a tool to create a non-classical philosophical illusion, not correlated with reality. It was a belief in a superhuman that arose from the demand for a new worldview: nothing was pre-established, nothing predetermined.

However, reality is bound to lead to the amendment of any speculation, regardless of its metaphysical interpretation. As expected, nihilism entered a new phase, shattering the illusion with the destructive turn "back from *God is truth* to a fantastic presumption *everything is false*" [314: 35]. This thought of Nietzsche's marked the actual negation of all senses, or absolute pessimism, if not for himself, then for many of his contemporaries. "The sense of truth highly developed by Christianity begins to feel an aversion to the falsehood and lies of all Christian interpretations of the world and history" [314: 35]; the words are fairly attributable to the illusion about a superhuman.

The superhuman faced a most difficult task: how to deal with his freedom from God [314]. However, the only thing he did was to identify himself as a being without any purpose that pointed to the future. Therefore, this non-realized freedom without God did not bring Man to the assertion of the will for power, but to the thought *I can do all I want to do*. In this sense, Nietzsche did identify one of the most painful nerves of the crisis, which may have been the reason for his popularity. Therefore it was no accident that Bertrand Russell noted that "If Nietzsche is a mere symptom of disease, the disease must be very widespread in the modern world" [342: 702].

Surprisingly, Nietzsche's tragedy had been anticipated by Dostoevsky's character Ivan Karamazov. In his final countdown, he continued Nietzsche's thought: if someone, rejecting God, believes himself to be God, then he will occupy *the first place* where there is no law. "Where I stand will immediately be the first place... and everything is permitted, and that's it!" This freedom led to a

terrible outrage and the fear of unjustifiable death. According to Vikenty Veresaev, “The idea is quite right. One can’t help knowing that one will die, if not tomorrow, than in forty years or so. How strange and stupid — to care for happiness, to bother about fleeting life, to strive and fight, to wish for and look forward to something. What for? There can be only two reasonable ways out: to kill yourself or to feast at a time of plague, while indulging in momentary pleasures, to blur the thought about the future and reveling in:

The horror of the deadly emptiness
That I find in my house,
And freshness of the mad feasts,
And the blessed poison from the chalice” [96: 11].

Paradoxically, Dostoevsky saw pessimism, unimaginable even for Schopenhauer, in Nietzsche’s words, “The wretched ephemeral race, children of chance and tribulation, why do you force me to tell you the very thing which it would be most profitable for you not to hear? The very best thing is utterly beyond your reach: not to have been born, not to be, to be nothing. However, the second best thing for you is: to die soon” [315: 29]. Evgeny Trubetskoy for some reason, considered the statement banal [404], and Lev Shestov referred to it as the voice in the wilderness [476]. Schopenhauer’s irrationalism, further metamorphosing into a Nietzschean sweeping rejection of the past, shows the way along which European culture came to realize that all hopes for any kind of world Reason, that could help obtain the meaning of life, had vanished.

The Russian school of thought proved sensitive to the concept of the superhuman. For example, Vladimir Solov’ev wrote that in his time people were responsive to three major ideas, including economic materialism, abstract moralism and the demonism of the superhuman. These theories are respectively represented by Karl Marx, Leo Tolstoy and Friedrich Nietzsche. Out of the three thinkers, Solov’ev considers the latter as the most interesting, his comments being undoubtedly positive, “Today, thanks to Nietzsche, progressive people position themselves so that one can and should speak seriously with them, and speak about superhuman deeds” [381: 411]. However, not everybody seemed to hear this.

Strangely enough, the Enlightenment initiated the transformation of the rational *code* of European culture, which had led to uncertainty as to the purpose of existence and made people look for it in alternative ways. As the rational form of divine or metaphysical ideals was becoming dated with regard to the interpretation of meaning, new ideals began to appear.

In the 19th century, irrationalism’s doubts about the issue were answered by the Anglo-American philosophy: what is useful is true [329]. This grew out of English empiricism and utilitarianism. According to F. C. S. Schiller, who adapted the sophistic legacy for Victorian England, every individual is a measure of his own truth [564; 565]. What followed is well known: the rejection of determinism, with the subsequent establishment of indeterminism, meaning the individual is free to choose definitions with regard to the worldview. Interestingly, a Russian contemporary of Schiller’s, YUshkevich [481] who sympathized with pragmatism, admitted that in this case the latter concerns not only our theories about reality but reality itself, which is understood as a concrete world of observation. William James is sure that there are cases when a fact may not take place unless there is a firm belief that it will. And if the latter can help the fact to occur, it would be *strange and illogical* to suggest that a belief preceding a scientific fact is incapable of helping Man to construct reality [165]. John Dewes said almost the same [173; 174]. Therefore, pragmatism continues to bridge the gap between creating the truth and creating the reality that disappears for this reason, as something independent from Man.

According to Bertrand Russell, pragmatism presents an attempt to build a superstructure of belief on the foundation of skepticism. However, this leads to a utopian worldview or as he puts it, to *cosmic irreverence*. He wrote, “The concept of ‘truth’ as something dependent upon facts largely outside human control, has been one of the ways in which philosophy hitherto has inculcated the necessary element of humility. When this checkpoint upon pride is removed, a further step is taken on the road towards a certain kind of madness — the intoxication of power” [341: 749].

The illusions of Nietzsche and pragmatics were very much alike. The irrationalist escape from reality and the pragmatic utopia of meaning were synthesized by the philosophy of life. It may well be said that they are all about the same thing, in terms of the epoch crisis. Henri Bergson declared intuition to be the only tool of cognition, the role of Reason being completely irrelevant [48; 49; 50].

Predictably, this called into question any reasonable purpose of reality. As soon as the mind is incapable of finding the meaning of life, Man should not count on it — it would be a waste of time and effort. Therefore, he should trust in the formation of life, *action for the sake of action*, with instinct playing the leading part. Having admitted that the human mind cannot set human goals, Man had to look for some other driving force. And if there was nothing of non-human, divine origin at hand, one could only turn to the evasive inner force of *animal life*.

Attempts to replace the mind with trust in the power of evolution of life shows a fear that is always part of crisis consciousness. The absolute pessimism of Man without purpose is really horrifying. It would be much easier not to think about it at all — let life itself do everything for people. Here spontaneity is illogically opposed to overcome and cope with the uncertainty of purpose in another way. This increases the uncertainty even more, at least because the aims of animal life are absolutely different from those of the human mind. Wilhelm Dilthey follows a similar logic [167; 168].

Despite all the differences in detail, the theories of Georg Simmel and Henri Bergson are rather similar in their core principles. According to Simmel, the craving for new forms destroyed the old ones. The *central ideas* were the first to fall down, from Antiquity's concept of substantially uniform existence and the medieval divinity to the Renaissance ideal of nature, and the metaphysical purpose of the ethical Ego of the Enlightenment. There were no new mind-related theories to replace the lost ones: no new integral concepts of culture can be formulated because the phenomena to be covered have become too diverse and variegated to make their ideological merger likely. However, for *supreme goals*, all utilitarian forms are considered inappropriate despite their being derived from Reason. Thus, there is bound to be a protest against all established forms in general and its consequences can hardly be predicted. This is a symptom of a crisis-related uncertainty that cannot be overcome by thinking that life has no other meaning than itself. Simmel admits that the Absolute World may exist somewhere above life, but it "will remain a mystery forever" [185: 397], which sounds even less clear.

Without changing the basis of the philosophy of life, Theodor Lessing adds a gloomy note of criticism: Christianity and utilitarianism have brought about capitalism, which destroys natural forms of human organization [249]. Additionally, "the defeat of life" is caused by knowledge. The greater the scope of abilities existing in Man's soul, the more difficult the process of their combination becomes. Those speculating all the time will gradually lose the ability to make decisions and act: they no longer have a single idea that makes them strong and decisive. The reverse side of differentiation is the loss of trust in *the great sea of life*.

The issue persists even nowadays. As has already been vividly and accurately stated, "All human history is a permanent crisis, to a certain extent. It is based on the fact that development that is understood as integral movement forward is *de-velopment*, differentiation, the loss of primary indivisibility and meaning of life. It is only integral life that has meaning; no combination of separate parts will yield it... Once life has lost the most important part of it, i.e., the sense of its integrity it begins to destroy itself" [336: 172]. In more general terms, the philosophy of life has formulated the thought about the loss of the core principle uniting separate parts of culture. This loss was felt by many. *The Decline of the West* by Oswald Spengler contains numerous facts proving that the soul of European culture is moving towards death; this has become one of the most vivid interpretations of the downfall.

The acute awareness of the disappearance of the unifying element in culture was accompanied by a disconcertedness that had resulted from scientific discoveries. The development of non-classical science, and first of all, quantum physics and the theory of relativity, led to an inexplicable view of nature. In the first decades of the 20th century, new scientific data sounded almost scary. Marie Curie spoke about people becoming restless and agitated [278], Niels Bohr mentioned a revolution in human consciousness [71], and Albert Einstein wrote about the moral responsibility of scientists [482]. It was also stated that power over knowledge about existence had moved from church leaders to scientists. Nietzsche's well-known words *as one learns more about causality, the boundaries of the kingdom of morality shrink* acquired new significance. The most astonishing idea was the negation of the concept of physical reality as something independent from the observer. The discovery of the uncertainty principle by Heisenberg added even more to the great confusion, particularly among those far removed from science [116].

In the early 20th century, the philosophy of life articulated the principles of a completely new worldview, *perception of the world*, as a reaction to situations of uncertainty of meaning. *Perception of the world* is about a specific attitude to the world that relies on senses or intuition. It is totally different to the worldview, or outlook, that appeals to the mind. However, academic thought that seemed to be trustworthy in issues of the rationalist worldview, faced its own difficulties when following metaphysics. And if perception of the world cultivated an intuition of the uncertainty of meaning, this worldview merely stated it.

The fact that, with the uncertainty of meaning, it would be easier not to think about it at all was observed as early as the 17th century. As explained above, Blaise Pascal noted, “A person’s only blessing is to distract from thoughts of his fate; it may be an activity that channels thoughts in another direction or some passion occupying the thoughts, gambling, hunting or some interesting event, everything that is called entertainment.” [326: 140]. This statement was not appreciated by most of his contemporaries. However, in the 19th century its meaning seemed to deepen. Thomas Carlyle revisited it and developed the then popular criticism of philistinism among the bourgeoisie, whose morality seemed too trivial as compared with the standards of the past [213; 214]. He pinned hopes on the future rebirth of the Knights’ Code of Chivalry that is known to have never materialized.

Kierkegaard’s opinion on the subject was even more popular in the 20th century [236; 237]. He described a significant component of crisis consciousness in emotional terms, “I have understood that the meaning of life can be reduced to a *nice cozy job*, with the aim of becoming a state or other councilor, the purpose of love is to marry for money, the blessing of friendship would be financial support, the truth is what is recognized by the majority, delight is to make a speech, bravery is concerned with the risk of paying a fine of ten pounds, kindheartedness means that you say *you are welcome*, piousness is annual fasting” [237: 20]. This primitivization of spirit that was spread during the crisis was much spoken about. Later Nikolai Berdyaev would not describe the civilization of the day only as an atheistic and pragmatic *world city*, seeking to conquer nature through technology [54; 55; 56; 57]. For him, civilization is what “rejects memory of the past, thoughts about the future and a responsibility before eternity; it values only the power of engineering thought, which provides comfort” [52; 58].

In his famous works *The Dehumanization of Art* and *Revolt of the Masses* Ortega-y-Gasset outlined the same factors that drive the individual away from the uncertainty of meaning [319]. A reluctance to admit that life is *an effort to become self* and the inability *to feel the very essence of life* lead to the fact that instead of searching for the meaning of life, the individual focuses on ways of making it most comfortable. However in his works, the issue makes a sharp turn-around. Ortega-y-Gasset states that striving for satiety and comfort is not merely a tendency of a certain period of time. Impersonality and the ambiguity of ethical and moral norms and more importantly, pragmatism as the basis for goal-setting have become a mass phenomenon. *The self-satisfied ignoramus* is also one of many whose irresponsible existence threatens civilization.

According to Ortega-y-Gasset, the future is for the creative minority. However, he also directly pointed at the uncertainty principle established also in art. “All characteristics of new art can be reduced to its non-transcendence” [319: 258]. It is in art that the radical transformation of the code of European culture was reflected. As has been noted more than once, when old ideals “disappeared, new ones seemed dangerous and destructive; behind the smoking ruins of the former artistic illusions, new peaks could hardly be seen. The only thing one could be sure about was the awareness of smolder, disillusionment and the end” [334: 31]. There appeared concerns that the creative potential could not be reproduced. All this came down to the death of the old rational method for obtaining the meaning of life and its visualization in art, which Ortega-y-Gasset referred to as the non-transcendence of the latter.

The visualization of a new state of the uncertainty of meaning occurred in modernism. The latter shows signs of maturation that did not result from a new level of scientific knowledge or technology or changes in living conditions, but from the necessity to cope with the world of diversified forms and phenomena without turning to all kinds of universal doctrines. Modernists noted the claim for independence as a sign of maturity that had formed during the crisis. However, to maintain that Man has succeeded would be to bend the truth. The demand for freedom articulated by modernism was a call for freedom from political tyranny, bourgeois morality and obsolete ethical

values that were no longer true. However, the modernistic declaration of freedom *from* did not specify freedom *for*. That is why the uncertainty of meaning persisted.

According to Ortega-y-Gasset, modernism had remained a phenomenon of an elite sphere of culture for a relatively long time. In a society dominated by mass man, mass culture turned out to be in demand, that is, culture based on the commercial production of kitsch. The self-sufficient and even suppressing nature of mass culture was considered to be an inability to reproduce the creative potential, augmented by the overall standardization of culture. If the concept of masterpieces in art has gradually leveled out, with mass-produced prints replacing genuine works of art, the boundaries between moral and immoral in the ethical sphere have been fading away. In mass culture, a print instead of a masterpiece would be comparable in ethics to perceiving a dirty trick as a prank, heroism as unnecessary bravado and a religious belief as a customary ritual. The standardization of culture manifested itself in the primitivization of both the moral and aesthetic principles of the average person.

In its turn, the inability of mass culture to satisfy the demand for something unique and exclusive, for a masterpiece, provoked strange actions to attract public attention, even at the expense of a de-esthetization and dehumanization of art, even by raising the hideous to the level of beauty. Having little taste for such experiments, the majority went on nurturing the idea of thinking about their everyday life. This included the mass demand for the commercial production of everything that fences one off from the issue of the uncertainty of meaning. The main result of the overall turn towards mundane needs was the absence of conditions to resolve the issue of the purpose of life, i.e. its principal aspect. To be more precise, it could have been solved, but only if based on categories of the steady growth of material wealth.

The motto of the philosophy of life that says *the only purpose of life is life itself* expressed a pragmatic and hedonistic mass worldview: one must get maximum use and pleasure from living. Here philosophical speculations on the situation of uncertainty of purpose reflected the existence of crisis consciousness [477], supposedly stabilized by cultivating the means of subsistence.

The tragedy of culture and its impact on Man's inner world is one of the most important issues in the works of Carl Jung [490 — 493]. In his *Problems of the Mind of Our Time*, the consciousness of modern people was compared with "the mind of a man who has experienced a great shock and therefore lost self-confidence" [491: 217]. Integrity of mind is not only about intellect as well as rational and empiric activity, for "the integrity of life is both natural and unnatural, both rational and irrational". Without the mystery of the divine, the world is unable to answer the question about Man and his mission.

The same view is expressed in most philosophical studies of the crisis, specifically by Albert Schweitzer, Alfred Weber, Martin Buber and many others. Each in his own way defined the dire symptoms of the stable social psychological state and the uncertainty of the present and unpredictability of the future. The social structure had radically changed; mankind had defined prospects for political freedoms. However, the latter had aroused the feeling of amorphousness intensified by *social memory* of the lost hierarchy with its certainty. An individual within the impersonal mass was experiencing loneliness and angst. Therefore, so as to stay in the whirl of life, one had to live in its rhythm. However, the fear about dropping out of the amorphous system did not suppress doubts about the future. Paul Tillich noted more than once that the feeling of anxiety had become the main symptom in those days [397]. All this led to a demand for strong political power. On the whole, the contradictions related to the uncertainty of purpose had intensified even more. Thus, it was much easier to provide for unclear mundane needs than think about the even more incomprehensible meaning of existence.

In the course of the crisis, a completely new type of personality was formed, which could be described as a nihilist trying to escape from nihilism, one who loved freedom but was not ready to exercise it, was confident about his superiority over people of any past epoch but was incapable of formulating the essence of this superiority. It was a non-believer craving faith; a man relying on technology but altogether morally disappointed in it. It was a person concerned about his own abandonment and loneliness in the godless space of civilization, who was trying to relieve his anguish using all available means. He was ready to be removed from any illusions and reveal them. He was trying to escape from thinking about the unpredictability of the future of mankind into mundane needs, into the never-ending concern for self-expression and comfort, while getting tired of the

rhythm of the race. He would look for and rarely find someone with the same inner feelings. It was a cosmopolitan who could choose from an endless variety of worldviews and end up with nothing in particular. In short, it was a man who, if asked about the meaning of life, would say that it was just to live it, with the pragmatic estimation of life embracing all the components, from his career to his family. Eventually, this type of personality seemed to be omnipresent.

It is worthwhile mentioning here that, in the pre-crisis period, K. Marx and F. Engels in *Bourgeoisie and Proletarians*, the first part of their *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, had already clearly proved that exploitation of the world market had led to cosmopolitan production and consumption on a worldwide basis. "In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible..." [282: 29].

There appeared a specific interpretation of cosmopolitanism, without literally seeing oneself a citizen of the world — in the newly formed worldview, the latter was perceived as one global whole, with all its components depending on one another. No feeling of a common fate emerged from this; however, the potential availability of the experience of any other culture, religion, ideology or philosophy provided an unprecedented opportunity for thinking in terms of synthesis. However, on the reverse side of such compilations, there still remained the unresolved issue of the meaning of life and the longing to escape from it.

The ramifications of the Enlightenment resulted in a radical transformation of European rationalism. Having become *externalized* in civilization, it assumed a worldview which stated that reality is something to be thoroughly studied and disclosed in its entirety. It turned out however, that *rationalism* with its mathematical approach failed to present the world as one global whole. In addition to this, when science began to be considered as a force that was indifferent to morality, the worldview in itself seemed to be an illegitimate subject in the sphere of existential meanings. However, the new outlook appeared to show another way more than effectively. It was concerned not with the world as a whole but with its elements rationally considered as conditions for existence, without asking *Why live?* The evaluation of the effectiveness of this worldview in the area of pragmatic and hedonistic tasks laid the basis for the interpretation of purpose as the cultivation of living conditions. According to Romano Guardini, "We endow trivial things with metaphysical significance" [114: 27]. However, in this way, the question *Why live?* seemed to be positively resolved through the metaphysics of the *will for wealth*.

In these circumstances, a new equivalent of purpose arose that was very widely criticized. The purpose of society, i.e. to increase the efficiency of the means of subsistence, was considered either as an immoral or a repressive mentality or as altogether risky. The *novel outlook* was blamed for leading to a pointless existence. With all this, the crisis of the uncertainty of purpose was thought to result from a degradation of human nature, rather than from a changed personality structure. This new attitude was thought to be inherently combined with the metaphysics of the *will for wealth*, the numerous postulates of which can and should be an object of criticism.

The works of Edmund Husserl seem to be the most conclusive among the first papers on the subject [146; 148]. As is well-known, it is the statement of the crisis in the scientific worldview that is the basis for his thinking. The fundamental point captured by E. Husserl is that rationalization has led to the dominance of a formal rationality that calculates and takes into account natural phenomena regardless of any other goals apart from calculation and accounting. He thinks that scientific knowledge considering the world as *vseedinstvo* (*all-unity*. — translator's note), will always present it *as is*. The causal kind of contemplation that stems from this attitude will look for something typical and universal, something like a law. Therefore, a method will have to be devised that could always help "to a certain extent in advance to construct the world with its endless causal relations out of the limited set of what is established, albeit relatively, via direct experience each time and that tries to validate the construct in spite of its endlessness" [148: 51].

Up to this point, it was a mere statement of the limitations of the scientific worldview. However, Husserl later *held it responsible* for its own failure. Husserl offers a much broader interpretation of the crisis as the detection of the complete inability of scientific knowledge to outline an imaginable prospect for mankind. He thought this to be the reason why Man had begun to follow a

new way of constructing meaning that involved abstracting from people as personalities, from all cultural properties acquired by objects in the practice of human life. This abstracting is combined with the mindset for mankind as dominant over itself and its surroundings. Thus, it relates to the ever-increasing power over its own fate and over greater *enjoyment*. As Husserl puts it, the postulate of modern times can be formulated as *God is an infinitely distant man*.

This leads to a conclusion that is metaphysically critical in its essence whereby Man has become a *bare fact* that is not for judgment about the meaning or senselessness related to human merits and mental activity. "Sciences that deal solely with facts form people who care about nothing else" [147: 20]. Neither the world nor Man in it can possess meaning if what we consider true is only what scientific knowledge teaches us, that all the forms of the spiritual world come and go with a kaleidoscopic speed, leaving nothing behind. According to Husserl, the crisis in the scientific worldview has brought people to a sad state when intellect will always lead to meaninglessness and benefaction will lead to torture.

Husserl's ideas were adopted by many scholars. Of particular interest are the ideas of Konrad Lorenz, an ethologist, famous for his studies of aggression, and a Nobel Prize winner, about the cultural crisis. His essay *Civilized Man's Eight Deadly Sins* was the result of many years of thinking [254]. The second of the eight sins is violence against nature. The scientist stresses that "devastation of our natural environment is not only the destruction of our surrounding, but also of Man's reverential awe for the beauty and greatness of a creation superior to him". The third sin is technology. An ever faster pace of its development is like "Man's race against himself", "blinding people to all real values and robbing them of time for a genuinely human activity of *reflection*." The fourth sin is the loss of the ability to experience joy. K. Lorenz calls it *thermal atrophy of feeling*, and as an ethologist he believes that the "beautiful divine spark of joy" is only "attainable through surmounting serious obstacles" rather than seeking pleasures. "The natural waves of joy and sorrow ebb away into an imperceptible oscillation of unutterable boredom". The eighth sin is nuclear weaponry. However, according to K. Lorenz, it constitutes a threat that is much easier to avert than the danger posed by seven other sins that lead to dehumanization.

Many have warned about the intimidating power of technology, while viewing the latter as a demonic force subduing its creators rather than an instrument to transform nature. Lewis Mumford suggested that Man could thus be *demoted* to the status of a passive and useless machine-controlled animal [275]. Ortega-y-Gasset had expressed concern that the availability of technical equipment may result in civilization eliminating its own mental resources, whereas the growing specialization would form a one-sided personality, incapable of a holistic worldview. A somewhat similar position was that of Fromm: with the disruption of holistic perception, critical thinking would be impossible. Now an individual "is like a child with a puzzle; the difference is however, that the child knows what a house is and therefore can recognize the parts of the house in the pieces he is playing with, whereas the adult does not the meaning of the 'whole', the pieces of which come into his hands. He is bewildered and afraid and just goes on gazing at his little meaningless pieces" [430: 309].

Karl Jaspers had stated that mechanization intruded not only in external but also in Man's inner world, making him relinquish his human essence. The fast-growing technological capabilities separate him from self-being, from his own roots, which makes him easily controllable by power structures. Like Ortega-y-Gasset, Jaspers writes about the newly emerging human mass where individual personality traits are indistinguishable. The novel worldview contemplates a natural meaningless existence and purposeless activity that cannot be detected by a nervous system that has been excited by all kinds of entertainment that fill up a person's free time. Jaspers endows the attitude with an important feature, i.e. doubt, which has seized "all populations of the globe". The process of technological development does not correlate with any assigned goal; that is why its significance becomes dubious and provokes a feeling of helplessness [502].

In his *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Max Horkheimer gives a similar assessment of the changes [455], which is shared by Adorno. According to him, the mind has turned into a technical tool with which to rule nature, and this leads to an "objectification of mind and Man". He regards technology and its product, i.e. *cultural industry*, as gigantic autotelic forces driving people to self-elimination.

Heidegger criticized, in a poetic way, the new anthropomorphic metaphysics based on the technical component of the worldview. Technical devices as a means to uncover mysteries have always been with people. The Greek meaning of «τέχνη» included both craftsmanship and fine arts,

that is, a way to unmask mysteries by turning truth into beauty, which is akin to poetry. In modern times the word denotes some kind of extraction industry. The most important thing about it is enframing: “nature’s energy is extracted and processed; the product is accumulated, then distributed and finally reprocessed. Extraction, processing, accumulation, distribution and reprocessing are ways to reveal the concealed”. [445: 227].

It is worth noting here that Husserl referred to the *discovering* nature of physics as a method that is art rather than a method of manufacturing something. This art is also a method to continuously upgrade it by inventing ever-new means of art, for example, its tools. The latter have recently become most important, and have become a purpose gained through relentless production of new theories, which leads to the erosion of meaning or formation of inverted meaning. In this regard, Heidegger wrote that although the difference between *τεχνη* and science is to a certain extent recognized, the return to its intrinsic meaning, that is, to be gained for nature by a skillful method has been interrupted too soon. [445: 74]

Enframing is not spontaneous; it is controlled by Man. However, the control system will seek to provide itself with things to regulate, while relying only on a scientific search of nature as a calculable system of forces. Having become the essence of technology, enframing turns the latter into manufacturing and extracting comprehension of a meaning that has been understood as literally correct, that is, providing a further energy supply for the control system. Therefore, the human turns out to be in the whirl of the production-extraction cycle to make things available; he is an operator, without a general purpose as before, but is no longer looking for such a purpose. Machines fatally overshadow *poetry*, i.e. obtaining of truth as purpose, specifying what control is for. “Amidst the right, the truth is missing” [445: 233]. Technology, which seems to be a modern means of reaching the assigned goals, turns man, who controls it, into an operator who makes reality available for its further use of providing information about the world. In the meanwhile, Man, the human per se, things comprehended by people, and the humane essence all *slip* out of the whirl.

However, Heidegger’s criticism is different from the philosophical attitude to 20th-century technology expressed by Mamford, Ortega-y-Gasset or Jaspers. On the one hand, its object as usual was the *new metaphysics*, presenting artefacts of civilization as forces dominating people. On the other hand, there are obvious distinctive features: Heidegger’s criticism discloses the causes of *new metaphysics* as a phenomenon depending on Man’s attitude.

The most impressive criticism of the metaphysical *will for wealth* addressed Man’s focus on bourgeois values, one of which was comfort. In his sociological works, Weber explains it through the difference between the concepts *to consume* and *to acquire* (in Sombart, frequently cited by Weber, it is the difference between *satisfaction of needs* and *profit*) [91; 92; 93]. Later Fromm referred to it as the psychological and social difference between *to exist* and *to have*. [433]. *To exist* and *to consume* are not the same. However, one could *exist* only when *consuming*.

In this respect, the very notion of comfort loses its meaning, and the craving for comfort is regarded as a kind of addiction. On the whole, the views of social and cultural processes became pessimistic again. All crisis-related issues, including *transfiguration*, the rationalistic code of European culture [4], the *externalization* of rationalism [148], irrationalism in the worldview [185], and the impersonality of culture [319] came down to one statement: there was no way out of the circumstances. Their main characteristics are likely to be crisis consciousness [337; 477] and a crisis mentality [64; 138 — 140; 243; 244; 416]. In the time period between the two wars of the 20th century the situation became paradoxical: on the one hand, there was tangible technological progress but on the other hand, Man was becoming a part of the machine. On the one hand, there was a shift towards globalization based on a single capitalist economy; on the other hand, it appeared to suppress once-individual cultural worlds. A vast opportunity for *have* presupposes on the flipside a minimum possibility for *be*, which ultimately means Man’s self-destruction.

Although deep in his heart such a person does not trust the worldview of civilization, he uses its principle of efficiency as a paradoxical basis to deduce the purpose that consists in the success of activity for the sake of this activity. Its postulates are clear and simple: higher profit and more comfort, increasing consumption and the use of all these to expand the scale. Social goals are defined in a similar way [276; 277]. With such an approach, there is no difference between the human world and the world of things, except for their biological or non-biological origin. Remove this differentiation parameter, and it will open up an opportunity for the metaphysical identification of

Man with artefacts of his activity: Man differs from things in his ability to manipulate them but, like them, Man is in the same circle with them.

However, the newly appeared metaphysics of the *will for wealth* does not address Man as a creature capable of setting goals outside any circles, nor does it note that finding the subjective meaning of existence has become Man's prerogative and area of competency. In contrast with the *new worldview*, the *new metaphysics* does not ignore the uncertainty of meaning; metaphysical dogmas have become a surrogate of salvation that was much easier to obtain than the unknown but true version.

While continental Europe was going through the pain of its crisis and later, when the metaphysics of the *will for wealth* became the object of large-scale criticism, England remained practically cut off from these processes. Neither did the country have any concerns about the crisis, nor did it have any fear of globalization. It was by no means accidental: England was prepared to deal with both. Moreover, today's world is driven, if not controlled, by the ideology that has formed in the specific historical and cultural milieu of what the Russians refer to as "Foggy Albion". It is this ideological code that permeates the mainstream of today's world.

Chapter 2. Disproportions of the Models of the World Order of Today

2.1. The Anglo-Saxon Code of Globalization

Every Culture has *its own* Civilization, Oswald Spengler writes, interpreting both terms in a periodic sense, to express a strict and necessary *organic succession* [476]. A civilization is a socio-cultural phenomenon distinguished by its ethnic history, economic, political, and ideological traits, as well as by the geographical factor. The notion was first introduced by French philosophers in the 17th century, in order to assess the two poles of *civilization* and *barbarism*; it formed the *ontological basis* of European expansion and transformation of the world, never taking into account the interests of non-European cultures. The formula was only abandoned after World War II; as the third millennium dawns, the meaning of the term is being shifted from the *blood and soil* aspect, which stresses the geographical component, to the *language and culture* principle. Now the borders of civilizations can coincide with those of languages and the relevant lifestyles, which include, according to Fernand Braudel, "collections of cultural characteristics and phenomena" [448].

In 1981 John Maclin came up with the notion of "globalization" for the first time; he suggested explaining and understanding the historical process of the globalization of social relationships [197]. According to Russian scholars [122], globalization comprises the current interaction of national economies, an open exchange of information, the free movement of goods and capital, interethnic social movements, international space programs, innovative telecommunication technologies, and an international education system [See also 29; 306; 496].

The idea of peaceful development was first brought forward when countries and continents drew closer, owing to steamboats, telephones and improved modes of transport, at the turn of the 19th–20th centuries: Free trade would seem to make war impossible due to the economic interdependence of the developed nations, the British Empire heading the list. August 1914, nonetheless, changed things drastically. It is only after two world wars, the Great Depression, and failed social experiments in the USSR that the market economy system eventually won the day.

In the modern period of globalization, the USA has entered numerous negotiations to set up multilateral institutions in order to establish its own *democracy model*. The rest of the countries have to adapt to these new conditions, as long as their political and economic choice is restricted solely by the world superpower and by capitalism as the only economic world base [122]. The international division of labor is shifting from "the developed industrial world base, the semi-periphery of the developing economies and the periphery of underdeveloped countries" to the global economy, which is claimed to be market-ruled rather than governmentally-channeled. However, the market mechanism should be prevented from "being the only master of people's destinies and the environment", as happened in Russia in the 1990s. Such *state wisdom*, as Karl Polanyi put it in the 1940s, would end in social disintegration.

Governments have to rigidly control privatization and budgets, be open to investments and market flows, and stabilize currencies. The quality and price of healthcare, income levels and bank interest rates all over the world are being equalized, and the world market looks like that of a single state. The nature of the interdependent economy is changing: “Lowering the barriers between sovereign states, globalization transforms inner social relations, strictly standardizes each and every distinction, trespasses over cultural taboos, severely restricts idiosyncrasies, and is merciless to ineffectiveness” [122].

If modernization is becoming a national constant, the economic, military and informational potentials of separate countries are resisting globalization. This is the reason for possible international conflicts: globalization is asymmetrical in nature.

New opportunities for the economic, geopolitical and socio-cultural expansion of the developed countries are turning the world into a space characterized by a new natural selection. There exist *gold bullion* and *the rest of humanity*, compelled to make room; as a result solidarity and interpersonal trust are collapsing. There is also direct evidence of immoral decisions made by modern elites. The world seems to be witnessing a global power being formed; what Alexander the Great and Hitler failed to fulfill may, perhaps, be accomplished by the ideology inherent in globalization, free of national sovereignties and democratic control.

The profound sources of the globalization ideology should be looked for in British history. Britain has always been in a specific relationship with Europe [121]. Geographically an island, it revealed its insular *character* academically, religiously, philosophically, morally all through the Modernity.

The generally accepted terms to characterize the tendencies of Britain’s historical development are traditionalism, liberalism and evolutionism. Apart from the Industrial Revolution, there has not been a single significant shake-up that would essentially affect society’s foundations since the Glorious Revolution. When revolutionary shock waves spread the events of the Great English revolution all over Europe, the suppression of Ireland had occurred long before. Even Chartism, a powerful movement as it were, failed to appear as the most impressive form of social protest against this background [89, 90].

Even at the beginning of the 20th century, the crisis of self-reflection in British culture was incommensurably less evident than that of the Continent. The words of E. Utin, a Russian scholar of that time, are more than indicative: “One really needs to concede that we are experiencing hard times, transitional times, when the old life has teetered on its base, when the old rules cultivated for centuries have obviously had their day but are still stubbornly trying to look younger, obstinate in their reluctance to give way to new concepts and novel institutions. Doubtlessly, these new concepts, *mores* and institutions have not come like a bolt from the blue; they emerged from the old ones just as these came out of the preceding concepts, *mores* and institutions. In some states, like England, this transition from the old institutions to new ones occurs almost naturally, with no salient shocks and shake-ups, and is practically unseen; in others, as in most continental states, the adoption of these novel institutions and of a new lifestyle causes terrible cramps and convulsions, threatening to smother life itself” [415 :129].

The idealization of medieval England and the mediocre critique of “the mechanism of the era” set the style for the assessment of the turn of the century. Thomas Carlyle, the only Briton who embraced and glorified the crisis, seemed to herald such views. Industry and democracy were equally hateful for him as their reverse dwarfs any “aristocracy of spirit”. An amorphous crowd, incapable of resolute actions, void of a hero — a born master — is alien to him. He is repelled by the embodied “Hell of England”, that is, by making gain, crying beggary, and lack of spirit. Such a transformation in the British assessment of the changing cultural situation is not comparable, however, with that of the continental criticism.

Bernard Bosanquet was a philosopher whose role it was to reveal the symptoms of the crisis. His reflection is partly dedicated to the theme of national dissociation [512; 513]. George Trevelyan specifies the symptoms of the crisis more clearly, although they are not the prevailing theme as he assesses the condition of British society. He regretfully states that Britain has lost her leading position in world politics. He is concerned with the failure of her “splendid isolation” policy, with the growing “secularization of thought” and the characteristics of decadence in art and literature. In his opinion, everything is readily going to obey the rules of a more mechanical and more democratic world; the

world of huge cities, instead of villages; a world articulating itself through science and journalism rather than through poetry, religion and literature [578].

Nevertheless, Trevelyan, like many others, is keenly interested in industrial advances, material wealth and the improving living conditions of the majority. All these changes, he believes, are linked with resurrected Puritan ideals. "Active individual Protestantism", austere personal morals, and open piety are the core features that shape 19th century Britain. As Trevelyan notes, the Englishmen of all classes formed a strong Protestant nation with two leading tendencies, obedience to a certain moral code and commercial prosperity. "The individualistic spirit of shop-keeping and that of religion united to support self-confident and loyal people" [402].

Thus, reflection on the culture crisis in Britain at the turn of the 19th–20th centuries was confined to the exposition of its symptoms, the number of studies being few. The question of what caused such a striking difference from continental Europe of that time, which produced Nietzsche, Spengler, and Simmel, still remains unanswered. In order to find the answer, several facts that are common knowledge need to be revisited.

First, the English legal and political system originated long before others [150]. Universal national legislation had been formed by the 12th century, far earlier than that of the Continent. Edward Freeman, the 19th century adherent of social evolutionism, compares the experience of state construction and lasting political stability in Britain and Switzerland. He concludes that both countries managed to preserve, though differently, the original spirit of free meetings.

Natural and geographical conditions predetermined the specific nature of both agriculture and state government. Freeman wrote about the British constitution that each step in its development has been the natural consequence of some earlier step. Each change in law and constitution has been, not the bringing in of anything wholly new, but the development and improvement of something that was already old [429].

Keeping primitive institutions of self-government intact was advantageous [426; 427; 428]. As they outlasted the emerging feudalism they became invulnerable. Thus, in analogy with Switzerland, Freeman considers the maintaining of *freedom* once gained to be the guarantee of British prosperity. The word *freedom*, in the context of its exceptional manifestation in the Anglo-Saxon world, will become a key one when comparing it with the rest of the world. According to Freeman, it is to freedom that the English Parliament, the institution which later formed the basis of the English legal and political system, owes its origins. What is more essential, this particular experience of state construction will turn out to be the most adequate one for the modern world.

The second example is as much interesting — the early, as compared to the Continent, emergence of bipartisan system, which kept existing up to 20th century. For years Whigs and Tories, the driving forces of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, remained the balance, the tandem's very existence helping avoid revolutionary methods of solving cataclysms.

The word *serenity* is not, perhaps, the proper one to be applied for a historical moment. Since the tandem appeared, the two parties personified polar modes of life and ideologies. Whigs would be committed to bourgeois cities' free spirit, while Tories would be confidently devoted to *good old England* traditions.

Thirdly, quite an exceptional phenomenon in the Britain's history is the influence of the Reformation on the country's social system [24; 25; 26; 82; 112; 129]. Since the times of Henry VIII, perhaps, there emerged quite a special world-outlook of the British, which secured Britain's insular position both de facto and de jure [69; 70]. Once she had broken free from Rome's guardianship, Britain took the chance to enhance its ideological rather than geographical separation from Europe.

On the one hand, this stimulated the feeling of national identity, and allowed the nation to share and solve its common problems, in a sense, *in private*. On the other hand, The Reformation, at least for a while, brought forth the conditions for religious syncretism, which allowed Calvinism to spread over the country [208; 219]. The Puritan tendency to consider mundane affairs as heavenly gifts along with the achievements of the Golden Age of Queen Elizabeth I — from Shakespeare's and Bacon's writings to the defeat of the Invincible Armada and the establishment of the East Indian Company — set the stage for the most powerful empire to emerge. As early as the 16th century, the British *youthful* bent for adventure and world expansion went hand in hand with pragmatic calculation and extreme rationalism in secular affairs.

Spreading Calvinism decisively affected revolutionary events of the 17th century. When the first revolution broke out and the Independent Republic was proclaimed, it was the Calvinist spirit that inspired the intellectual core of social changes. Trevelyan observed that the 17th century opposition was “the war of ideas and principles” rather than the revolt of the hungry [402]. The ideas of the social group which headed the revolution agreed, to a great extent, with the longings of other social strata. Remarkably, Lytton Strachey observed later that the English Reformation was a social rather than a religious event [391]. Puritanism, originally the driving force of the changes, was incarnated into Britain’s historical *tissue* revealing its power in politics, literature, social and private life.

The Counterreformation did not win through in Britain as it did in Europe. There was a lasting struggle between groups and parties linked with certain religious sects and tendencies, as well as with Catholicism. However, Calvinism managed to surrender not a single secular position, having preserved and strengthened its influence through politics. Although it is true that the Puritans were persecuted and compelled to flee, the Puritan ideology became ingrained and survived even under unfavorable conditions.

So far Britain has been the country which preserves (in the religious sense) transformations brought about by the Tudors. Puritanism is still present through Parliament. The interconnection was observed long ago by public thought. Puritanism “rejected any supremacy in the Church, which was arranged as a federative republican system. The national synod was in a sense a church parliament” [210: 34–35]. This had tremendous consequences for the nation. Although the defenders of the ancient rights of Parliament and the Puritans sympathetic with Scottish Presbyterianism drew together in the 17th century, the event predetermined the vector of Britain’s political development for years. In particular, Britain was viewed as a Puritan country up to the end of the 19th century.

The intimate interlink between the Puritan spirit and the British mentality was widely recognized. John Green, the British historian of the mid-19th century, perceived the seeds of the British mentality in the coldness and narrow-mindedness, secular blindness and practical common sense of Henry VII’s reforms. In turn, Samuel Gardiner connected the British character with the religious values of the first Puritans, which stubbornly held on. “And I hope fervently”, he writes, “these will never vanish among us” [534: 4].

At the time when the Continent fell under the spell of Schopenhauer’s somber philosophy, sensing its importance, the art historian and traveler Hippolytus Taine had plenty to say about the British character. A propos, Théodule Ribot’s book on Schopenhauer alleges that the philosopher does not hide his disgust of English hypocrisy, which brought down the most civilized and, perhaps, the first nation in Europe to the condition when it would be just right to send to England missionaries of the Mind having Strauss’s works in one hand and Kant’s *Critique* in the other against Their Reverences [346].

Taine himself accentuates British emotional stinginess, in particular practicality, inner self-regulation, and a *wonderful* bent for super-intense activity. Taine believed that the British respect Christianity, along with the church, the priesthood, the pastor [410]. It is this respect for the church and other traditions that maintains the nation’s conservatism in general, which “secured the reforms not yielding to revolutions”.

The English soundly esteem the constitution. Taine even writes that each British citizen is a policeman for himself, the specific mentality being of great help: “It is possible to make a fairly exact comparison of the inside of the Englishman’s head with Murray’s guide: plenty of facts and few ideas; lots of useful and precise information; small statistical tables, numbers in abundance; accurate and useful maps, brief and dry historical notes instead of the introduction — but no general overview, nothing of the literary kind; this is just a stock of good, reliable documents, a notebook convenient for a traveler” [410: 233].

At the same time, he writes that it is only natural that in the country where laughing on Sundays is believed scandalous, where sullen Puritanism preserved the remains of its hatred for happiness, that in such a country there is much to gain from being moral outwardly. It is the small change to have on your person. Those who don’t possess the genuine coin forge a counterfeit one; and the more valid it is claimed by English public opinion the more it is counterfeited. This vice is an English one [409].

William James's viewpoint is worth remembering in this connection: the only criterion of truth is what *works* best for Man and best facilitates "the joining with the whole scope of our experience". So if the notion of God and religious ideas *work* for Man as well as any others do, it would be meaningless for pragmatism to consider *untrue* a notion that is so pragmatically fruitful [166: 55]. Pragmatism reflects and generalizes philosophically what is evident to a sharp-eyed traveler. In any case, in one form or another, true or affected, English religion performed a pragmatic function.

In the meantime, the British are disposed to work intensively, adhere to law and order, and practice frugality in the artistic and emotional sphere. Religiousness and *affection* for their constitution leave the British no time or place for pleasures. If, perhaps, there is such a need, there is no ability to satisfy it in full. So painting and other arts, Taine writes, which address feelings, are neglected, and naturally recede into the background. There is no time to spare; thinking is focused on more pressing and urgent matters; art is taken up because it happens to be in vogue or a custom; it only stirs curiosity; it is studied seriously by a few devotees. On the other hand, Taine, when speculating on English painting, notices a peculiarity in it, namely: the depiction leaves room for efforts to reflect moral qualities.

The character traits that Taine pondered over are later observed by other authors. For example, a Polish scholar, Maria Ossovskaya, enlists the same ethical features of Victorian Britain: the ideals of duty, diligence, respectability, home, and austere morals [320]. At that time the utmost business utilitarianism would go hand in hand (and not in word only) with the utmost attachment to traditional religious morality [28].

The economic supremacy of long standing, Britain's governmental power, the lasting experience of liberal development, the early maturing political institutions of an industrial society, the national capability to find a social compromise in order to avoid huge destructive upheavals during tense historical moments; the peculiarities of religious experience — all these and many more strengthened a seminal trait in the English mentality, viz., the sense of self-superiority and exceptionality. Kant among others indicated this, along with one more particular feature: "The English language became the most wide-spread business language, that of commercial people..." [204: 87].

As a matter of fact, at this stage the British globalization code has already been outlined. Its interior features, however, are shown in detail by the British School of philosophy. It is worth remembering: while the continental Enlightenment distinguishes between Reason and Sence, the British intellectual tradition actually concentrates upon the latter. The obvious example of this is the unparalleled empirical bias of British thought. The empirical tradition, along with other conditions, appeared to be one of the factors that caused early economic growth. Having devised a political economy, Britain, like no other country, smartly disposed of its intellectual potential.

It was at the end of 18th century that there occurred a more or less noticeable deviation from the empirical tradition. As time went by, there emerged numerous schools: absolute idealism, positivism, pragmatism, various forms of *realism*. However, the way British mentality is exposed in them shows that the difference between them is less significant than it might seem. Even British form of Kantianism and the example of *clear* deviation from the British empirical tradition — British absolute idealism — both embodied the same principle, to wit: Sence and its pragmatic consequences are more important than Reason.

An example of the Kantian tradition is "the Scottish school of common sense" founded by Thomas Reid at the end of the 18th century. Its followers essentially accentuated the practical — or moral — ability of a subject rather than the cognitive one. Later this tendency was developed by Robert George Collingwood. He believed that the growing British pragmatism of the end of 19th century can be traced back to Kant's writings.

During the second half of the Victorian period it was common for *educated and thinking* Englishmen to attribute two abilities to the mind: theoretical and practical (ethical) ones. The latter were much more safe and trustworthy than the former. While complicated intellectual problems seemed insoluble (such as, for example, the question of the ultimate absolute truth), equally complicated moral problems needed to be solved immediately using the faculty of "conscience".

The mixture of intellectual skepticism with moral dogmatism was fairly characteristic of the Victorian era, Collingwood believes. Its effect on the basic mood of the era was somewhat

catastrophic. It instilled moral narrow-mindedness combined with intellectual apathy and turned Victorian Englishmen in the world's eyes into pedants and philistines, religious, proud of their ignorance, firmly confident in their monopoly on the sense of justice. The analogous delusion was a typical Victorian belief that the doctrine of Christian faith should be discarded as one impossible to prove whereas Christian morality should be preserved as the best ethical rule in the world [521].

The origination of British absolute idealism, or neo-Hegelianism, is connected with *The Secret of Hegel* by James Sterling. Neo-Hegelianism after Sterling was represented by Francis Bradley, Thomas Hill Green, Edward Caird and others. Berrous Dunham explains this late establishment of Hegelianism in Britain by the fact that the country was culturally isolated as befits the nation with broadening economy and vanishing doubts as they concerned its own superiority [153]. On the other hand, "the excessive attention paid to Anglican orthodoxy" prevented neo-European ideas from intervening. "It was the era when Mr. Gladstone refused to hire a servant until he was aware of their views on the church and the government" [153: 37]. Many believed that philosophy after Hume was just of historical interest; Dr. Arnold, speaking to stunned students in Rugby, put forward the double ideal — "to be an Englishman and a Christian".

Paradoxically, English absolute idealism also comprised empirical and pragmatic elements. Hegel worked up the Enlightenment hope for the transforming role of Reason into a colossal concept of the Absolute Idea of self-development. Later Marx *picked up* the other Enlightenment feature — the requirement for justice and social equality. But the English accent of neo-Hegelianism stresses different notes.

Green, the head of the new British absolute idealism, formulated ideas more appropriate to an evolutionary theory than to metaphysics. One of his theses is the permanent character of relationships where each individual is inseparably linked with society, with the government as the regulator. Similarly, the other conspicuous British representative of neo-Hegelianism — Bradley — stood up for "self-realization through self-sacrifice" as the basic principle, not in a sense of service to the people, but in a sense of submission to the *absolute* [65]. The resulting personal entity must call forth that of the state.

The metaphysical requirement of the stability of the social system in Green's neo-Hegelianism is very similar to the philosophical version of the Whigs' political program. The stability of the state through the social stability of its members is the invariable point of the British liberal program, which would repeatedly occur in books considering Hegel's doctrine.

It is remarkable how Caird treats the Hegelian notion of "the state". The state should be similar to a family, he writes, it should be of a natural character, race and language being its common basis. This remark alone totally rejects Hegel's whole metaphysical construction of the state and appeals directly to Hobbs, that is, to that particular domain of the Enlightenment that is entirely focused upon the notion of Sense.

Caird writes that this aim, as Hegel believed, could be best achieved in a hereditary monarchy, where the monarch's face becomes a kind of establishing point liable to no discussion, and represents the historical unity of a nation. On the other hand, the state should also be a "civic society" where all the citizens are provided with their private rights of personality and property and confidently possess the opportunity to pursue their particular aims and develop special abilities either through rivalry or cooperation. In order to harmonize natural unity and social freedom, a monarch should be a constitutional monarch governing through his ministers who communicate with parliament and are responsible to it [238]. There is an impression that the non-codified English constitution was not the result of certain historical precedents but was written by Hegel himself.

Caird's interpretation of Hegel's *views* on "progress" is just as remarkable. He believes that the revolutionary scorn for the past is pernicious as regards any progress for it is in the past only that we can find such an explanation of the present which gives us a chance to discern a germ of the future in it [238]. This pure example of social evolutionism excellently matches Caird's image of Hegel's childhood visualizes a quiet bourgeois household governed by the spirit of honesty, economy, and diligence, and where the upbringing of the children was the major care [238].

Social evolutionism mixed with pragmatism is brought to its head in Bernard Bosanquet's writings. A liberal in his political views, he apparently borrowed his theoretical notions concerning society's development from Darwin on. In particular, he considered the "struggle for existence" to be

the main principle of social life. This contributed greatly to the fact that Bosanquet's theory became a kingpin of social Darwinism.

The astonishing mixture of neo-Hegelianism and social Darwinism was firmly linked with the notion of British supremacy in world-relations. While comparing the European events of 1848 with those in Britain, the well-known British philosopher, historian and thinker Thomas Macaulay wrote that Europe was threatened to be enslaved by barbarians as compared to whom wild hordes of Attila and Albion would be reputed educated and human. Meanwhile the routine administration in the island did not cease for a single day. If they would ask why we are so different from others our reply would be we never lose what others madly and blindly try to regain [265].

Macaulay demonstrates an illustrious example of an opinion on the *difference* of what was taking place in Britain. The whole British experience, he believes, displays the aversion for revolutionary changes: "We are aware of no one such a revolution which would not be headed off with a timely and amicable agreement" [265: 495]. He attributes Britain's *quietness* in 1848 to the fact that "the freedom, secured property and happiness of English families" were definitely established two centuries ago.

Robin Collingwood — one of the last English philosophers impressed greatly by Hegelianism — draws a certain conclusion, quite in the vein of the Frankfurt School, for example [223]. He writes of an *inner disease* of western society, consisting in a mass thirst for entertainment, the degradation of the meaning of labor, which is only viewed as a means of income that can be exchanged for pleasure, etc. As a result, he questions the idea of progress, for progress is not reduced to a mere change of historical periods (because we do not know which one is *better* ethically) [27: 315–316]. However, all the questions he raises are not of a specific British character but relate to the problem of western society as a whole.

Neo-Hegelianism necessarily became a *compromise* in part, as did everything British in general. Moreover, Bertrand Russell noted that although the influence of German idealism in Britain was unlikely to have been felt beyond the boundaries of the universities, it reigned and ruled inside. There, within academic walls, neo-Hegelianism accomplished a task of major importance — it developed the *academic* foundation for the idea of the inevitable evolutionary unification of the world under the only worthy banner — that of the British Empire. The above-mentioned episode became a crucial element of the current code of globalization, namely: the inalienable right to lay down the rules belongs to no one but the Anglo-Saxons.

At the same time, Hippolyte Taine accurately indicates a distinction in British neo-Hegelianism. He believes the British lack the kind of philosophy that is called metaphysics in Germany. The British have scientists but they want thinkers; he writes [409]. The question whether there is or there is not metaphysics in Britain is too abstract though. The fact is that the leading concepts in 19th century Britain were utilitarianism, pragmatism and a *pure* social-evolutionism *unstained* by metaphysics. The British philosophy of pragmatism was almost of the same significance as the interpretation of the culture crisis in Europe at the turn of the 19th–20th centuries. Moreover, one should bear in mind that pragmatism is a purely Anglo-American phenomenon.

The English propensity for compromises and step-by-step reforms would always be determined by the principle of utility. Such an interrelation was most clearly expressed by Herbert Spenser [386; 387; 389] though he was not the first one to do it. Jhon Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham could possibly be called the founder of similar views. It is appropriate here to recollect his definition of "asceticism". Those accepting the ascetic principle fall into two classes. While the first are prompted by hope, the others are impelled by fear [39]. If this is the case, "hope" means the "food of philosophical pride" — hope to be merited among people and fear is seen as the expectation of suffering, the fear begotten by a superstitious imagination pending the invisible future and the punishment that it brings. According to Bentham, such asceticism is detrimental as it is reduced by society to a sort of socially useless pleasure, or to fear, which means suffering, in other words, the deprivation of pleasure.

In Bentham's wake, Spenser accepts use and pleasure as pivotal ethical criteria; he develops the utilitarian concept, applying it to his theory of social evolution [see details in 388]. In so doing, he *inherits* doubtful moments in Bentham's ideas making them much more qualitatively complicated. The principle of an active force producing more than one action is exposed as the main law of social progress, as well as any other. This complicates both the organic and the inorganic world.

Theoretically, the abstraction is hard to argue with, unless, at least, a positive moral appraisal is attributed to such a complication [305]. However, not only this but the evolution of morality itself is also discussed. Spenser assumes pleasure to be the ultimate moral aim, an ineradicable basic element of behavior, “the necessary form of moral intuition”. He recapitulates: 1) production can be accomplished in cooperation only, and the possibility of cooperation itself as a certain stage in the development of behavior bears witness to the progress of behavior; 2) the criterion for the appraisal of moral progress is a sum of ultimate pleasures received by society. Spenser never doubts that the evolution of technology and production increases such pleasure and, consequently, provides the impulse for ethics to progress too or, as Jean-Marie Guyau observed, for ethical ideals to evolve [151].

This viewpoint became firmly implanted in the British mentality and was reflected in many other concepts. In particular, Leonard Hobhouse’s work on the subject was entitled *Morals in Evolution*; “the development of ethics” is traced from the animal world to the then condition of Man. Later the ideas set out by Bentham, J. Mill, and H. Spenser would be specifically developed in British pragmatism.

Pragmatism, through British empiricism, is rooted in the Reformation [295]. The Puritans of the Independent republic and J. Mill, the author of pragmatism, seem to share the slogan: of all the wastes the emotional ones are the most worthless for they promote fruitful activity in no way.

William James compares the role of pragmatism with that of the Reformation, explaining the historical conditionality of pragmatism on Anglo-American soil. He confidently states that the centre of gravity of philosophy must therefore alter its place. The earth of things, long thrown into shadow by the glories of the upper ether, must resume its rights. To shift the emphasis in this way means that philosophic questions will fall to be treated by minds of a less abstractionist type than heretofore, minds more academic and individualistic in their tone yet not irreligious either it will be an alteration in “the seat of authority” that reminds one almost of the protestant Reformation. And as, to papal minds, Protestantism has often seemed a mere mess of anarchy and confusion, such, no doubt, will pragmatism often seem to ultra-rationalist minds in philosophy. It will seem so much sheer trash, philosophically. But life wags on, all the same, and compasses its ends, in protestant countries. I venture to think that philosophic Protestantism will compass a not dissimilar prosperity [166].

The direct connection between Protestantism and pragmatism is evident from this reasoning. The earthly vocation of Man being the sole focus of the Reformation, the pragmatism of the Reformation is crowned with that of philosophy. The English Reformation and the Puritan revolution called forth specific types of everyday life practices. Religious Puritanism turned into a *new Puritanism* of bourgeois morality, and pragmatism became a *philosophical tuning-fork* of everyday morals. As a part of ordinary consciousness it lost its academic isolation almost at once. As a matter of fact, J. C. F. Schiller aimed at this, when he linked pragmatism with *humanism* [564; 565].

The philosophy of pragmatism fixes this very phenomenon while demonstrating — explicitly or implicitly — that the Puritan morality norms turned into pragmatic moral categories. The primacy of duty, activity, thrift, and emotional reserve configured the basis of the national mentality. Even in the political sphere, Puritanism hardly lost its positions. Puritans seemed to *be embodied* into Whigs; active landlords, members of the new-born bourgeoisie, citizens, in a word, all who earlier represented the social basis of Puritanism, could now practice Anglicanism, being Whig adherents at the same time. This transfer from a religious tenet to a secular regulation, to a *new guise* in a way, would remove the additional contradictions between the requirements of the official religious doctrine and the lifestyle.

There was one more significant change. The radicalism of the Puritan revolution changed with Whig liberalism and what failed to be realized immediately was possible to inculcate over the centuries. However, in the British case, the combination of the notions of “evolution” and “development” was transformed into that of “evolution” and “averaging”. Max Beer’s description is of interest: ‘In the destructive atmosphere of compromises, the sharpness of theoretical thought, a person’s fundamental position, thinking through an idea to its logical end were far from being welcomed, they were avoided [43: 50]. A similar viewpoint was articulated by John Morley in his work *On Compromise* [289]: the latter develops to originate a solid, properly functioning social model, where it is permitted to be rich, where the poor are provided with the minimum financial state support and social security; where order is maintained by an effective police system, where nobody

cares whether one is a believer or an atheist, and where the endless development of the economy and wealth has been enunciated. Everything in this production and consumption society has been averaged and subjected to one major line — to serve society, whose aim, in turn, is endless economic development.

M. Weber believed that people filled with the capitalist spirit are now quite indifferent, not to say hostile, in relation to the church [94]. These, however, have different systems of worship. Thomas Eliot described his notion of “higher religions” in a peculiar way. In his view, some of them can be apprehended by people of different cultures; that is, they are of supreme universality ... and can set the principal pattern of common beliefs and behavior [526]. In so saying, Eliot did not mean the goals and guidelines of pragmatism although the other thinkers, J. C. F. Schiller in particular, implied this very idea.

Thus, the second constituent of the Anglo-Saxon code of globalization is rooted in an unambiguous choice: the power of Sence in constructing civilization has been preferred to that of the worship of Reason and culture. The empirical and pragmatic potential of Sence was proclaimed to be not only the main but the sole aim of the nation long before the beginning of the 20th century. This choice was articulated by Bacon in his famous motto “Knowledge is power”. One aspect was of particular significance: the choice in question should reveal a universal character, for it is the only true one.

In a manner, Britain made its choice at the dusk of the Middle Ages. The values of the *will-for-wealth* metaphysics had germinated in the English mentality long before the culture crisis of the turn of the 19th–20th centuries. They fed and dominated socio-cultural events for several centuries. As Weber wrote, *the watershed* was formed as early as the 17th century, when the boundary between the squires of *good old England* and Puritan circles became evident. Europe reached *the watershed* much later, not until the 19th century, and experienced what England had assimilated long ago as something novel.

Taine, when analyzing Carlyle’s works, writes about Puritans with great emotion that they founded Scotland; they founded the United States; their descendants are founding Australia and colonizing the whole world [409]. Roughly at the same time John Seely claimed: “Generally, there isn’t more significant a question than that of the reciprocal influence of these two branches of the English race. The future of the planet depends on how it will be solved” [376: 199]. In a sense, it turned out to be true.

Later Herbert Marcuse, in quite a similar vein, accentuated the close kinship of what we call the American and the British ethos. The American lifestyle, through Puritan roots, appeared to be a model to emulate all over the world. Max Lerner in his *America as a Civilization* observed, that the whole history of how Americans conquered the entire world without arms or colonization is the evidence of a certain inner harmony between America and the spirit of the modern world [248; V.I].

This is far from being the whole story though. Americans, when they conquered *the entire world* were driven by a borrowed idea — the one brought by the English pilgrims. However, it is true that the modern world is subjugated to a common aim which is close to one that had encouraged drastic social changes both in Britain and the USA. Was it not anticipated by Seely, when he wrote in his *Expansion of England* of the future mission of “two branches of the English race”? Britain, with its vast colonies, produced the *islands* to influence them ideologically. The most illustrious example is the USA, which implemented the idea in full.

The islands of influence were not always obedient — after all, the *taming of the stubborn* is not the case. What really mattered was the English language, which spread all over the Empire, carrying with it a new relationship with the world as an envoy bringing new principles and purposes. By propagating its rules through its language, Britain provided favorable conditions for world universalism to appear.

Today civilization more than often *explains itself* via mass communications. These form a sort of *central nervous system* with the perpetual flow of information functioning to govern the civilized world. The language of the flow is English.

While the development of the code for civilization was gaining strength, however, “Foggy Albion” was losing its status as *the workshop* of the *world* as well as that of the empire. In 1946 Churchill admitted: “The United States stands at this time at the pinnacle of world power”. At the crux of the speech he referred to “the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples”. The

Fulton Speech is also referred to as the Iron Curtain Speech; as a symbol of the start of the Cold War, it became a sign of *handing over the keys* from Britain to the USA. Pragmatism in relation to the world and a sense of self-supremacy are implicitly present on the USA flag; they strengthen the nation's conviction of the right to sway the destinies of mankind.

If continental Europe could set the legacy of the Middle Ages against *the will for wealth* attitude; if the relative quiet was secured by the early development of capitalism in Britain, America lacked both. In effect, Britain implanted its idea in the *youthful* American mind, which had no historical restrictions. Both factors turned out to be more than ominous.

It should be emphasized once again: the adherence to *the will for wealth* values results from the deep processes of self-awareness. Regardless of the tranquil way that Britain actually passed through the peak phase of the crisis, the principle of the correlation between civilization and culture was the same there as on the Continent. Britain did acquire a pragmatic stance independently, by evolution and earlier than others. The scope of calculation and control endowed on the subject embraced the sphere of human meanings. As this stance was scaled up socially, the pragmatic constituent evidently prevailed over the existential one.

Accordingly, the Anglo-Saxon project, to a great extent inspired by the Enlightenment, is not globalized within the framework of its initial ideals and addresses a *mature*, morally autonomous subject, responsible for his self-awareness. Instead, a marginal consequence of the Enlightenment, cast in the ideological formula of the universal pragmatic perspective, is being spread all over the planet. This pragmatic attitude, rather than the hope for the intellectual creative power of Reason, is triumphant, the notion of the world supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon model being its core. The modern Western diplomats' speeches on freedom distinctly echo the colonial British model based on direct political rule.

As a consequence, the balance between civilization and culture has been disrupted not only in Britain and the USA, but in lots of countries that follow the Anglo-Saxon globalization model. The pragmatically aimed social consciousness lost the ability to differentiate the existential constituents of being from its other constituents. Under the current conditions of uncertain meaning, these social systems tend to focus on what is most evident, available and effective, viz., civilization. The societies that had been pragmatically oriented for many centuries suppressed the existential sphere in the same way as totalitarian regimes suppressed opposing social groups and classes.

Europe eventually assimilated the Anglo-Saxon globalization model after World War II; the continent was urged on with the economy in ruins and under the prevailing conditions of the uncertainty of existential meanings. In the meantime, the Frankfurt School proved that the human right to doubt any systems — both natural and social ones — as the criteria for the truth of personal judgment on the existential meaning is a specific kind of freedom [9; 14]. However, Erich Fromm demonstrated convincingly that this release from dogma was beyond the strength for many to bear [430].

Man appeared alone in the newly acquired right; as existentialism specified, he was alone first and foremost in the responsibility for his freedom. The state of uncertainty and instability was compensated for using the method suggested *by default* together with the Marshall Plan. The new dogmas grew from the unconscious confidence that pragmatic standards can serve as the criteria of existential meanings. Simply speaking, material wealth was taken on a mass scale as the meaning of existence. Erich Fromm defined the phenomenon as a sort of *disease* and diagnosed it as the “market-oriented personality model” [430].

Concurrently, it became evident for many: “Capitalism is totalitarian because all it can give people is essentially a back number which a good many, including those who once crowded or seated behind the Berlin Wall, are just trying to catch up with” [417: 131]. Moreover, “capitalism is totalitarian because it uses morality without scruples to terrorize human consciousness. The moral code of the builders of capitalism is no less absurd than that of the communists; at the same time, it is much more rigorous for it offers no moral options but the morality of money”. As Serge Moscovichi figuratively stated, “money is our Socrates. Plato questioned: ‘What would Socrates say of this or that thing?’ The moment we see or hear of a thing we ask: ‘How much is it?’” [303: 371].

Moscovichi does not fall into reductionism or simplify the situation, calling money *our Socrates*. He just suggests a bright formula for the main idol of modern society.

The 20th century revealed the mystery of money, “one of the greatest in the world”, according to Ernst Jünger. An economy that is driven by and aimed at money plunges civilization into a pre-cultural state targeting people’s mutual extermination. Georg Simmel’s *The Philosophy of Money*, which supplemented Marx’s works with psychological explanations, experimentally confirms the following proposition: “Money is something more than a historical substance, such as capital, something more than an economical means. It appears to be Ariadne’s thread following which it is possible to explore the movement of society and, through that, human subjectivity in general”. The latter, in the light of Freud’s teaching, seems to *get stuck* at the anal stage of development. As a child holds its faeces to enjoy a stronger anal excitement at defecation, an adult saves money to enjoy a strong psychological thrill.

Simmel’s investigation on the nature of money is still topical, with an essential reservation, though. It is common knowledge that civilizations differ in *how* rather than *what* they produce. The nature of money and an individual’s feelings linked with it do not change, but their form of manifestation does, turning money into an actual phantom, mirage and a virtual reality. A personage responsible for the total advocacy of the image of money becomes a cultural, who, in a centaur-like fashion, combines the traces of an intellectual with those of a legislator. Terrified of only one thing — going away empty-handed — culturalists desperately grovel to the powerful. Lacking imagination, they are lost in the empty buzz of party programs and dreary political meetings. “Tiresome are they, and tiresome is their life. Their only rejoice is their clambering when they see they’ve managed to outfox their rivals, to push them off or to degrade” [72: 116]. In this role a cultural, along with others, embodies “the transparency of evil” of the modern information society.

It is the American civilization that personifies this for many. One should agree with H. Keyserling, who wrote as early as 1930: “Today we live in a North-American historical period, which is essentially similar to Egyptian, Hellenic, and Roman, as well as German, French and English ones. I mean that today there is no questioning whether to accept or reject the USA, but of something quite opposite: it is only against the background of the USA that the spirit of other cultures can preserve any historical significance of their own. Such a statement presupposes the necessity of its discussion as any USA life problem, whatsoever trifle, concerns all of us” [201: 5].

Karl Paul Polanyi’s work *Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Sources of our Time* reveals the key characteristic of 19th century society, which clarifies numerous aspects in the realities of the modern world. It is in the 19th century that economic activity becomes a specific sphere: *the economical motive proper* determines the institutional pattern, which dictates its requirements and subjugates the whole of society to them [333: 85]. It is only logical that the main production factors: labor, land, money — appear to be involved in the market economy. They become commodities. However, — and this is of major importance, in our opinion, — the characteristics of labor, land and money as commodities appear to be *totally fictitious*. As Polanyi stresses, “labor and land are nothing but human beings any society consists of, and the natural environment they live in. To include them in a market mechanism as a means to subdue the very substance of society to market laws” [333: 85]. He proceeds: “...it is quite obvious that labor, land and money are by no means commodities, and with regard to them the assumption that anything to be bought or sold is produced to be put on the market is obviously false... Labor is just another name for a certain human activity intimately connected with the process of life itself, which, in turn, ‘is produced’ not to be offered for sale but has quite a different meaning; this activity cannot be separated from the rest of the manifestations of life, put in storage or on sale; land is another name for nature, which was created not by Man at all; and, lastly, real money is just a symbol of purchasing cost, which is normally not produced for sale” [333: 86].

It is also obvious that the norms of modern democracy in no way facilitate the recovery from the *Anglo-Saxon disease*, they even aggravate it. Postulating the *one-dimensional* concept of *Man*, H. Marcuse showed that a bourgeoisie oriented towards pragmatic meanings as a super-meaning is able to variously manipulate not only the masses directly but also political systems and via them citizens of democratic societies [283]. This fact allowed the danger of the *dictatorship* of bourgeois values — the chronic symptom of democratic consumer societies to emerge. Marcuse’s diagnosis of the Western *disease* of the substitution of meanings is still topical.

Intellectual freedom seems to have been reflected in the democratic constitutions which proclaimed the right to freedom in an individual’s inner life. However, neither inner life, nor the

principles of its freedom have been defined. Thus, a person's free right to say to oneself that "the meaning of my life is this and that" is only indirectly indicated [141–143]. Neither legal regulations nor educational institutions contain the principle of personal existential freedom. In these circumstances a person who is unconsciously striving for freedom and is still at a loss how to find it chooses what seems the most obvious. The standards of democracy readily provide an appealing image of an *ideal* society member, his inner life being interesting to nobody. Such standards are universal: academic standards outline the criteria of an enlightened individual; legal regulations provide those of a law-abiding one; and the level of consumption dictates those of a successful one.

So the individual can unconsciously (or even consciously) turn the *coordinates of success* into standards that identify intellectual freedom. However, the notion is emasculated in this way as the very conditions of freedom are eliminated. The pragmatic personal sphere is formed as the *external rules* are adopted; a departure from these presupposes a range of social sanctions. But the sphere of existential meaning is a priori exempt from such regulation, though it can be empirically fulfilled. At the same time political freedom turns into a false equivalent of intellectual freedom.

In 21st century the western crisis of substituted meanings drastically increased, and was followed by the signs of personality crisis, repeatedly pointed at by postmodernist philosophy. The subjects brought in by this short period — a semiotic reduction of symbols and fetishism of commodities [67; 68]; the growth in the demand for risk factors [35; 36]; the suppression of individuals by power institutions; the aggression of the mass media [437; 438] and many others — are still topical. They indicate directly that the new experience has not been assimilated, and in an indirect way — that the uncertain coordinates of existential meanings bewilder the individual in the modern consumer society. The major admission is, however, that the most advanced democratic propositions cannot regulate the intellectual freedom of the individual. As a result, they fail to assess either the assimilation of intellectual freedom by various societies or their level of democracy in this respect.

The West was the first to take the road to the free inner world of the individual. As the historical dynamics of personality structure changed, the legal and political understanding of freedom was also transformed. The consistent emancipation from religious dogmatism, from the diktat of traditional views and from political despotism were adequately reflected in legal norms. These, in turn, more and more corresponded with the space that was shaping inner personal freedom. Before the 20th century ended, however, it became obvious that the kind of freedom referred to as intellectual exists *de facto* only; by no means has it been fixed *de jure*.

In the meantime, the western individual is not the only one to be affected by the transformation in personality structure. Similar processes are accelerating in the different cultural areas of the planet. The historical leadership of the West is no longer a telling argument that proves its superiority in the building of democracy. In other words, it is not the point that western capitalism, engendered by the Protestant spirit, was once established somewhere and by this mere fact endowed the modern world with the idea of democracy. The point is that a natural and still little comprehended process of global change in personality structure was once historically molded as the western type of society. This by itself does not make such a model superior; various models tend to accompany similar processes in different cultures.

As no kind of knowledge regulates the condition of intellectual freedom, the desire for comfort as the equivalent of existential meaning creates some inner personal *spot* exposed to external influence. This fact is very much complicated by non-legitimate judgments of political institutions concerning ethical goals; and on the other hand, by their bias in claiming the solution of pragmatic problems to be the common existential meaning. Under such conditions, the substitution of meaning can turn from a personal issue into a social one. Besides, in this way, political elites are provided with a favorable medium to lobby their interests.

A radical legal-political view would point out something seemingly impossible: the most advanced societies are non-democratic as far as the realization of the declared rights of social political freedoms are concerned. They are left out *de facto* of newly-needed democratic formations, for intellectual freedom legally unsecured may be usurped by powerful institutions with only a formal respect for the *old* democratic principles. Generally, this means that what we are witnessing are not mere changes that have happened to a person, but tectonic shifts in the legal and political strata that existed and developed during the whole of the Modernity.

The political systems of any societies claiming themselves to be democratic also often claim that their electiveness is a legitimate ground to interpret freedom in all meanings of the word. It is not so, however, for the true judgments of the meaningful designata of the personal and, therefore, Man per se, do not become legitimate due to the mere fact that those who pronounce them have been elected democratically.

It follows from what has been said that as soon as a certain formally democratic structure proclaims something definite as the existential meaning of the system in general (whether directly or indirectly is of no importance), it immediately breaks the fundamental principle of its own citizens' intellectual freedom. If at the same time a particular definite meaning is taken from the pragmatic sphere, there would occur a substitution of meanings on a social scale. All these circumstances taken together would mean that such a social system discredits itself and, consequently, becomes non-legitimate as regards its supreme right of interpreting the democratic idea.

These final conclusions are, however, of mere theoretical value. The idea of their own supremacy is impudently proclaimed by the today's USA via its leaders. The advance of the Anglo-Saxon civilization model seems endless to them and their interests appear to be the only worthwhile realization, and at all costs at that. The feeling of supremacy begot two world wars, not to mention numerous minor ones. In the modern world, jam-packed with nuclear arsenals, such a claim of supremacy is utterly dangerous. This is all the more the case if this claim is not completely adequate for the existing world order.

2.2. America: the Demythologization of World Supremacy

Soon after World War II the West, providing its citizens with political freedoms and the opportunity to consume increasingly growing material wealth, became the attractive advertising wrapper both for those who did not have it and for those who did. Those enjoying the well-being inside the wrapper would readily agree with those who stirred up fears of the future where the hypothetical triumph of totalitarianism would deprive everybody of the gift of western democracies. By the end of 20th century the western consensus of society and power begotten by successfully developing systems of production and consumption seemed overwhelming for those who dared to oppose it.

When the socialist camp broke up, a good many on both sides of fast-transformed frontiers would willingly believe that the western social model would expand freely from now on. Experts in the West, ignoring the fundamental changes that have occurred, still adhere to an ideology rooted in the 1940s. All controversies are attributed to politics and business however, and the changing personality structure is never allowed for.

Where do the western political elites draw the assurance of the superiority of their model of democracy from in all the aspects of the problem of freedom? To begin with, let us specify under which conditions, and in relation to which other parts of the world did this model happen to be *more* democratic? Which comparative coordinates are of any relevance at all? Is it the 16th–19th centuries when *free* European capitalism was in the making while the rest of the world was the arena of colonial expansion and the suppression of any civilizations based in the West's sphere of interests? Is it the first half of the 20th century when America, with its incredible free capitalist cynicism, elbowed its way through the Great Depression to world leadership; the period when monstrous totalitarian regimes emerged in the USSR and Germany, and mankind was approaching the maelstrom of World War II? No. At that time the germs of the ideas of freedom were only emerging in the minds of the intellectual elite; freedom was interpreted not as the free expansion of bourgeois values, the only ones able to oppose the suffocating standards imposed by totalitarian regimes but as an inherent characteristic of the individual.

The modern and drastically obsolescent notion of the triumph of the western democracies emerged within a relatively short period, seen against the general historical backdrop, after Churchill's Fulton speech referred to the deliberate opposition of the two world systems — the totality of western bourgeois values and the repressive totalitarian regimes of the USSR and its satellites. . Today it is strange to observe though, how such outdated stereotypes, shaped more than 60 years ago, are still being foisted on the world community despite the huge changes that have occurred since the mid-20th century.

Which soil allowed these stereotypes to grow? We became used to thinking that the answer was partly given by Max Weber in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, which is still finding numerous advocates. Actually, the Albion of the 17th–19th centuries seemingly owed its might to the protestant morals that were rooted there. It is only after the protestant idea was *exported* by the Puritans to the New World that it thrived on the new soil.

The West's world leadership is fairly logical in this context. Catholicism, which originally displayed a particular practicality, *led to the* Reformation. According to Weber, Puritan leaders created a sober and sensible social structure in Europe, and then *the Mayflower* settlers — mainly Puritans — exported the idea to America. In contrast to Europe, though, they were influenced by no deep cultural traditions while building their new state. Actually, no one of the first settlers — freedom and fortune seekers — grieved for the past. Having repressed the Indians, the pioneers found themselves in a cleaned up rather than an empty space, where they had no past, nothing *preset*, as M. Mamardashvili observed [268: 331]. Capitalist seeds transplanted into *virgin* geopolitical conditions sprouted wildly. Once the intellectual effort expended on the search for the meaning of life *had been reduced*, capitalism took root in America surprisingly fast and is often seen as a native American product. The fact that Puritan ideas were transplanted into culturally *virgin soil* may be one of the reasons why in the 20th century American capitalism took the lead over the European form, which was struggling fiercely with the vestiges of the medieval past. Anyway, Europe was one of the first to assimilate the results of the changes that it had itself initiated. The above factor, along with others, contributed to the formation of the most powerful capitalist society, which *corrected* the past errors and appeared as the *new West with the human face* of democracy; the very West that is *obliged* to bear *the greatest burden*, claiming to administer changes for the better all over the world.

This model, which has become *the calling card* of western supremacy, in no way takes into account the volte-face that happened to people. Moreover, it also neglects the fact that the changed personality structure has been expressed in the forms of modern capitalism, which is no more than one of many possible, if not optional, manifestations thereof. In the same way, the Modernity, the time of a transforming personality structure, is enjoying the democratic social model as one of its constituent parts. In this sense, political democracy emerges after what the Enlightenment defined as mankind's *maturity*; the model conforms to the changed personality structure: not vice versa.

The West readily forgot its own culture crisis of the turn of the 19th–20th centuries. Whether it was observed or not, the existential revolution — the immediate effect of the Enlightenment — once really occurred in Europe and the USA. The revolution's consequences — which are still underestimated by many, topping the list being the fact that politicians *failed to keep pace with it*, — preordained the subject's essentially new position from within which he may mistrust any meta-narratives, including those compiled of totalitarian ideologies or the values of the consumer society. Even though the “phenomenon of the mistrust of meta-narratives” was formulated long ago [250; 251], it still has not been shared by modern politicians. The ruling elites ignore — what we might call the essence of these changes.

Despite the shortsightedness of the powerful in this world, both the revolution and its consequences are becoming universal: a new type of individual is also emerging in numerous cultures. Both in the West and in the East, there are obvious signs of a new individual emerging — intellectually free and responsible for his freedom, which the realities of the 21st century clearly demonstrate. *Democracy*, if mentioned at all, is of secondary relevance. The existential form of freedom and the political form are far from being the same. A freely-emerged meaning of personality and interaction-favoring formal rules do not overlap. Besides, one can be intellectually free while being politically dependent — and vice versa. Therefore, the consequences of the existential revolution may only be supplemented by the modern-day interpretation of democratic principles. That is why when democracy ideals are extolled today as the only achievement of human freedoms the praise is only often inadequate to the real state of affairs.

The universal process of the transformation of personality structure outstrips the dynamics of so called modern democracies. Social institutions have ceased to reflect the changes that have occurred in Man, this conflict being the cause of crisis in most western societies. This, in turn, increases potentially repressive forms of modern-day capitalism. The threats to *gold bullion* cause its beneficiaries to act in a way which least corresponds to the interests of the majority of the world community.

Would it be reasonable to suppose that it was the European culture crisis that provided the rest of the world with the *matured* personality structure? If so, we will fail to understand how it came about that various cultures achieved the existential revolution in different ways. Why do other cultures which are living through *the maturity crisis* have to enjoy it as a gift brought via the intrusion from outside of the western democracy model? Is it not an achievement of their own independently acquired and dearly paid for? Should we indeed seek the reasons for the changes in the capitalist expansion of the 17th–19th centuries and be grateful for the idea of modernization brought at the point of the western bayonet? The fact that the existential revolution first occurred in the West will not legitimate western democratic supremacy forever.

Why did the revolution advance faster in Europe and the USA? The question aggravated by the failure to fully understand the causes of modern conflict is of some significance. History never accepts the conditional mood, and we deal with what we have got. Today there is no need, however, to overestimate the idea that once the spontaneous birth of the Protestant spirit of profit predetermined democracy and the priority of the Anglo-Saxon globalization code that followed; not only is it incorrect but it is ruinous.

It is not the point that the western capitalism born by the Protestant spirit once gained its foothold somewhere and endowed the modern-day world with the democratic idea as a result. The point is that a natural and still little-studied process of the transformation of personality structure had as one of its likely forms the establishment of a western-type society. When the results of the changes became obvious, the bewildered world saw a Western society Man who really differed from the rest — first and foremost by the *adulthood*, in the sense that he reached the state of inner freedom of meaning-making. However, what appeared to be really visible and emulated criteria of the changes that had occurred were the formal rules of democracy, its economic potential and technologies; it was not the conscious intellectual freedom of the individual which many instinctively hurried — and still do — to get rid of. The host of the West's domestic problems appeared to be covered, in a fig-leaf fashion, by a more than attractive picture of material wealth provided by western economies and secured by political regimes.

It was Erich Fromm who warned that the western person was not ready for freedom and escaped from it into various dependencies — from consumerism to drugs [431; 432; 434]. It is only pitiful that his seminal works, *To Have or to Be* among them, sound out-of-date now and that a new understanding of the problems of the underestimation of freedom linked with the phenomenon of the crisis surrounding the individual is still not forthcoming. The prophetic words that consumption is not the ultimate goal of a person did not belong to Fromm alone. The works of Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse also pointed out *democracy* flaws; they showed the attempts of the power to impose the interests of big business to masses and unmasked numerous economic and political frauds suppressing the individual's inner world.

The Frankfurt School — one of the few in the 20th century to really inherit the ideas put forward in the Enlightenment — developed unambiguous formulas in this respect. Though Fromm, for instance, nowhere gives us a formal definition of intellectual freedom, he defines the escape mechanisms fairly clearly. He considers bourgeois values as a means of *refuge* from freedom to be such an important part in the process of a new enslavement because they seem the easiest way available to put the burden of responsibility on *somebody else's shoulders*.

While diagnosing the illness, Fromm turns away from previous statements which proclaimed that society suppresses personal freedom. His way of putting the question is essentially innovative: a person himself chooses stereotypes of social regulation as a means that allows him to avoid the problem of the meaning of personality. Besides, Fromm implicitly concedes that the dialectics of the general and the particular provide no rules which would regulate the principles that govern the choice of a hypothesis.

Fromm's conclusion can neither be verified nor falsified: one can only accept it. He created a *narrative* that reflects his personal viewpoint — a freely formulated *axiom*. The statements of his philosophy, taken together, point to a principle which was absent in a pre-crisis consciousness, to wit: the choice of world-view axioms is the individual's right provided by his intellectual freedom. Thus, the question as to why the individual chooses imposed axioms turns out to be that of a method using which individuals can arbitrarily choose their own. The unresolved question of a method means the unresolved question of the ways through which personal intellectual freedom can be realized.

One can draw quite a similar conclusion from Marcuse's works [284; 285]. A new society offers an essentially unfortunate world-outlook via an incredibly wide range of goods and services. If science is reduced to notions that are treated empirically, the rest of knowledge creates a new and meaningless construct from these. The Philosophy of Grammar shows that shortened language forms are followed by shortening forms of thinking; as a result, operational and behaviorist rationality absorbs the opposing elements of mind. Logical and linguistic analyses demonstrate the illusiveness of the old metaphysical questions, but in so doing the search for the meaning of things is substituted with that for the meaning of words. The result is a false metaphysics of artificially constructed needs. Freedom as such is reduced to that of making a choice from the goods offered, and cultural values accomplish a commercial task. All that remains is the search for pleasure, which is reduced to "sexuality in social forms". Society as a whole is unaware of its destination.

Marcuse's *positive* social critique is combined with the requirement of true human existence, of an individual's freedom and happiness, which should be provided by society. In order to fulfil the requirement he puts forward a *hypothesis* which is substantiated psychoanalytically, such as Fromm's hypothesis. Marcuse points at the necessity of a new correlation between instincts and mind which would lead to a new non-repressive society only possible if "sexual instincts driven by their own dynamics will be able to create solid erotic relations between mature individuals in the changed existential and social conditions" [285: 213]. According to Marcuse, it is the "libido rationality" rather than the aggressive one that can go hand in hand with progress that affects a person at higher levels of civilized freedom.

Generally, his proposals do not reach beyond Fromm's *prescription* although they substantially differ in the means of the grounding used. Moreover, one consequence is the supposition that personal release can be achieved via the conscious choice of suicide. The leitmotif is most distinct in *Eros and Civilization* where Marcuse actually proclaims Man's right to make an independent and self-reliant decision to die (though under certain conditions which are hoped to be reached in the future).

However, sordid Schopenhauerian tones in Marcuse's sociology, as in Fromm's philosophy, merely emphasize the implicit admittance of a possible *space* for inherent freedom. Fromm puts the question of the social forms of life intruding into a personal inner space, and, as a result, the need for privacy where an individual can think, enquire about and find replies to his questions [283]. Similarly, Marcuse formulates the problem of human privacy as a *sine qua non* that is needed to acquire an independent meaning of freedom determined regardless of social forms of thinking. Following the reappraisal of metaphysics, both its old forms and *empirically* oriented new form become a matter of personal preference. Therefore solitude is a *space* where the next step is possible opening the way to renounce social reality. In other words, loneliness is a *space* of free choice of meaningful axioms.

Similarly, Adorno stated the question of the laws governing independently determined intellectual freedom. In his opinion, Kant's moral philosophy of, in a sense, predicts the problem which the world-view of the industrial society is trying to solve [9]. Rationality embodied in science, industry, technology, and social institutions in no way explains the meaning of all these apart from the means of the existence that is being sustained. The world picture that occurs as the empirical given is comprehended establishes the unconditional causality within which Man appears as a finite creature for whom it is meaningless to question the meaning of the whole. The meaning, if any, of the participation in the system, is only revealed in a personal self-sacrifice in the name of this system's further existence. The preference for everything that comprises the social non-I is only justified, and the question of what this non-I represents is beyond the individual's competency.

According to Adorno, Kant could recognize the problem, neglected by the era of developed capitalism: everything which relates to society is only of functional value and serves for something else, in respect of which it acts as a means. However, this something, for the sake of which the means exists, cannot be defined with any categories of positive thinking. Adorno believes that Kant speaks of freedom as of the *empty* product of thinking which is not rooted in any superior, originally creative, principle. Nevertheless, as a Man whom "metaphysics beckons to cognize the absolute", Kant states that the "glitter of freedom" promises the inquisitive mind that it can reach the ultimate link in the chain of causes. In terms of practical philosophy, this presupposes a necessity to establish freedom as a law of a particular kind. Such a law should exist both beyond the mind and the world of outer

violence. There should be a kind of “zone of indifference” between the experience and *a priori*, where the given of the moral law is revealed.

Thus, Adorno fixes the situation of the uncertainty of meaning in the preserved state. Meanwhile, the essential difference from the direct relation to the culture crisis is the fact that pragmatic tasks of science and utilitarian aims of society are *taken out of the parentheses*, a personality with the question about meaning being at its heart. The problem of Man appears in the enslavement of the individual who is conscious of the dependence both on the nature and on the law, which directs him to obey the existing social order.

Such a change presupposes *by default* the right to be emancipated from common views on law to independent ethical behavior; or the right to freely establish the moral law for oneself. The notion of freedom, Adorno suppose, which is generally revealed as extremely spontaneous and uncertain most probably seems nothing but the ability to become disconnected imaginatively from nature or from objective reality, in the meantime establishing these as quite different relationships — those within the frame of which we above all acquire the experience of them and generally exist as such [9].

The critical theory realized the tendency of subjects’ self-addressing, wherefrom the recognition of self-reflection as freedom may follow. The indirect recognition of the fact is a certain degree of freedom. The space of personal ex-territoriality becomes something indifferent as regards both the world-outlook of civilization and its metaphysics. However, what is left is the unsolved problem of self-determination in the aim in the inner world of the individual, as he does not have an opportunity to overcome the doubt which considers the question of the aim to be the question for the sake of the question, and no more. Or, in Kant-Adorno’s terms, a question is left whether the Reason is able to accomplish aims besides itself. Thus, the individual longing for release is restrained by a sense of his own impotence and, in Fromm’s terminology, escapes. The only thing which can keep from it is, as Adorno states it, the remaining thought that the hell which we believe to be the earthly life cannot be everything that exists. There is something in the very human nature, Adorno claims, that gives the Man the ground to hope that our world is not everything and somewhere there should without fail be something else [9].

Similar considerations were sure to become a fly in the bourgeois ointment. Both then and nowadays the theme of the self-development of capitalism with no one to control it is on the *fringes* of scholarship. Fromm and his contemporaries’ warnings that capitalism and its democracy may also turn out a specific totalitarian model — that of consumerist values — are now fairly unpopular. We shouldn’t repel them, however, if the case in question is the freedom of the individual’s inner world. This is endangered not only by non-democratic regimes but by the consequences of the pragmatic choice of the Sense as the only tool to find perspectives for Man. So the appeal to the western model of political freedom as its ultimate form is not always unambiguous, for it is western democracy that begot the market-oriented personality model.

However, quite recently it seemed important that inner and outer critique of the West had dwindled in the presence of threatening totalitarian socialist regimes. The suppression of those few who did not fit in with the picture and fell outside the borders of guaranteed political freedoms was quite delicate as compared with political repressions in the socialist camp. All the domestic western problems seemed unessential and the colossal economic power which led to the unprecedented accessibility of consumer values was still the West’s chic calling card which gave it the right to dictate everywhere what the means of measuring personality should be in order to create *progressive* forms of the world order.

Meanwhile, the process of personality structure change carved its way from inside the socialist mindset. The resulting perestroika and *the time of troubles* merely triggered it. “Man is a creature that is always in the making, and the whole history may be defined as the history of his effort to become Man”, Mamardashvili writes. “Man does not exist, — he becomes... And you, people of the West, and we, those from the East, are in the same historical point, for history does not coincide with the chronological sequence of events” [270: 30].

The conflict between the East and the West is merely an instructive example. It is obvious that China, India, Iran, and the South American countries are treading an analogous path of *maturation* but making it their own. However, the changing personality structure is only rarely supposed to become global. It is the *supernova* Man rather than the democratic idea serving the capitalism beneficiaries that is being globalized, with the West only paying perfunctory attention to the fact. The very notion

of political freedoms is also being reconsidered: these are only possible if demanded by an inherently independent personality. Where the changes are absent, democratic freedoms are unlikely to be imposed artificially. Recent events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria indicate the total failure to govern the progressing personality structure. These have resulted in chaos, war conflicts and a considerable decrease of living standards at best, false patterns from the West having greatly contributed to this. The *democracy* which essentially serves the pragmatic globalization code is incapable of making an altruistic gift of intellectual freedom. Its aim is to implement the political elites' interests, the major one being the superiority in the establishment of the rules of the world game.

Despite the disproportions, an emerging global community of equals is evolving. Particular societies have the right to achieve their own forms of personality structure transformation. The process is at least governed by the abstract democratic notions that have matured as the intermediate form of one of its variants. Conversely, the process's specific nature in different parts of the world requires it to assume a concrete form of government in each particular case. The attempt to spur on these dynamic changes with so-called democratic revolutions and information wars is merely dangerous nowadays. As a result, some of today's political leaders who posit western *democratic* values as the universal means to improve the situation sound cynical at the very least.

Ukrainian events are the glaring example of recent years. Geopolitical interests of the West, aimed at spreading the springboard for the *attack* on Russia were packaged as *democracy*. Nobody was interested in the consequences of "the dignity revolution": the unprecedented fall in production, commerce, and standard of living with a huge increase in the level of corruption.

Structurally, the claim of the USA's political elites for the world leadership stems from the mechanisms which Adorno, Marcuse and Fromm exhaustively described. The authoritarian personality that *by default* became a stereotype for the head of *the world's sole superpower* is clothed in the illusion of free elections. Moreover, the confidence in their global supremacy — one of the most topical variants of totalitarianism nowadays — engrossed not only particular leaders but the social and political institutions of the West as a whole. Their firm belief in the exclusive right to interpret the *true* content and aim of globalization is to a certain respect comparable to the claim of the Third Reich for world supremacy. Nevertheless, the question whether it is possible to make them consider any real assessment of their actions and decisions is left without any audible reply.

Thus, it would be naïve to expect the emerging community of equals to soon be ready for any global consensus on the whole range of the questions concerning the world order. It is obviously a far cry. In a considerable number of cases we are dealing with modernization without Enlightenment which will be discussed in detail later. Meanwhile, it is a today's burning necessity to take into account the community members' equality in order to solve the existing contradictions rather than build unpromising but dangerous plans for a world-leading center.

Neglecting this delicate problem, the USA — the leader of the *developed* world though this is open to dispute — replicates the idea of its world mission with an obstinacy that is worthy of a better cause. The community of intellectuals who prized the majesty of the superpower, which implements world hegemony, steadily expanded from around the mid-20th century. Numerous reasons contributed to American exceptionality: Puritan roots [533] and the absence of feudalism with its aristocratic and liberal parties fighting [517]; special American republicanism [547], not to mention the unique role of immigration [576].

The words of Max Lerner, who added a line of his own to the ode on America's all-round supremacy over the rest of the world are quite characteristic in this context. America is quite a particular culture celebrating its own typical features, with its own views and power scheme, the culture, comparable to Greece or Rome as one of the great and independent civilizations in world history [248, V.1]. Symbolically, the two notions, "culture" and "civilization", are synonyms here. Although multiple distinctions between "culture" and "civilization" are known to be reduced to "meaning" and "a means" as constants, since the 1970s, but this the solution of the question on the difference of the concepts has been ignored in USA. Going back to the *out-of-date* polemics, the above quotation will sound quite different, particularly if we bear in mind the problem of America's supremacy.

The ancient — as well as modern — worlds would always find a way to articulate the meaning of a lasting life — that is, to build their own culture. Whether it was the antique or the Old-

Chinese myth, the Gothic cathedral or the orthodox icon — or whatever else from the list — everything would become the element of the system of symbols that represent the universal concept of the purpose of being, both of Man and society. In other words, until a certain historic moment, each culture represented its notion of the meaning in the meta-narrative. As related to other cultures, such a notion might appear somewhat subjective, but within each particular culture it was interpreted as the exhaustive knowledge of the meaning.

As we have more than once emphasized, the West — and the USA above all — were the first to experience the culture crisis; as it was surmounted, the individual realized that whatever his commitments concerning civilization should be from now on, his subjective definition of the meaning of participation in its reproduction, is a personal competence alone. As a consequence, the *old* myths — meta-narratives — lose their universal significance for an intellectually free person, and culture ceases to be a universal phenomenon as it was understood by Danilevskij or Spengler, for instance.

Each culture before the existential revolution can be alleged to have its own civilization. These were not identical; their similar technical means of survival are distinguished by a number of outward features. Some managed to reproduce the order system; others built Buddhist stupa; some invented gunpowder and paper; others conceived the gnomon and the clepsydra. Even ancient civilizations, however, much as they differed, kept corresponding to their main principle — they were the means of existence, and it is the spiritualizing influence of cultural meaning that turned them into distinguishable specific images.

The existential revolution was accompanied by one more extraordinary event, another revolution in a way — civilization changed its scale. Any achievements of civilization rapidly became a common integrated property, which somewhat later was associated with the idea of globalization. The novelty excited many minds; few could apprehend it though. However, there appeared some bright and precise formulae. For example, as early as the 1930s Vladimir Vernadskij wrote: “For the first time Man really became aware of his being a dweller of the globe; from now on he can — must — think and act bearing in mind this new aspect rather than that of an individual, family, or kin, even of states or their unions; in a word, the global aspect” [97: 28]. It is only pitiful that quoting the once famous work of Vernadskij sounds unconvincing nowadays although there were a great number of similar wordings of the idea pronounced in his wake. But let us raise the question: what does the need to *think of oneself globally* mean nowadays? These are not empty words. Science, industrial technologies, the challenges of a uniform character facing people, as well as their uniform reproduction in films, literature, etc. — have become obvious signs of a globalized world, to mention a few [83; 84; 85]. All these phenomena stem from the same structural core, namely — civilization as a global code of means and rules that aim to furnish our common home where there is room for everyone.

The code of means and rules concerns just one sphere — how to live in order to sustain and multiply the survival media? The code is, as always, indifferent to the question *what for*? Finding a compromise of interests that provides mutually advantageous survival conditions is the aim. Peoples become civilized, i.e. able to contribute to the general mechanism that maintains the means of survival. Many also consider this as follows: those who have mastered the rules become more *civilized* virtually in the same sense as more *cultured* ones. However, this supposition *by default* is a blunder as related to culture and the existential revolution that has occurred.

The task of making the rules of modern civilization function has also fallen to the West. It is no coincidence then that America is still trying to promote the idea that was promoted by a noted American scholar Lerner that the whole history of how Americans subjugated the world without weapons or colonization witnesses some inherent harmony between America and the spirit of modern world [248, V.I]. Why not think like this if it is the USA that has managed, with the instruments it conceived, to concentrate planetary financial and political resources in New-York and contrive global punishment for those reluctant to play *the game with one goal-mouth*? Neither M. Lerner nor many of his fellow countrymen, nonetheless, could foresee what is obvious nowadays: the players loyal to the rules that have been imposed are in a decreasing minority. It is of minor importance whether they have been *developed* or *underdeveloped* or *at least developed*: the *supernova* era seems to neglect the difference.

At the beginning of the 21st century, Man, as in all times, builds and applies civilization to maintain culture. The current phenomenon is, however, that civilization and culture are different. Civilization is becoming global; its universal principles will soon be available in any distant corner of the Planet. Moreover, the change in personality structure, and the move towards existential freedom is also an objective and universal process. Still, we are far less aware of it than of economic transformations. Is it a reason for us to fail to notice that formerly great local cultures have ceased to exist, however? On the contrary, some new potential is inherent in our era; its realization implies that the host of cultures — if we understand these as the core of the world's meaningful content — is equal to that of personal judgments on the subject. Whether we tend to admit it or not, a global post-crisis cultural space is coming into being; this is created by anybody willing to, rather than by the few *chosen*. The limitless space of free personal interpretations of the world meaning is brought to formal — and only formal — agreement by the universal rules of civilization, which do not apply to the free individual's inner world.

Mamardashvili was right at least in the following — there is only one civilization at the moment. Moreover, if the cultural contact can be conceded, one may regard civilization solely as the condition of its external formal variant. The actual cultural contact, even if it comes to be in the future, will follow its own, absolutely independent and still unrevealed rules. Hidden from today's mindset, the concealed opportunity of contact may be exposed to the light of actual knowledge centuries later. Someday the universal notion of the world's meaning will have been formed, perhaps. If so, it would be needless for the West to cherish the hope that it is bound to be its mission. The global factor of the new world system is that both civilizational power and the essentially novel cultural phenomenon — the individual capable of independent meaning-making — have ceased to be the prerogative of the West.

Whatever are the West's endeavors to believe that the rest of the world is still its satellite, whatever are the plans to make powerful coalitions to establish western hegemony — all these cannot possibly be applied to the processes of personality structure transformation. Moreover, the condition of the West is unsteady, and the USA's financial might is but doubtful. Some years ago, Francis Fukuyama in *The End of America Inc.* [532] conceded that China and India had become economic colossi; that other economic models were becoming more and more attractive; and, generally, the "America brand" was being subjected to a tough durability test. Although all the attempts to foretell the economic future of America appear a thankless and good-for-nothing task, the fact of the beginning of the reorganization of the world economy is unquestionable. It is no wonder that nowadays the disruption of the economic might of the superpower makes its claims to civilizational superiority particularly intriguing.

The End of History, Fukuyama's once famous work, is scarcely remembered nowadays. In the modern political context its purport is somewhat lost, if not naïve; his *Confidence* might sound even cynical. If the western social institutions still enjoy the confidence of the citizens, on the world scale these are losing their credit drastically. The above is especially true of the USA [439].

Both developed countries and those that remain underdeveloped, even the least developed, are repelling the hegemony of the Anglo-Saxon code — not because of a primitive stubbornness but due to the objective processes in the changing world, the growing distrust first and foremost. Anyway, the West has lost its peremptory right to claim its own model of the world order. There are still financial, political, and military reserves at the West's disposal but there is a lack of moral superiority. It is of no importance though whether its opponents' current prospects of acquiring such reserves are illusory or real. Everything will change sooner or later. The fact that the other worlds still do not possess equal wealth does not play a key role anymore — for it is their future already seen. What is really essential is that the West's dictate of the will is now facing the changing self-consciousness of masses from many other worlds where the personality structure that once appeared in the West is being shaped.

The Anglo-Saxon code — globalization's weapon — is dramatically turning against those in whose hands it lies. It is even possible to allege that the way it is nowadays institutionalized in the USA is disastrous for the country. Involvement in pragmatic issues tends to disavow the legacy of the Enlightenment. Social institutions of democracy, education and mass information are ceasing to fulfill their role of providing citizens' freedom and dignity. Quite on the contrary, they are turning into the tools that serve the interests of political powers that aim at world hegemony. The state in general, its political and powerful institutions are unable to critically assess themselves and are bound to lose the

capacity for moral responsibility. This results in a dangerously explosive atmosphere where self-conceit drastically contradicts reality. Ruling elites set inadequate targets; they make appalling errors both in domestic and in foreign policies, which cost millions of ruined lives.

Something similar occurred in the twilight of socialism. Now the modern world is a kind of *mirror image*. The objective processes of the fading West can hardly be compensated for artificially. Nonetheless, it is these means that devour the lion's share of effort which leads to the exhausting of resources. The *overstrain* on the West is more than obvious, the financial challenge being the least of many; there are political, migratory, cultural challenges, to mention a few. The most morbid sign is the existence of demoralized ruling elites encouraged by the worst variant of Machiavellianism: their *end that justifies any means* is to establish the world supremacy of pragmatic preferences that are advantageous for them alone.

Is it worth considering that there is a strong reason to call the USA and the West in general just a contemptuous glance from history? In fact, no. It would be meaningless, even silly to deny that the content of the personality structure depends on the medium providing the conditions for an individual to cope with historically determined tasks. What Solov'ev and Weber showed reveals the historical ground the West had used to promote the content of the personality structure. The outstanding idea of a universal civilization emerged in the West radically influenced by the formation of global media and caused the specific processes which affected the change in personality structure in the modern world.

Are there any grounds to believe America is the center of the world order? No again, for two reasons. Globally, America is losing its dominant position. Although its economy is the largest, and nobody is interested in the crash of dollar — the world currency, there is an essential difference between an economy and a currency that are naturally dominant and those that are dominant due to the interests of some other participants in the social-economic processes. Culturally, America has already lost its leadership, because the growing personality structure is rapidly becoming a universal phenomenon. The world has entered a new and unexplored phase of dynamic reconstruction where there is no room for any *world centre* to rule changes. De facto the world is not subjected to any self-proclaimed centre; any attempts to do this are devoid of any legitimate grounds.

To successfully solve domestic issues is a major challenge for both the West and those who is still *en route*. Whether we like the West or not, it has experienced some universal changes in the personality structure that provided the basis of civilization base — and the process still has a long way to go. What remains for the present time is a responsibility for the future though what has been done to take it on is a question that is still open.

2.3. Freedoms in Today's Russia: Modernization without Enlightenment

According to Vladimir Klyuchevskij, Russia “has made the transition from Pope Silverster's Domostroj to Diderot and Dalember's Encyclopedia in less than a hundred years” [72: 16]. In the 20th century mass religion was replaced with mass atheism, and the early 21st century saw Russia set on the path towards Orthodox culture. Behind this impassionate statement there is a gigantic national catastrophe that means a dramatic increase in the amount of suffering per capita [72]. It would not be easy to assess our *movement forward*; it would be possible to speak with certainty about some major outcomes of modernization in Russia.

The concept of Modernity appeared for two reasons. The first is the development of the heliocentric worldview, science and technology, which ensured the formation of high-tech industrial societies with high labor productivity, effective banking capital, as well as flexible and diverse economic models.

The second cause is the Enlightenment, with its ideas of democracy, human rights and view of Man as an independent moral individual. The contribution of this factor to modernity materialized in a personality with *genetic* respect for its own political freedoms, which are regarded as something natural, something that goes without saying. In turn, the attitude makes social institutions feel some responsibility that is manifested as a need, albeit insincere, to maintain the status-quo between personality and state.

In recent times it has become increasingly clear that there had been one more factor, the historical change in the personality structure, which had brought about a person with not only political but also intellectual freedom. The latter is of a special kind, pertaining to the sphere of the formation of an existential sense. As had been understood by the mid-20th century, Man has a triple nature: biological, social and psychological. As a biological organism, an individual can move about freely. As a social being and member of society, Man can be vested with political freedoms. As a sensible creature with his inner world of emotions, he is free to formulate his own view of the meaning of his participation in the world. It is the ability that, in simplest terms, constitutes intellectual freedom, which modernized people of the West were the first to discover.

In the course of the 19th century, the three factors merged. However, their role in Russian history needs to be studied separately, beginning with early times. For example, according to Vladimir Solov'ev, "the Christian East, righteous in its constant piousness and dedication to the motherland's holy Christianity, <...> while maintaining ardently the basis of the Church, Christian Scriptures, <...> was reluctant to create anything on this basis"...[382: 53]. In turn, Rome "being practical, gave high priority to caring about the means of making a Kingdom of Heaven on Earth. <...> The Christian Rome, having the same energy of powerful human will as the pagan Rome, exerts all this effort to establish the Church <...> coming up everywhere with its powerful decision and steadfast actions" [382: 53]. In contrast to the East, the West was originally focused more on practice; what caused it to modernize early.

The first attempt to modernize Russia was made by Peter the Great. Today there seems to be little disagreement as to its results: modernization of the state and political system, technology and culture being imposed on a society that was not ready for the change. The state did its best to make the gigantic leap, and there was little time and energy left to reform Man's mindset and traditions towards the *autonomous individual* in a more or less natural way. Therefore, with regard to modernity, Tsar Peter's reforms can be described as fragmentary, if not premature, or modernization without enlightenment. They did not lay the grounds for democracy or for what could be called intellectual freedom.

The next milestone in Russia's modernization was the reforms of Alexander II. They gave momentum to the reforms undertaken by S. Vitte and P. Stolypin. Vitte's plan included railway construction, the growth of oil extraction and coal mining, and the development of the metal industry. It was relatively successful; the financial system also stabilized considerably. Stolypin went on implementing the project for non-coercive disbandment of village communes and transition to private property. The Vitte-Stolypin modernization was substituted for by Bolshevik reforms, with class ideology, with science and technology driving progress. Mass education was the only idea of the Enlightenment to be implemented, while intellectual independence of personality as well as economic and political liberalism were discarded by Bolshevism.

The Russian Empire, and to a far greater extent, the Soviet government adopted an industrialization strategy that brought Russia much closer to Europe. However, they failed to reach modernity, as it exists in the West. The Russian idiosyncrasy was that medieval attitude to people (*mip* [*mir*]. — translator's note; *на мpy и смерть красна* — to die is no fear if there are people around you) transformed into the Communist Utopia of social equality.

As Bertrand Russell wrote about ideas shared by Christianity and Communism, "the Jewish pattern of history, past and future, is such as to make a powerful appeal to the oppressed and unfortunate at all times. St. Augustine adapted this pattern to Christianity, Marx to Socialism. To understand Marx psychologically, one should use the following dictionary:

Yahweh = Dialectical Materialism

The Messiah = Marx

The Elect = the Proletariat

The Church = the Communist Party

The Second Coming = the Revolution

Hell = Punishment of the Capitalists

The Millennium = the Communist Commonwealth" [342: 343].

Both Russian ideologies — first the *Orthodox vseedinstvo* (*all-unity*. — translator's note) and the commune system and later Communism — each in its own way hampered the implementation of the Enlightenment program to the full extent, The utopian component of modernization proceeds from

the archaic, medieval outlook that the world exists thanks to the Creator, i.e., some impersonal, super-individual power, “a reasonable being that assigns the purpose to everything” (Thomas Aquinas) [see 105: 349–350]. The medieval worldview perfectly fits the idea of building a new society that lives according to a 5-year plan and without private property, a free market and anarchy. On the other hand, archaic thinking is incompatible with the academic analysis of current social, economic and cultural processes, as well as social or individual criticism.

Communist ideologists appealed to both the mass and the individual consciousness with discourse on equality, anti-market and the Enemy in various images. According to N. Berdyaev, all constituents of the Communist ideology had been prepared for by the history of the Russian intelligentsia, including the yearning for social equality, recognition of a working Man as a supreme type of personality, a hatred for capitalism and the bourgeoisie, intolerance for sects, and a suspicious attitude to the cultural elite [53: 100].

By the end of the 20th century, Russia had not yet passed the stage of urbanization which is necessary for molding a special type of personality that had been forming in Europe for hundreds of years, concurrently with the economy. It is these people who drove the industrial revolution and were themselves its product, while developing a particular way of thinking, behavioral code and lifestyle. [See 172]. Unlike peasants, they have self-control instead of external regulators, thereby realizing the medieval maxim “*Stadtluft macht frei*” (“urban air makes Man free”).

Therefore, a new phase of modernization, *perestroika*, was set in motion by Mikhail Gorbachev virtually from scratch, in terms of the Enlightenment. During the period of transition from the totalitarian system, it seemed that once political freedoms were a given, all the rest would take care of itself. Fostered during the period of stagnation, indifference, if not disgust, for any ideals of collectivism played a trick on a society that no longer had any fear. The resulting freedom turned out to be not freedom for some purpose, but freedom from everything. The absence of a legal culture, and what is more important, the culture of intellectual self-esteem, yielded a predictable result: in the chaos of freedom, there emerged a few groups that thought they were also free to benefit from the situation *better than others*.

In today's Russia, the accumulation of primitive capital occurred under the most unsavory circumstances that had little to do with the Enlightenment. The degradation of some spheres of education as a social institution, being the most important characteristics of Enlightenment, illustrates the situation. All this would be sufficient to admit the fact of a deep crisis in modern Russian society, be it not for the third factor of modernization, that is, the historic transformation of the personality structure towards intellectual freedom.

Europe and the West were the first to come to the state of freedom. Together with the historic development of the personality structure, the political and legal interpretations of freedom were transformative. Consistent emancipation from religious dogma, the dominance of the traditional worldview and political despotism became increasingly factored in legal norms. The latter in turn correlated more and more with the forming of an inner personal *space* of freedom. Thus, the modernization of the West was based on science and industry, the Enlightenment and the pursuit of all aspects of intellectual freedom as a whole. However, Russia has hardly measured up in the first aspect only. Still, there are a few reasons to disagree that having once become established somewhere, Western capitalism together with the ideas of the Enlightenment by virtue of this very fact bestowed on the world the ideal of personality and society.

It is clear that the transformation of personality structure is a global process. Like a road roller, the Communist dictatorship in the USSR ran roughshod over the Christian worldview. One should by no means think that millions of lives were a redemptive sacrifice for the result. However, Communism destroyed all medieval traditions, and then collapsed; this was not due to low oil prices or pressure from the West. It was caused by the objective process of emancipation of the individual's inner world, something which people in the European culture had experienced earlier. It is a historical fact that the citizens of today's Russia had to go through the crisis of obtaining intellectual freedom in this particular way and pay for this a historically determined price.

The natural and so far little understood process of the global transformation of personality took the shaping of a Western-type society as one of its forms [190]. The fact itself does not imply the superiority of the model to those accompanying such processes in other countries. In the sphere of existential meanings, a modern Russian citizen is as free as a westerner. However, his status is not

sustained by a traditional respect for political freedoms that appeared due to the Enlightenment. Modernization without the Enlightenment makes the risk of freedom turning into lawlessness increase considerably, especially if an archaic morality is on the decline. Only the conservatism of the political system can counterbalance the lack of a natural sense of responsibility. And for the same reason, the discrepancy between legal political freedoms and practice cannot be eliminated instantly, in a revolutionary way. The only smooth remedy here would be inter-generational social and cultural evolution. All attempts to catalyze the process are bound to lead to chaos and lower the cultural level even more, of which Ukraine is a terrifying example.

Another problem is that the educated community is not *intellectually ready*. is the term “the educated community” denotes not only the intellectual elite of the modern social hierarchy, but also the *aristocrats* of knowledge, who can analyze facts as their essence requires, and who constitute the educated community itself. Here we mean the critical mass of the social stratum without the reproduction of which the society cannot efficiently function. If there is no social layer keeping up high standards of fundamental values and the corresponding real-life relations, rather than rhetorical devices, the mass, including the would-be elite, will inevitably be devouring itself. And the answer to the old question in Russian studies *who educates the educators*, analyzed by the Frankfurt School and customarily discussed within sociology, will demonstrate the heavy dependence of the educated community’s outlook on the institutional structure of post-totalitarian society.

An indispensable component of a person’s socialization during the establishment of capitalism is the experience of failure, which a Soviet-minded person is not ready to face, because the entire social system was proclaiming the possibility of achieving success. In reality, the words turned out to be hardly more than a declaration, as compared to the capabilities of the state to suppress everything personal (as a means for what was common). The absence of the experience of failure in the adaptive mechanism of post-Soviet people often led to frustration. They lived with the sense of inferiority and could slip into a depression, while suffering shock and emotional paralysis.

The history of western capitalist culture proves that one of the fundamentals of personal identification is a combination of experiences of success and failure, both facilitating socialization. The former is a prerequisite for self-actualization and motivation for higher goals, something that is purposefully cultivated in capitalist society. Without it one can hardly become a talented businessman, scientist or doctor.

The experience of *failure* is also a prerequisite and mandatory natural *training* that teaches people how to respond to the requirements of the social environment, without help from their parents and friends. It is a key stage in maturation that should not be missed; otherwise, there will be no self-awareness, self-identification and understanding of personal effectiveness. The experience is connected with the formation of a personal discourse analysis that is a culture of *rationalization*, i.e., understanding why one fails to do or make something better or have a better life. The analysis of the experience of failure makes one be the prosecutor, attorney and judge at the same time. The final stage, *execution of judgment*, is to turn the results of the analysis into actions. Common thinking does not go that far, usually shifting the balance towards the attorney, who will always justify any deed and incapacity whatever.

Living through failures and overcoming them presupposes a certain level of self-assessment that is an indispensable part of socialization and the formation of individual ethics. It implies breaking the vicious circle of paternalism, of juniors always relying on seniors and of social disability. It presupposes the formation of an independent, self-sufficient and moral individual, capable of telling good from evil based on personal experience, and taking responsibility for his words and deeds. Values, ethical norms, customs and traditions of any culture are of little use unless at a certain stage of their enrooting in a person’s mind they are daily sustained with hard personal efforts. Combining words with deeds, assessing a person’s goals against the reality would help to get rid of burning ambitions and the madness of *self-conceit* (Hegel).

Thus, the experience of failures is not a person’s personal result gained through trial and error, but a mechanism to constitute identification. It is about the analysis of problematic, uncertain or prospective circumstances or concrete facts, an assessment of various situations and external roles against their imaginary counterparts that impose a possible, desired or obligatory way to behave. The experience is not learnt like the rules of hygiene, multiplication table, spelling or the Highway Code. It is mastered more like the diagnostic tools used in acupuncture that identify the most sensitive and

efficient areas of combining a person's natural abilities with requirements of society. This results in the development of a system for evaluating other people and for self-assessment that matches a person's actual accomplishments in work and life, irrespective of status.

The necessary combination of the two fundamental components of socialization, success and failure, is directly and indirectly present all aspects of Western culture, from top-level politics, haute couture fashion, corporate codes, school curricula, topics for essays, methods to deliver lectures and conduct practical training, to inscriptions on monuments to outstanding public figures. Success is viewed as the quintessence of merging social ethics with individual effort.

In Russia, it is not the case. The success ideology (*The world is for the young*) is hardly more than a figure of speech; while in reality there can be many hurdles in a person's life and career.

The declarative theory of *success* is of key significance for describing the hierarchic structure of Soviet society in terms of gratification [132: 280]. Economically and socially it looked like rationing, typical of the Asian style of production, with the reward depending on a person's rank, position, or status. In fact, it is not based on merit, but is more like a classification system. Such a gratification system forms an illusory consciousness with a gap between self-esteem (which is inflated, as a rule), declared ambitions, and actual accomplishments in life, career, family and relationships within a person's social environment. The gap is wide; it is a constituent part of the Soviet character, with a particular set of views that are still widespread. It can be referred to as hierarchy-, status- or rank-based; it is a conscious or unconscious attitude when everything is evaluated through a person's social standing (position, academic degree, rank, association with power structures, membership of a party or foundation etc.). It is a special system of axes with the social status as the absolute constant. If there is a status, there is also respect of others and self-respect: *I have reached the status*. "Worthy people" means those of a certain social standing. Once you have lost it, you are nothing.

Self-respect and attitude to others is based on the level of demands rather than accomplishments. Typical behavior includes the craving for self-assertion, demonstration of a person's absolute significance and impeccability, self-assuredness as the underside of a person's lack of accomplishments, a strong belief that only the social status is everything, and not talent or actions. Therefore, rather than expecting benefits from society, one should come and grab them, by any manner of means, e.g., become president of a virtual foundation, of an academy, a head of department, etc.

Thus, one of the key components of the post-Soviet individual's identification remains social standing. Like a student approaching academic research where he "has no other identity apart from a phonetic or molecular one" [158: 18], the post-Soviet individual's identification mechanism turns out to be extremely poor, while being concentrated in the force field of status achievement.

Together with the fortuitous experience of gaining status, the basis for personal culture in Russia is failure, or the experience of suffering, which imposes a special mechanism of self-determination and constitutes a key feature of collective living, the code for social behavior and the socialization of members of a team that has to work together. The experience of suffering and non-success is the omnipresent hypostasis that virtually nobody can escape. Even if a person has made a good career, the experiences of non-success and suffering will haunt him all his life. Their incarnations are innumerable, including the subconscious anxiety of a city dweller who is always expecting a pitfall in all spheres of life, rudeness everywhere in Russia, bureaucracy that arouses Kafkaesque horror, psychological strain from interpersonal relations, the monstrosity of family tyranny, irremovable gender stereotypes (that are the basis of a touchy teenage boy's belief that girls are inferior and not worthy of male approval), and the redemption of male chauvinism for intellectual independence and a successful career. Hence constant fear, the tendency to feel like a victim, and envy form an intrinsic trait of the Russian character (people of low birth, as was said in earlier times) along with a wish to seem unhappy, for it is better that way etc.

A specific anthropological structure of a post-Soviet Russian can be described as follows [132: 375]: anxious, non-self-reliant, profusely aggressive, envious and ready to say something unpleasant about others, rather than something good. He or she may be full of malicious joy about a person's bad luck and expect a better chance for him- or herself. When taking up a vacant position in the social hierarchy, he or she immediately adopts the manner of speech of a slave who has finally become the master and an authoritative tone not only towards people in a lower position, but also to

colleagues who are senior with regard to professional experience, academic degrees, or age. As a rule, the surrounding people do not take this lack of respect as rudeness. They do not seem to hear it, as if they were unable to hear some sounds or intonations or a certain range of sound waves. Their ears do not hear, like those of patients with multiple sclerosis demonstrating a smaller range of emotional responses. Their hearing is impaired, untrained; with the gratification system, the manager (the master) is beyond criticism.

A typical example is the manager who thinks that constant discontent and *reasonable* suspicion will help to achieve discipline and a creative atmosphere at work. The *boss* is sure that the employees will constantly make mistakes and by definition do not deserve any praise or apologies. This keeps them in tense expectation of a reproach and the need to find excuses. At work, subordinates are like soldiers sitting in a trench and waiting for the manager's surprise attack. *Corporate ethics* often include yelling; swearwords, back-handed compliments and the phenomenon of the hopelessness of a trembling creature, treated like dirt, branded forever as an ontological jinx, as if there were the evil eye present in culture [266].

Such phenomena and related mechanisms are not confined to particular social spheres or strata. They are universal for all levels and prove the overall *immune deficiency* of the cultural component, for culture is initially oriented to a *careful upbringing*.

In addition to side-effects of the absence of culture of self-analysis and morally responsible individuals, there is another danger, yet common both in Russia and the West. In the late 20th century, it became obvious that intellectual freedom is not defined legally and only exists *de facto*. At best, some research in the area of humanities identified it. For example, the Frankfurt School justified as a special category of freedom Man's right to question both natural and social systems as criteria to assess the validity of personal existential meanings.

In the newly gained right, Man turned out to be alone, and, as existentialism specified, alone in terms of responsibility for his freedom. Fromm warns that people in the West are often not ready for freedom, that they do their best to get rid of it, by escaping from it to all sorts of addictions, from consumer values to drugs. One of the reasons for this is the state of complete uncertainty as to criteria to assess the validity of existential meaning. As was mentioned above, intellectual freedom results from the transition from a fixed meaning to its uncertain, probability-based and individual version.

Predictably, the latter causes diffidence and instability, which is compensated for in a controversial way. Soon new doctrines appear, stemming from an unconscious belief that standards of the pragmatic sphere can serve as the criteria of existential meanings. And the political elite have yet not understood that the pragmatic code of globalization is fatal for spiritual culture.

Because of these circumstances, the Western, especially American, modernization will not do Russia any good. The US has no centuries-long experience of the formation of ethos, that is, preliminary social experience [446; 447], sustained by the family, religion, community, and an entire cultural heritage; everything that constitutes "the human, chaotic, illogical, that so often seems funny in its provincial affections and legendry" [296: 11]. The lack of such experience as a rule correlates with a failure to understand the other's ethos, with vain attempts to penetrate into the other's way of thinking and behavior. Moreover, today's analysts, from Coker to Kissinger, agree that "both the Old and the New World are on the way to becoming multicultural communities, something which begins to undermine the single cultural basis on which the whole Western project hinges...Drifting purposelessly, it is unable to coordinate its politics even when it can regulate common principles" [230: 9].

Russia has to resolve a difficult task of becoming a self-respecting nation. In part, this has already happened. The principal lesson for the West to learn is to give up recasting Russians to comply with its own standard. It can be done, provided one overcomes the philosophical illiteracy of thinking and the "ethical behavioral consequence thereof" [271: 57–58]. Interpreting another's life as a person's own does not help communication; the strategy is always close to violence against another person, forcing the latter to adopt a person's own civilized norms. One should do something different; create another reality, which can only be achieved through dialog and mutual understanding.

However, what we see today is that almost every step Russia makes to fulfill its own plans is regarded by the West, following the historical cliché, as a threat to democracy. The Russian political elite, on the contrary, point out that the West, asserting its indisputable right for democracy, ignores its own faults, — when establishing democracy, it interferes in other nations' affairs. Naturally, for

Russia these faults of the West have become a kind of advance, and the time has come to use it; Russia believes her interests should be considered as justified and deserving at least a silent approval. However, the two camps' internal affairs are also a subject of criticism. With global interdependence, if the Western countries themselves fail to reach an agreement on all issues, the whole situation becomes a dead end.

One of the pressing issues to be resolved both in the East and the West is to develop an attitude to intellectual freedom. Its non-codified rule is to set Man's intellectual sphere free from all aspects of the social context. On the other hand, modern law defines the limits that subjective manifestations of freedom must not trespass on. However, the existing limitations cannot determine the essence of intellectual freedom.

The objective of developing a new methodological attitude to freedom sounds paradoxical and baffles today's humanities; the issue does not seem to have a solution. Should society establish new social institutions that will be able to form people's attitude to intellectual freedom or should the process be considered as self-organizing? At the moment there seems to be no answer to the question, but the solution holds the promise of moral health.

Chapter 3. The Phenomenon of Intellectual Freedom: Ongoing Escape and Recognition

3.1. The Unconquered Peak of the Enlightenment: Self-Cognition of Identity

One of the core *projects* of Modernity, the Enlightenment, has impacted deep structures of human personality. As can be seen from the previous chapters, it is about historical transformations of consciousness; that in turn lead to changes in the whole personality structure.

As a result of transformation of the inner world, Man has obtained an unprecedented right to determine his nature. This quintessence of intellectual freedom was declared as early as the mid-20th century, but since then it remained without further development. With regard to the modern individual, the academic community considers it legitimate by default. However, the ambiguity of the concept of intellectual freedom still remains one of the major problems, both of purpose-related self-identification itself and the goals of its theoretical studies.

The fact of gaining intellectual freedom means another step made by mankind on the way towards *adulthood*. During the cultural crisis, intellectual freedom brought about a claim for independent worldview, which is a characteristic of maturity. To state that Man has gained it would mean to deliberately bend the truth. However, it is undoubtedly one of global problems for *Supernova* to solve.

The issues of freedom are often related to those of personal identity. Both are primarily about ethical and purpose-related self-identification of Man. Identity has long become an object of research in the humanities. In recent years, the scope of studies dealing with identity directly or indirectly has dramatically expanded, and yet no commonly acceptable interpretations of the term *personal identity* have been suggested thus far.

In the Russian language, its usage has been influenced by its dual meaning in English: the word can mean *sameness*, and also *selfhood*, or *individuality*, or *personality*. Lack of appreciation of these differences has caused significant misunderstanding referred to by a Russian scholar Vladimir Malakhov in his famous article as *inconveniences* [267]. The most notable of them is that *sameness* and *personality* are often used interchangeably. Additionally, one should distinguish *identity* as a synonym for *selfhood* and the temporary stability of the latter as maintaining the identity of its traits.

Malakhov suggests to consider three dimensions of *identity*, i.e., philosophical, sociological and psychological. He believes that in the most general understanding of the philosophical dimension, *identity* appears to be either the equivalence of the process and the subject of cognition in classical German philosophy, or equivalence and distinction in phenomenology. In sociology, specifically in works by George Herbert Mead [291], Charles Horton Cooley [232], Erving Goffman [127; 540], Harold Garfinkel [113] and Robert King Merton [289], the concept of *identity* is used as *selfhood*. Therefore, in purely philosophical and sociological uses of *identity*, there is bound to be a

considerable difference. As is well-known, the sources of symbolic interactionism include pragmatism and behaviorism, founded by John Dewey [173] and John Broadus Watson [414]. Their postulates gave rise to the concept of *identity* or *selfhood* being formed in the process of social interactions with others. Then in the works by Cooley and Goffman the concept of *identity* was subject to minor changes. Later, sociologists Jürgen Habermas [444] and Vittorio Hösle [453] used the word *identity* to primarily denote *individuality* and *selfhood*.

Predecessors of the psychological application of *identity* of the concept include Sigmund Freud and Karl Jaspers. However, as Malakhov notes, in Freud's vocabulary there is no such word. Freud wrote about the inner world that is again a kind of *selfhood* as viewed through psychoanalysis. The same use can be found in most of modern psychoanalytic and psychological studies. Jaspers in his early works studied the continuity of self-cognition [501], the opposite being considered as a symptom of serious deviations, like those in schizophrenics. Jaspers practically does not use the word *identity* either. However, when the term became popular, it was ascribed to him, perhaps also because of the influence of his theses on Erik Homburger Erikson's psychosocial conception of identity.

The publication of Erikson's works was a turning point in the fusion of the two meanings of the word *identity*. On the one hand, Erikson means a characteristic of a personality denoting self-recognized selfhood, or knowledge of a person's *I*. On the other hand, the term points at the continuity of processes of self-cognition or in this case, maintaining the identity of their mechanisms. Additionally, Erikson was the first to describe identification as establishing the equivalence of personal and social identities. However, his interpretation of the latter is extremely abstract.

Apart from all this, together with *identity* Erikson uses the concepts of personal *identity*, *self-identity* and *ego-identity*, of which the latter is predominant. Erikson believes, that the key to the identity issue is the ability of Ego to maintain self-identity and indissoluble integrity, through all turns of fate. However, fate always combines changes of a person's inner state in consecutive periods of life, with changes in the social environment and historical conditions. Identity also means some kind of resilience of essence-relevant structures in the course of changes. Thus, however strange it may seem, the firmly established identity must radically change, because it contains fundamental values shared by various cultures [488]. Therefore, identity is also understood as the personal *I* is somehow associated with certain parts of one or more subcultures (ethnic, class, youth, etc.) [The sample does not reflect the whole range: 20; 38; 62 80; 106; 169; 170; 188; 217; 274; 293; 294; 309; 310; 318; 322; 347–349; 356; 359; 360; 368; 370; 377; 378; 380; 405; 456; 458; 471; 472; 479; 487; 489; 499; 503–510; 518; 520; 524; 541; 544; 545; 548; 551; 556–559; 572; 573; 577; 580–583].

According to Erikson, identity is the same as selfhood, but it is also equivalence of mechanisms that provide person's temporal and spatial integrity of personality. So, why is *equivalence* used in the second case and not merely *continuity*, for example? Why is the concept of identity irreplaceable? For example, definitions of a developing individuality or a personality capable of seeing its own continuity and the like would look more correct, although less compact. The significance of the outcome of Erikson's research does not help to understand the potential of the term denoting it. The fundamental difficulty consists in inseparability of the meanings of the word *identity*, in which *sameness* and *selfhood* coexist. Therefore, in Erikson's works the identity of mechanisms of selfhood development sometimes means the same as identity of *identity*.

Additionally, endowing selfhood with sameness, *severed* from synonymic identity, presupposes the target of equivalence, that is, a clear idea of what is identical to what within selfhood. In other words, it remains unclear, what elements in the personality structure must be similar, so that one could speak not only of the continuity of recognized selfhood but also of the state where the point of intrapersonal identity has been reached.

In Erikson's works, this unsolved question is followed by another. He notes that identity formation begins where a mere introjection is no longer enough. That is, time comes when *mechanisms* of simple appropriation of someone else's image by a personality is useless and the person begins creating its own that concurrently becomes embedded in the social environment. The latter has a very important feature: it provides people with a projection of themselves in the society. The ability to see the projection becomes a criterion of a successful verification of oneself with the surrounding. So the notion of a person being constantly in the process of *identification* is formed.

Naturally, neither the process of gaining the identity of selfhood nor selfhood identification with something different can be regarded irrespective of a standard towards which the two processes

are applicable at all [183; 189; 292]. To determine the standard, Erikson uses the concept of *social identity* that was not well-defined, as was shown above. However, if one does not go into detail, everything seems perfectly clear: the *social identity* formula should reveal who is a concrete person and who represents *the species*. Another statement of Erikson also seems perfectly understandable, according to which we deal with a process localized in the core of individual and also social culture, with the process that establishes the identity of the two identities [488].

Even if the system does seem self-evident, it is so only at first sight. Going deeper, it is hard to understand what *social identity* and *cultural identification* mean. The same questions remain unanswered as before: can there be such a thing as *social selfhood*, and if so, what is it like? What must be similar in the society so that one could speak of social identity? Moreover, there is one more question: what particular similarities should be determined in the process of social or cultural identification?

The issues have turned out to be so controversial, that Anthony Giddens' conclusion is hardly surprising: "Erikson admits that it has at least four connotations. It refers to a "conscious sense of the individual identity", an "unconscious striving for the continuity of personal character". The third meaning is a "criterion for covert activities of the Ego-synthesis maintenance of inner-solidarity with the group's ideals and identity". It might be noted that none of these single uses is particularly lucid; let alone the concept that embraces them all!" [120: 110]. Although Giddens' reaction is understandable, it is unfair. Despite indisputable appreciation of Erikson's research, it should be admitted that criticism of concepts, identity and identification, was by no means accidental — both require further detail. Whatever way is chosen to develop the concept, the logic can be the same — for personality description, the word *identity* may be used to mean *sameness* only suggesting that it is due to similarity of something to something *within* selfhood.

As a subtotal, it could be assumed that on the whole, personal identity is possible, first of all, when the personality reveals similarities between some inner components of its structure. Secondly, a prerequisite for identity should be the continuity of its development. Then, what components of the personality structure are meant? The question seems to be rather complicated because at the moment there is no universal interpretation of the concept of *personality structure* [11; 12; 358]. The structural model of the human psychic apparatus as described by Freud [425], does not help. Erikson, who followed the theory, also suggested that it contains three *homogenous* substructures, including Id, Ego and Super-Ego. It is unknown whether Erikson developed Freud's later hypotheses about the *single* Id consisting of Thanatos and Eros. Nevertheless, the ideas laid the basis for the modern psychoanalytic theory, maintaining that the personality structure is *bipolar*. As of today, this is the only way to consider identity as similarity of some inner structures of the psyche.

According to Vladimir Sukhachev, one of very few clearly formulated social philosophical approaches to identity as sameness of mechanisms providing temporal and spatial integrity of a personality consists in turning to Kant's philosophy. Sukhachev notes that the empirical Ego is unable to possess sameness without relentless work of transcendental intuitions — without this, there is no Ego identity. The sameness of intrapersonal mechanisms "is not the issue of myself being the same, but rather it is about finding out the condition for such repetition to occur. And this persisting repetition (identity) cannot be explained through the form of equivalence of the established and establishing Ego identification" [393]. This important detail shows that to build an identity model, it is worthwhile to juxtapose the concept of bipolarity with what can be described in the human psychic apparatus as its *transcendental* properties.

The original theory by Alfred Schegolev provides one of the broadest interpretations of the human psychic apparatus as a binary phenomenon. While developing Freud's ideas he proves that Id, Ego and Super Ego are binary formations [480]. The Id duality can be traced in two diametrically opposite instincts, libido and mortido, as different as the absolute wish to perpetuate life and the urge to destroy everything around for the sake of unlimited self-confidence. The Ego bipolarity can be detected in the masculine and feminine principles and two kinds of love, maternal and paternal. The former is unconditional, that is, to be loved by the mother does not require any conditions, whereas father's love, on the contrary, is conditional and must be deserved by demonstrating certain expected qualities. Therefore, Super Ego is not a homogenous psychic formation either, structurally it is a combination of instinctive conscience, morality originating from unconditional love for the world and trust in it and also from conditional conscious morality based on the ability to gain public recognition.

This interpretation of the personality structure proceeds from a centuries-long philosophical tradition that distinguishes between poly-semantic concepts: *ethics* (as moral rectitude) and *morality*. The first attempt to differentiate the concepts was made in ancient times. Centuries later, the approach was enrooted in classical German philosophy, and more recently was developed by the Leningrad school of ethicists. After a long debate in Soviet philosophical literature in the 1960–70s, the terms finally began to diverge in the late 1990s. Ethics is a branch of philosophy, whereas morality is a system of absolute values that establish a stable and objective order for the world of culture, and it is also real life with its taboos, limitations and implicit rules that often happen to be more effective than written ones [145: 37].

Since ancient times, European mentality has had a set of ethical principles that went unchanged through greatest social upheavals. Their hierarchy is structured through attempts to understand the meaning of life that were first made when Man began thinking about his fate [461; 462]. The answer varied in the course of history, based on the degree of a person's dependence on natural instincts and inclinations, community habits and ways, corporate norms, taboos, state practices and political laws, legislation, education, ideological doctrines and the social situation in general. Cultural history, as well as that of philosophy and ethics, reflects the history of answers to the question about the meaning of life, often contradicting one another. Ethical positions that determine patterns of consciousness and behavior as related to search for the meaning of life can be divided into two opposite groups.

The first group believes the meaning of life to be life itself. With the cultural values found ready-made but not a person's own, the meaning of life turns out to be preset. However, this does not make less stressful the process of finding a person's way in dynamic interaction with the whole world of culture. In this situation, one becomes the Creator. This group reflects the so-called *inherent* [184] approach to the issue, as it is impossible without seeing the purpose in the very existence.

For the other group, life is meaningless and absurd, culture accumulating all there is negative, because human mind is suppressed by the power of the irrational and history does not teach anything. Moral ideals, norms and principles are a kind of intellectual rags that can only be used on a verbal level to wipe the stalling social mechanism. In the narcotic haze of permissiveness, one might fall into an illusion of absolute freedom; then there would be no need to create a person's own field of uniqueness, and the creative attitude to others and to culture in general disappears.

If the admission of absurdity of life becomes something more than just an intellectual game, its politicization results as a rule in nihilistic ideology. The latter will manifest itself as terrorism and extremism, which is a predictable outcome of the use of ethics as a political tool. The option presents one of the moduses of the *transcendental* approach, presupposing the search for the meaning of life outside the boundaries of real life itself.

Both options belong to the cultural axiosphere; theoretical axiology must not absolutize either of the two [200]. The issue was indirectly touched upon, for example, by Viktor Frankl [422 — 424]. It is in this context that Schegolev expounds his own way to distinguish between ethics and morality. The latter is based on the code of behavior in a certain society and communication rules impressed on and adopted by its members. *Morality* orients one towards a model that has been chosen by the society or the group. Following the model prevents the society from impending disintegration. While *ethics* presupposes the ability to love and sympathize, support other people in their life, because of conscience (con-science) and inner involvement of all living things with the Supreme source of animate life and veneration of it. Therefore, conscience reveals itself, above all, as a moral feeling of involvement and sympathy with other creatures and not as a principle of the appropriate societal behavior [480: 25].

"Transcendental sophistication" of Schegolev's model can be considered as an attempt to compare the philosophical and psychological theories of identity. In this respect, some theses formulated by Carl Gustav Jung and Merab Mamardashvili appear to be of key significance. As early as 1916, Jung put forward the concept of *transcendental function* of consciousness (Super ego) [493]. Mamardashvili in *Kantian Variations* significantly updated the idea, by saying "Following Descartes, Kant suggests abstraction of the cogito consciousness: *cogito ergo sum*. And the abstraction is that of realization phenomenon, something, the existence of which is presence for itself. It is presence of consciousness for consciousness, rather than understanding of some content. In the abstraction, consciousness is fixed as non-having a reference in the world and therefore directly distinctive" [272:

216]. One should thus speak of juxtaposing post-classical interpretations of transcendent (non-empirical, not based on any evidence) structures of consciousness and most up-to-date psychoanalytical understanding of Super ego.

Assuming that Super ego has as well certain non-empirical components suggests that both its *moral* and *ethical* centers have two inner substructures of their own that could be referred to as *a priori* and empirical substructures. The *a priori* substructure is predetermined by its two different functions. One is to reproduce pragmatic rules of coexistence in the human society and ways to comply with them for the sake of survival. The function will be further referred to as *P* (*pragma* meaning *deed, matter* in Greek); it is responsible for the formation of the scope of moral ideas, *knowledge* of conditions to be fulfilled so as to be accepted by the society and produce means of subsistence together with other members, both for oneself and the society. The other function is to generate concrete interpretations of the meaning of life; it will be further referred to as the *M* function (meaning). It is responsible for the formation of the ethical sphere, the knowledge why survival makes sense, that is, what ends justify means. *A priori* the functions are of different transcendental value: for the *P* function it is the power to interpret the means of subsistence, whereas for the *M* function it is the ability to think of meaning of life.

Thus, the empirical content of the central substructures may only result from the real work of the two functions, in the course of existential application of the transcendental value of their work. Life experience forms the empirical content of the centers that is supposed to also split into two components. The real work of the *P* function produces its own empirical series of results *P1 P2 P3 ... Pn*. The empirical value of the series is the real moral view of the world, i.e. the acquired rules to obey if one wants to be accepted by the society and reproduce means of subsistence, that is, everything that complies with the pragmatic modeling of the means. The real work of the *M* function consists in generating its own specific empirical series *M1 M2 M3 ... Mn*, the empirical value of which is the ethical picture of the world that integrates discrete things in one meaning, detached from the pragmatism of means. The sequence makes up a personal field of the postulated meaning of the world, an integrated picture of symbols of unconditional moral self-identification in the world.

Therefore, the ideal *state* of the given substructure of a person consists of two spheres that differ both in the *a priori* and empirical aspects. Super ego bipolarity is transcendently predetermined by the initially different values of the work of the two functions. Bipolarity can also be supported empirically, if the application of the functions causes different *dependent variable* empirical *P* and *M* chains in Super ego. They are components of Self-Consciousness and to a great extent, present a dynamic system of personal meanings. As has been noted, in this case, according to Lev Vygotskij, meaning is the experience with a higher subjective value of an object or phenomenon [108: 96].

It should be mentioned that the transcendental and real values of the work of the two functions may or may not be equal. Their transcendental predetermination and empirically performed work are not always identical. Whether their real work coincides with their *a priori* value depends on the person. Twists and turns of a person's life may cause the functions to reset and yield the results they are not supposed to. In this case, it will be a crisis-type personality.

A prerequisite for a harmonious personality is congruence of two different *figures* of the Super ego centers, deliberately separated with a boundary. The word *congruence* describes precisely the hypothetically best relationship between the empirical content of the centers formed without deviation from the transcendental value of their functions' work. Congruence suggests that the content of the centers is not interchangeable: the ethical meaning cannot be replaced with thoughts about means of subsistence. On the other hand, morality does not turn into a requirement to eliminate conditions.

Should a personality building congruence of the centers be also endowed with *identity*? It is not by chance that Erikson points out a characteristic of identity: it arouses the inspiring feeling of a person's integrity. This does not occur if one center suppresses the other, that is, if their congruence is broken. And certainly, identity does not arise from similarity of the empirical content of the centers or *self-identity*. A personality can be endowed with identity too, provided the two conditions are observed, *a priori* and empirical.

The former is the main one; it suggests that the value of empirical *P* and *M* series resulting from the real work of functions of Super ego centers is equal to the transcendental value of their work.

In other words, identity arises when the transcendental value of the functions' work and their real work are similar. It only occurs if the person does not *reset* the functions, with *M* acting like *P* and vice versa.

The empirical condition of identity actually results from the *a priori* condition. If the latter is observed, the centers (with the boundary between them that allows to speak of their congruence) will have different empirical contents. In this case, the person forms two different *figures* of Super ego: one for understanding conditions empirically and to understanding the meaning. Then the empirically supported congruence of centers *confirms* its *a priori* condition and a person's full-fledged identity has *P* and *M* components.

If both conditions are fulfilled, it can be said that the person has reached the state of identity. Thus, the presence or absence of the latter is a major parameter of the directed process of filling Super ego's two centers with empirical content. If identity is there, it means that the functions work properly. Its absence is a sign of some incongruences, the most important of which is substitution of the meaning of life with means of subsistence.

Hence, a question arises: how can identification processes can be understood? The word *identification* itself has two major connotations. First, it is determination of identity of an object and its name and second, comparison of the former with other objects, to see if they are similar. It is basically the same with people, but in contrast to things that one deals with in his life, human identification has specific details. Here everyone can perform two processes, *self-identification* and *social identification*.

Determination of identity of transcendental values of the functions' work and of the empirical series generated by them during real work constitutes the process of *self-identification* that answers the question *who am I?* In simple terms, it is about getting *knowledge* about oneself [2; 13; 465; 466; 538; 552; 560; 577]. *Social identification* involves the comparison of the personality *object* with something external. It would be tempting to suggest, that one compares the obtained answers about oneself with some objective standards provided by the social *knowledge* of Man as a representative of the *species*. On the whole, it makes more sense to speak of a single process of identification with two inseparable and interdependent components. However, it is still unclear how they are connected.

As Jürgen Habermas has accurately established, a person's identity can only be guaranteed by others. A personality always projects itself against the intersubjective horizon of the living world, because a person cannot realize their individuality on a person's own. "Whether the choice of a person's life history is right, depends on others people's *yes* or *no*" [444: 39]. The approval or disapproval from those that one looks for in the intersubjective horizon, make up a person's identification context, or, to be more precise, the intersubjective space of identification standards localized in the social reality in general.

There should be at least a general understanding, what social reality and its identification standards are. The former as an intersubjective phenomenon is bound to reproduce at least some qualities of those who create it. Here it would be natural to suggest, that like the personality structure, it must be bipolar but in what sense?

The duality was described in detail already by Kant [207], who was the first to separate the concepts of civilization and culture. In today's world that seems to be indifferent to the approach, the duality of the social context persists. Meanwhile both the society and the personality structure have radically changed, what has influenced identification. Moreover, the latter may nowadays cause a personality crisis.

Personal *P* and *M* series, making up bipolar knowledge about self in the world, constitute on the social level an intersubjective *sum total*, i.e., a bipolar *atom* of social knowledge about the world. Similar to the bipolar personality structure, objectivation of subjective series does not lead to *unified* but to bipolar knowledge that splits into knowledge of civilization and that of culture. The knowledge of civilization is highly pragmatic, use-oriented because it originates as an inter-subjective phenomenon from the empirical results of Super ego's *P* function. It consists of three main components, with their specifics depending on the type of society. The first is the resolution of practical issues of survival, such as technology, economy and manufacturing. The second is the organization of its own activities, providing for interaction of individuals, that is law and jurisprudence. The third is about well-being, i.e., the level of consumption and comfort.

Knowledge encapsulated in culture is based on a totally different principle, that of existential meaning. The intersubjective analog of *M* series should be representing socially fixed universal views of the meaning of life of Man and the society. It is supposed to include the related identification standards serving as criteria to verify a person's understanding of the purpose of existence.

The concept of *identification standards* is much harder to define [173; 232; 453]. A hypothetical intersubjective *coordinate system* with identification standards is often referred to as *social identity* [22; 23; 227; 242; 470; 471; 498]. It can be suggested that within the two types of social *knowledge*, two fundamentally different areas of identification standards may form. One of them represents standards for a person producing means for subsistence, i.e., standards of morality and conditions. The other area is for a person concerned with the meaning of life, i.e., standards of ethics and the purpose). In reality, we deal with a complex dynamic balance of subjective views and the resulting intersubjective coordinates for their verification.

Therefore it might seem logical that the intersubjective *knowledge* of civilization enables the individual to identify the empirical results of the *P* function whereas intersubjective knowledge of *culture* helps to identify the results of the *M* function. However, it would be no more than an illusion.

Radical changes in the personality structure over the last 150 years have been commonly interpreted through the concept of *existential revolution* what has made the denotatum of the original meaning absolutely unclear. Today, a person's consciousness deals with designata, or in other words with subjective hypotheses of the denotatum of meaning. This is a prerequisite for the phenomenon of intellectual freedom that is manifested, first and foremost, as free formation of a person's personal purpose of living in the world. In these conditions, the only objectively true meaning-related denotatum becomes the very fact of freedom of Self-Consciousness in developing the hypotheses of the origin of the purpose of human existence. And then intellectual freedom as a whole is a transition from fixed to random work of the *M* function, what leads to the random formation of the *M* component of the dynamic systems of meanings.

In this case, the only free result of self-identification with regard to the meaning can be a personal myth about the world, a subjective symbol of the inner core of the personality that presents an *image of the meaning*. A non-codified prerequisite for intellectual freedom provides for permanent incompleteness of the myth. Its content is constantly reshaped by the person following twists and turns of the person's existence. Recognition of freedom of empirical results of the *M* function *dictates* its most significant condition: the results cannot be verified, falsified or identified with regard to something external. Anything opposite would only mean non-freedom.

Prior to existential revolution, congruence of transcendental and empirical values of *P* and *M* functions resulted not from identification processes but from mastering inter-subjective rules included in the two types of *knowledge*. Both knowledge of civilization and of culture provided for that, and Man could easily form two different Super ego centers with congruent contents, with identification processes playing only a secondary part, if any.

The modern demand for identification resulted from the existential revolution and is primarily concerned with the *M* center of personality structure. Modern identification mechanisms are fundamentally different from their older naïve version. Thus, the question of purpose is always unanswered for a free intellect — nothing can serve as an eternal criterion of compliance with *the standard*. The identity of the *M* center comes and goes, so one can never determine its precise empirical characteristics. Arising states of identity are probabilistic and quantum; rational methods of self-identification frequently happen to be of no use, just like an ordinary microscope for the study of quarks in the atomic nucleus.

Here comes the paradox of intellectual freedom: there is a need for identification context to confine it. For this purpose, one can use any artefacts of social reality that are inside a person's *knowledge*. In other words, inability to exercise freedom can make Man seek for its so called *proper* standard. In turn, this revitalizes the identity issue and makes it identify what cannot be identified. The current *knowledge* of civilization meets the demand almost to the best advantage.

It should be noted that Man has gained freedom only in the *M* center, but in *P* center. Although civilization has survived many revolutions, including technical, democratic and consumer revolutions, none of these has changed the essence of its *knowledge*. The *knowledge* has always been an explicit image of subsistence means, whereas all its alterations were about its quantitative

parameters, rather than its qualitative principle of pragmatism. Enriched with political freedoms, knowledge itself does not ensure intellectual freedom, being related to it only indirectly. Due to their biological component, people have to master and reproduce subsistence-related rules they depend on.

On the contrary, *knowledge* of culture radically changed already in the 20th century and even more so in the 21st. Disbelief in meta-narrative was only an external sign of its qualitative transformation. As a result *knowledge* of culture was no longer a universal reflection of the image of the meaning. The inner transformation consisted in the newly shaped *universal* personal culture of meaning, the *quantum* identity of the *M* center becoming a person's unconditional exclusive right.

The existential revolution, performed only *de facto*, put Man on *top* of the pyramid of intellectual freedom, which is a highly unstable, probabilistic, quantum position. It was indirectly established by Fromm, who specified many options to flee from freedom [430]. Finding oneself on the wild peak of transcendental freedom, Man subconsciously needs stability and tries to reach it via the external context of personality. Whether consciously or not, one wants to stabilize the labile identity of the *M* center of Super ego. This may be achieved through the identification of empirical *M* series with something external. However, this is a new symptom of the ongoing crisis of modern personality formation.

Although an identification context is desirable, the prerequisite for intellectual freedom remains the same, presupposing prohibition of identification of personal interpretations of meaning with any kind of standard. However, *quantum* identity is a state that is both unexplored and painful. The new problem of identity has no universal solution, for nobody knows how identity forms and persists. However, the role of various crises of the *M* component must not be exaggerated. This is not retribution for the death of the spirit, but payment for the awkward age of humanity on the way to maturity.

However, ignoring the problem makes the price of *stability* too high. After the transformation of personality structure as well as of the role played by knowledge of culture and civilization, many scholars of the 20th century, from Maximilian Weber to Jean Baudrillard, began to believe that civilization had *engulfed* spirituality. Despite all statements of the kind, the question of human fate and civilization is still unclear. Disruption of congruence of Super-ego centers could not but affect social reality, and inevitably influenced personality. Man found himself in a difficult situation. How should generally valid criteria of freedom be formed? May one *teach freedom* to subsequent generations? How does one get accustomed to differentiating between freedom and the escape from it? All the *adult* questions remain open thus far, and this causes various forms of identity crisis, both in *M* and *P* centers.

One of the forms of identity crises occurs when both identity elements remain intact. If one distinguishes between means and ends, one can also see the difference between knowledge of civilization and that of culture. However, it often happens, that unconscious and therefore unbearable freedom of the *M* function makes one intuitively search for external criteria of its work. This results in mechanistic comparison of an individually formed meaning with its objective counterparts. In this way, one turns social reality artefacts into *customized* identification standards, while preferring those that can properly guide the shaping of their ethical outlook. The most convenient way to find standards fitting a person's inner demand for an unconditioned ethical worldview that provides for empirical approval of *M* center identity, is to turn to religious systems, or, generally speaking, to meta-narratives of the past.

The real value of the meta-narratives depends on the modern personality. Even if the subject of intellectual freedom uses meta-narrative images of the past, they serve as material to create a person's own personal myth about the world. Those who are not ready for this want to find both clear and solid criteria of the meaning in old myths. The sense designatum is transferred to the rank of denotatum and, predictably, to dogma, with empirical *M* series being identified with the *alien* mythological land. This sustains the dependence of personality on the *alien* meaning. Therefore, the content of the meta-narrative field may become not only identification standards, but also a kind of *ethical cage* for personality.

Refusal from freedom, together with the demand for a clear existential sense, makes it necessary, as it happened before, to learn external guidelines for the ethical content of the world. Instead of a subjective free interpretation of meaning, one increasingly becomes a passive recipient of someone else's view of it. This artificially restores the condition violated by the existential revolution,

for belief in meta-narrative based on naïve trust in the narrator. Man is included in the content of the story, being endowed with the right to listen and at the same time rebroadcast it. Those willing to confirm the choice of the proper moral path at any cost, will be looking for the one who is saying the right words and complies with someone else's dogma, and will also seek for listeners to rebroadcast the story.

Clear-cut identification standards of *moral* meaning may be supplied not only by conventional meta-narratives and religions but also new religious trends or sects, or any myth that justifies civilization. An example of this kind of identity crisis is search for someone *who knows*. The person *who knows* can be anyone evangelizing their own narrative, a guru, a Teacher, somebody *senior*, father or mother, spouse, etc. In any case, although the *M* center retains its identity, the person is not free and is incapable of assessing the work of the *M* center. The processes in the latter stagnate, and the person does not develop or degrades. In other words, the *M* function deteriorates, with the free mind giving way to a dependent personality absorbing someone else's dogmas.

It may lead to disruption of congruence of Super-ego centers: the ethical center begins to suppress the moral one. Instead of a tolerant person, there may be *a saint on Earth* declining most means of subsistence and passively condemning them. In the end, there comes a bigot, feeling strongly about other types of worldview and defending his own, in spite of everything.

Concentration on the stagnant meaning, together with dogmatism may lead the bigot to the suspicion that *knowledge* of civilization is fatal for *knowledge* of culture. One of the outcomes is hostility to civilization in general. Overconcentration on ethics requires discarding of morals, what leads to imbalances in the whole personality structure. The ability to recognize conditions restricting mortido is eliminated, which leads to intrusion in mortido and its blockage. Such changes to personality structure as well as reversal to Super-ego result in inability to view external conditions as necessary. The arising protest against the conditions brings about the need to physically destroy everything that does not fit the interpretation of meaning. At this point, a bigot becomes a kamikaze.

A second type of the crisis of the *M* element in identity proceeds from the original incongruence of transcendental and empirical values of the work of the *M* function. If freedom of the *M* center is not formulated rationally as a demand for the meaning, but still felt subconsciously, the person fails to believe any myth. Neither meta-narratives, nor religious ideologies, nor any other *alien* myths may work as coordinates for individual's search. However, the problem remains basically the same, i.e. the subconscious demand for meaning needs external criteria. These criteria can be found in what is illusory and what does not constrain unrecognized freedom, at the same being clear, concrete and effective. A subconscious search for conditions stabilizing the ethic center happens to be directed towards *knowledge* of civilization, because the false equivalent of intellectual freedom is there, that is where only political freedom can be found. Additionally, the *knowledge* of civilization includes a large amount of artefacts that, if chosen as standards of existential meaning, can give one a temporary state of psychological comfort.

As in the previous case, now the identity of the moral center, or of the transcendental value of the work of the *P* function and the value of its real work, results from mastering the intersubjective analog of empirical series of the *P* function, rather than identification. For example, for the citizenship status, one has to have his passport issued, rather than verify the compliance of his understanding with legal norms which are to be observed regardless of a person's attitude to them. Besides, the repressive power of law should also be taken into consideration. Therefore, it is possible to speak of identification standards of civilization in the *normal* state only in an abstract way, if at all. Normally, the civilizational channel of identification is reduced to a minimum: civilization imposes its requirement on the personality and the latter is only to choose its proper role in it. Instead, some civilizations enable their citizens to exercise certain political freedoms. However, everything formed by science, technology, legal norms and the consumption level may become the identification context for the desirable, yet unattained, freedom of the *M* center, although in a paradoxical way. Thus, a specific dilemma of our days — Man, not yet self-confident, can no longer believe in meta-narratives — often finds its resolution in civilization.

Intellectual freedom, obtained *de facto* but not recognized *de jure*, is often reduced by personality to the long-codified political freedom that can be also manifested in success measures. The success measures present a clear idea of a model citizen, whose inner world is of no interest to anybody. The standards are objectively significant, due to academic and technological discoveries.

They are also legitimate, thanks to generally recognized legal norms, and at the same time convincing, with regard to the upper limit of the achieved consumption level. At a person's will, success coordinates may transform into identification standards of the empirical work of the *M* function, what in the first place will be expressed in smooth self-identification.

Such refocusing of the demand has been noted more than once. According to Habermas [444], as soon as *the vertical axis of prayer* shifts towards the intersubjective context, the fascination of transcendence, as Baudrillard maintains [68], immediately gives way to that of the medium of manipulated signs that create an illusion of eternity. Or, as Ralf Inglehart suggests [196], conditions of self-preservation are supplemented by a new one: mere survival is not enough, its quality is also important. All this determines one of major civilization standards, the status. Its quality can be easily confused with meaning, and *smooth* identification of this kind becomes *one-dimension* identification. The moral center of Super-ego happens to be *abandoned*, left without human care. Fans of civilization idolize material objects or, as Fromm puts it, form in their minds a market-oriented personality model. In this case, success and money become a criterion of purpose, what constitutes escape from freedom, turning Man into a pseudo personality. According to Fromm, there are almost no other proofs of identity, except the material envelope; it has no essence of its own; the personality merely reflects what others expect from it [430: 62].

As a result, the personality subconsciously *resets* the *M* function to work as the *P* function. In the extreme case, there will be a complete incongruence of ethical and moral centers of the Super-ego. The meaning, i.e., purpose of the spirit, becomes equal to means of subsistence. Not only does such turn block the moral center, but also causes perversions in it. In due course the perversions undermine the ability for unconditional trust in the world, causing too much egoism, hedonism and pragmatism. Due to this, libido is suppressed, its impulses being identified as mere sexuality. According to Marcuse [67], instead of creativity, this kind of personality desublimates the energy of libido by increasing the number of sexual partners. Or according to Baudrillard [283], the person is confined to viewing himself as the body containing only two fused types of reality, job-related and sexual.

Such change in the inner world is driven by Man's own choice. However, it should be borne in mind that civilization can be repressive. Reoriented towards the civilization, the moral center of Super ego becomes weak and susceptible to external pressure. This was the focus of research of the Frankfurt School scholars, who showed that the pragmatic rules of civilization, used by its successful adherers to get rich, in their hands may also become a tool to suppress other people. As is well-known, the more people are involved in consumption of means of subsistence perceived as the purpose of existence, the higher the profits enjoyed by those who control the process.

The range of tools to manipulate people with the *reset M* centers is enormous. Education and science are turned into business, with the criterion of knowledge effectiveness replacing the main intellectual feeling of love for Truth. Law, extrapolated on the moral demand for justice, is turned by politicians into a tool to support private business. Due to interference of *P* and *M* functions, the desire of comfort raised to the second power, became the sweet spot for advertisements pushing more and more consumer goods. The modern art-market has become one of the main instruments to exert such impact.

Finally, Man's purpose can be reduced to the ability to play and win by the rules of *knowledge* of civilization, whereas anything not presupposed by them, such as love, conscience and compassion are excluded from the range of motives. A *zealot* of civilization does not understand and even hates both the *saint on Earth*, and the subject of intellectual freedom. With this form of crisis of the *M* element, the empirical values of the work of the *M* and *P* functions are equal. Both centers are formed, totally on the basis of pragmatism, and Man is trapped in the web of dependence on means of subsistence.

A third scenario of the crisis in the *M* element of identity is predetermined by unconscious non-recognition of the *M* function in general, what turns the *P* function, i.e., the need to survive, into the super-meaning. Although negating the *M* function, the person still admits in this case that there must be some purpose. However, its search is shifted as *extra load* to the transcendental value of the *P* function; and the only relevant thing the latter can empirically reproduce is an interpretation of the purpose of physical survival. Against this, ethical objects will seem far less important, and the blessings of civilization are viewed in a reduced way. What becomes the most significant is the role of the absolutely self-sufficient and primitive *P* function, i.e., continuation of life and therefore

maintenance of natural conditions given by the Universe, which is meaningless by default in terms of ethics. However, for such personality the *natural* purpose does exist. It is *predetermined* by the *soulless* Cosmos rather than Man, and expressed in the simplest version of philosophy of life: to live in order to survive.

The bipolarity of Super-ego in this type of personality is developed so poorly that there is virtually no question of congruence of its centers. Negation of the moral purpose presupposes viewing most of what has been created by civilization as a useless and pernicious *wart* on nature's body. However, some part of civilization does happen to be of value: our care for reproduction and health makes us accept, though in the *most natural* form, its artefacts relevant for our survival.

Science is viewed as a means to produce medicines prolonging life, law as a way to limit the interference of culture and civilization with nature, and comfort only as a *natural* condition. The original requirement of such ideology was formulated already by Rousseau as *Back to Nature!* [362]. Slogans expressing such outlook may also include modernized Aristotle's quote about Man being a political animal. Love is hardly more than a way to perpetuate life. Libido is a tool to be controlled by the rules of the *P* function, viewed as a means to match natural conditions. Whereas *mortido*, even if controlled, is literally controlled by libido what corresponds to the nature-oriented type of personality. Unlike Aristotle, we would define it as a social animal. The limited scope of its objectives would include eating healthy food, breathing fresh air and exercising. Its key responsibility would be to stay within the boundaries of the law. The range of its irresponsibility involves indifference to the surrounding world as well as inability to sympathize with others, to love and to sacrifice.

The fourth form of the crisis of the *M* element is predetermined by the radical non-acceptance of transcendental values of the work of both functions — *P* and *M*. As a result, their empirical meanings, both moral and ethical, are no longer of any use, which leads to negation of all goals, even mere physiological survival. Such person perceives everything produced by transcendental Super-ego functions, as impact of the highly developed animal nature. In the extremes case, they would by default admit only the empirical value of the *P* function and the assigned issue of the meaning of existence is treated as a non-grounded question of the purpose of survival. Hence, it should be recognized that the demand for its existential meaning is a most bizarre consequence of human nature which has no substantiation whatsoever, whether transcendent, transcendental or empirical. No identification process would work in this case, as it cannot stabilize personality in any way.

The totally suppressed Super-ego of personality is unable to create anything that would disprove the assumption that Man differs from the natural senseless Universe only in the useless ability to ask the pointless question about the meaning of life. Then Man sees himself as a meaningless sneer of the Universe, to which he is to address the question without getting any answer. This type of personality considers as its worst fate the expectation of death, clinging to conditions of survival in the meanwhile. Then people who assuage their fear of death with various drugs or adrenaline from extreme sports would seem stronger than the weak who stick to false meanings.

Sooner or later the person will come to an uncompromising conclusion that these people are also weak, because this is the absolute weakness that comes from adrenaline addiction of any kind. Given the *a priori* refusal from the purpose, there is no way to overcome such weakness, unless one rebels against life in general. Any attempts to sustain unjustified survival are perceived as not worthy of the person aware of its meaninglessness. Once this is understood, those with *courage* should either prove the discovery of the purposelessness to other people (through cruelty, hatred or violence) or stop everything at once, by eliminating the means of survival of any kind.

After this, there will be no personal constraints, such as internal or external claims for sense, or unconditional love, or wish to have children, or egoistic acceptance of conditions for a person's own sake, law, or moral rules. *Mortido* will break through any barriers and destroy everything on its path. An accurate description of such personal scenario can be found in the book *Fight Club*, by Charles Palahniuk [330].

The above mentioned signs of the modern crisis of the *M* element are applicable to that of cultural identity. Prior to the cultural crisis of the turn of the 19–20th centuries, cultural identity was shaped up by the primitive methods of *fostering the purpose*. This yielded a static, clearly formulated idea of the meaning of the world and a person's place in it. The connection, even *fusion* of the *M* center of the Super-ego and the naïve and confident view of the purpose denotatum was rigid and firmly determined the transcendental value of the work of the functions. Therefore, the empirical

content of the moral core perfectly matched its purpose. However, the static cultural identity transformed to variable identity and inability to identify without infringing intellectual freedom.

The variable cultural identity cannot possibly be embedded in the non-existing intersubjective coordinates. Nor is it clear if the rules of its formation can be specified. Paraphrasing Martin Heidegger's thought, we can say that the answer can be found via differentiation, i.e., culture cannot be identical to civilization. The differentiation enlightens the civilization its events are insights that give back to things their essences although hidden almost always from rational thinking. Insight comes from responsiveness to the calling space where danger lurks.

The real danger consists in the absence of any objective or subjective criterion to define the guidelines, for it is in the unforeseeable distance that another mission, so far concealed, awaits us. Illumination amid light shed by it retains the darkness of its source that does not come out to light [445: 256]. It is the question of *how to begin thinking* rather than *what to do*, that we are facing. It means to find, to discover, to distinguish between illumination and examination, understanding of freedom and objectification, being *too material*. It is differentiation alone that "helps to self-actualize in this world and remain as being", to admit that we are left not to be robbed by civilization, but to turn something inaccessible and unimaginable into intuition of meaning illuminated by hope, in anticipation of enlightening co-existence. Then what awaits the personality is the creation of real Man's ontological space that gets its capacity only from the attitude that represents maintenance of life in its truth as it is entrusted to Man and needs him [445: 254]. The refusal to think can be perilous; it may lead to a personality crisis that in today's world threatens to become global. Its signs can already be seen in the international, political, economic and educational areas. Although the specific typological features of the crisis and what is more important, its causes are yet to be identified, this is the only way to cope with it.

3.2. The Aesthetic Illusion of the Existential

Scholars of the Enlightenment considered the aesthetic feeling as something to be permeated with thought. Emotions are to be counterbalanced by Reason. That is the only way to reach harmony between nature and Man-made objects. However, complete reliance on Sense evoked radical changes to aesthetic principles of the Enlightenment. The pragmatic approach to art allowed combining *the will for wealth* with the process of aesthetic creation of a false equivalent of existential meaning.

The issue of the role of aestheticism in formation of a meaning-related worldview has long history. As early as the Age of Baroque, there was a demand to reform the world, so that people would have confidence in controlled transformation of the environment. The bold idea led to the construction of mansions and parks forming integrated space. The palaces boasted the interior that mingled with regularly planned nature. They looked endless, due to mirrors and painted ceilings and seemed flow out, along boundless alleys of neatly pruned trees. The limitless space was to sustain the dream about eternity that appeared to be passed on from God's hands to those of the earthly sovereign living in the palace. The ruler intending to be a keeper of eternity, made the creators of the earthly magnificence use an infinite variety of aesthetic methods to continuously demonstrate confidence in the reality of the dream.

Classicism delicately tried to refute the idea. However, after the crisis of the Enlightenment, rationalism had to gradually step back, under pressure from the romantic opposition. Having called this world as the wale of philistinism and banality, Romanticists began to create with unearthly energy an even greater illusion. The *sleeping mind* allowed *the castle in air* to become a major part of the worldview. Aesthetics thereby acquired key significance. All collisions of the turn of the 19th century were directly reflected in the crisis of European culture a hundred years later [10].

In the dreams about the future, some trends in art like Modern Style that appeared from transfigured irrationalism turned to the *better* past that was aesthetically revised. Concurrently, it was admitted that it would be possible to construct reality; one was only to choose a means to do that. The discovered method, to be inherited by Post-modernity, to a great extent turned to the aesthetic motive that was useful as the psychological comfort from the artificially created illusion of meaning.

During the crisis, unpredictability of the rapidly changing present made many people recall the *understandable* past that had been so *spiritual* in contrast to the super-mechanistic age of burgeoning megapolises. This brings to mind a symbolic statement by Gordon Craig, a British

theater practitioner: "To see the old in a whole new light was our main idea" [231: 144.]. The words profoundly reflected one of the most significant leitmotifs of the time. However, the curious intent to see the old from a new perspective can be found in politics, art, aesthetics and even everyday life of much earlier time than Craig's. For example, as early as the 1840s there was a group of Tories headed by Benjamin Disraeli that sounded rather sarcastically *Young England*. Its main idea was to build the so-called *feudal socialism*, under Disraeli's motto *Wisdom of forefathers free from speculations* [See 406].

One of the most significant followers of the motto was Thomas Carlyle. He disclosed the depth of humanity's moral fall in the capitalist era and recommended human relationship be subjected to mutual obligations, as it used to be in the Middle Ages, that was the only period of time when the moral principles of the real meaning of human existence were appreciated [212; 214; 515; 516]. As Fromm noted in this connection almost a hundred years later, they all agreed that the only way to save Man from becoming a part of the machine in the age of capitalism is to turn back to the feudal, yet "somewhat modernized forms of social order" [433: 159]. However, in those days the moral sermon addressed to the rich and the powerful was not much of a success, and those who immediately followed the idea to reverse everything, changed its sense.

John Ruskin, Carlyle's disciple, borrowed from his teacher's legacy only one thought, by far not the most important in terms of ethical search. Having revealed the mechanistic nature of the bourgeois era and commodified human relationships, he stated straightforwardly that "Either industry has been wanting, or industry has been in error" [343: 54]. Although it sounds like Carlyle's quote, the implication is absolutely different [344]. According to Ruskin, the only escape from bourgeois morality could be aesthetic principles of gothic art, rather than ethical norms of the medieval landed nobility.

A charming aesthetic illusion of the medieval past, though short-lived, was the only thing to oppose to civilization [319]. The picture was completed by William Morris [299; 300] who followed Carlyle and Ruskin. In his works one finds synthesis of romanticism and pragmatism that produced a tremendous aesthetic chimera of European culture, relentlessly moving towards its crisis. Although there had already been hopes for the *neo-aristocratic* spirit and *neo-gothic* style prior to Morris, it is he who can be regarded as the founder of the Modern Style that appeared in England. Its main idea, the medieval-and-socialist Utopia, was quickly buried under the glamour of works of arts.

Morris' moralistic sermon could be narrowed down to rethinking medieval art and the over-idealized feudal social system. Thus, although two Utopias — aesthetic and social — were brought together, they did not produce the anticipated *unified environment* based on the principle of equality of the utilitarian and aesthetic components. Nevertheless, the modernist movement established everywhere in Europe for the next ten years or so. Although it was sophisticated and magnificent, whatever but living, and will remain for centuries a beautiful evidence of inexplicable longing for the lost harmony of life.

Bertrand Russell has left a clear warning: "To take into the inmost shrine of the soul the irresistible forces whose puppets we seem to be — Death and change, the irrevocableness of the past, and the powerlessness of Man before the blind hurry of the universe from vanity to vanity — to feel these things and know them is to conquer them. This is the reason why the Past has such magical power. The beauty of its motionless and silent pictures is like the enchanted purity of late autumn, when the leaves, though one breath would make them fall, still glow against the sky in golden glory. The Past does not change or strive; like Duncan, after life's fitful fever it sleeps well; what was eager and grasping, what was petty and transitory, has faded away, the things that were beautiful and eternal shine out of it like stars in the night. Its beauty, to a soul not worthy of it, is unendurable; but to a soul which has conquered Fate it is the key of religion" [341: 21].

However, Morris failed to conquer Fate. He did not notice that while giving an impulse for integration into an artificial aesthetic environment with all the objects in the *same medieval style*, from wallpaper and curtains to furniture and clothes, he created his own theater of life. According to Alexey. Bartoshevich, "Most often, such integration threatened to turn out to be false pretenses or self-delusion" [27: 69]. In many cases, the boundary between theater and life happened to be blurred. *Productions* both in the theater and real life seemed to replace life itself, with the spiritual substituted for by the soulful and the tragic with the pathetic. In the end, this became tiresome. Having lost its connection with the rapidly changing life, aestheticism gave way to other movements.

Due to the inevitable turn of events, the cultural crisis was marked by a temporary crisis of aestheticism itself. The immediate natural reaction to this was the Decadent movement. It was initiated by Aubrey Beardsley, who ingeniously cultivated vice, and evolved into taking the aesthetic pleasure from watching the looming catastrophe [51]. It was not at all by accident that the next phenomenon faced by the Man who hid from the emerging intellectual freedom was the loss of individuality. It was manifested in many aspects: not merely the loss of specificity and uniqueness, but the loss of a person's individual character. Shortly before the beginning of the crisis, as well as during and after it, there were talks about run-off-the-mill copies replacing masterpieces; of the blurred distinction between what is moral and what is immoral, of regarding shameful deeds as mere antics, heroism as unnecessary bravado, and religion as just performance of the ritual. The loss of individuality and godlessness — the damned Nietzschean myth of the crisis — almost became synonymous.

After Thomas Carlyle and Søren Kierkegaard began to speak of primitivization of mind, and Nikolai Berdyaev about a global atheistic city, driven by pragmatism and care for comfort, José Ortega-y-Gasset declared the triumph of the mass Man [319]. Martin Buber was concerned of the world of mass culture; he believed that Man could not cope with it [74; 75]. Jaspers referred to it as desert with a maddening race for profit [501].

Unpleasantly consistent philosophical evaluation of what was happening in culture mirrored real events in life and art. Having dispensed with all this quickly and decisively, Modernism also reacted to the cultural crisis in its own way. The most impressive was the complete severance of art from the particular reference system, what made newly created characters unrecognizable [119; 211; 340]. The unparalleled irrational phantasmagoria enchanted and scared the public, especially when modernist art turned out to be highly rational in the choice of means to visualize the radically changing code of the worldview. Whatever could be said about Modernism, it gave unprecedented freedom of self-expression, with most complicated relationships between the ethical and the aesthetic. However, it should be borne in mind that freedom was too often inspired by longing for the meaning of the world that was lost during of the crisis.

For a long time Modernism could only be appreciated by a small group of intellectuals who regarded themselves as the elite. Those who were *not on their list*, needed something less eccentric; they did not need moderate yet incomprehensible abstractions, or most extraordinary results of bizarre experiments. The mass demand was satisfied through mass production of copies more recognizable originals. Depersonalized and many times replicated culture was more suitable as an aesthetic tool to take care of a person's daily needs, one of very few ways to escape from unanswerable existential questions. However, everyday life before was not the same thing and after crisis.

After the World War II, the hope of Modernity, that was expected to provide means of survival, finally came true. Industrialization and development of technology broke cultural traditions that had constrained economic achievements [196]. Instead, there came a temporary feeling of satisfaction — survival was now guaranteed. However, when Man became fed up with material wealth, the longing that one felt during the crisis came back, because the meaning of survival was still unclear. An obsolete way to obtain it through contemplation of the image of the transcendent did not match the secularized society and depersonalized culture. According to Adorno, Modernity with all its expressivity and bringing out all its advantages, grows out of reflecting the inner world and moves on to the expression of the inexpressible, i.e., something that cannot be formulated in any of the existing languages [9]. By discarding God and bringing about competition, Modernity reduced the threat of hunger but caused the growing psychological stress instead.

The postmodern thought began to rip up the old wound with heroism of philosophy of the crisis time. All at once, postmodernists began to praise pluralism of choice, combined with the loss of meaning, and what was more frightening, the death of the subject. Robert Williams put forward the slogan *culture is ordinary* [412; 413; 584], and Peter Berger *supplemented* it with a special interpretation of secularization [45; 46; 477]. Niklas Luhmann's research of ever-increasing differentiation in all spheres of social life [259; 260], William Beck's idea of *uncertainty and risk* [36; 37] and many others [161 — 164] did not add optimism either.

In the meanwhile, the empty space between the two poles — economic prosperity and the lack of response to existential demands — was bound to be filled with something. The fast-forming society of consumption experienced the shift of priorities from survival-based *materialistic* values to

post-material quality-of-life values. As a result, the role of everyday life radically changed, both as compared with Modernity and the peak of the crisis. However, to define the meaning of existence still remained as arduous a task as it was in the epicenter of the crisis. It was much easier to suppress the demand and find relief in an equivalent of meaning of life compiled skillfully from everyday artefacts. The only difference was that the consumer society had provided for this an unprecedented variety of material.

In the modern world the subject *acts on its own behalf* [156]. Postmodernity economic prosperity paved opened the door for possessing of artefacts of any culture that used to be coordinates of the meaning. Postmodernity eliminated the genetic difference between the content of works of art. *Purpose making* passed into the hands of the subject eager to construct the reality with the help of postmodern romantic-pragmatic means. All that referred to the transcendent ceased to be of value; it became senseless because it no longer pointed to the purpose of the present, and even more so, the future. This has affected the antiquity market in a peculiar way: what is purchased there as an aestheticized wreckage of the heroic past gives *communion with the eternal*, and becomes a modern analog of a holy relic.

Technology was also made serve current needs. What could not be purchased in the antiquity market could now be bought as a fairly decent off-the-shelf copy. The warning of Walter Benjamin that a work of art when copied is closer to Man *in terms of space*, but not authentic and has no aura [40; 41; 42], was coldly received. Much more appealing was the aesthetics of replica that gave the recipient relief in projectable and smooth recognition, as was termed by to Umberto Eco [483; 484; 485]. In contrast to the aesthetic principles of the Middle Ages and Renaissance [486], at the end of the late Modernity the never-ending process of replication gives a new meaning to the process of variation. It is duly appreciated that the series of variations can be endless. Anyway, possessing a replica made one feel superior with regard to the unique masterpiece and also expressed a subconscious desire of *communion with eternity*, rather than heavy thoughts about the meaning of life.

Postmodern *playing with old objects*, whether genuine antiques or their replicas or both of them combined with their modern or postmodern interpretation, penetrated mass consciousness. So a super-new type of art synthesis appeared, with the motto *a copy of the Venus de Milo in the bathroom*. The rich owners of the bathrooms did not know that postmodernists had already played Mass for the Dead for them. They went on living and did not want anything but to spend their money, whether righteous or not, on creating their own small world that ensured them psychological stability and protection from unrealized problems related to the search for the meaning of life.

The Baroque era hopes for regulated control of the world were revived and transformed; paradoxically, the ruined *castles in the air*, of Romanticism, began to be rebuilt in everyday life, and aestheticism of the crisis time came naturally back in a new capacity. On behalf of postmodernists concerned about this situation, Jean Baudrillard came out with a dire diagnosis: in Postmodernity the appeal of transcendence had completely been replaced with that of the medium. When the form becomes perfect it makes Man a passive observer of his own puissance. However, according to Baudrillard, the creation of a system of objects is equal to producing an alibi for the absence of the meaning of life [68; 82]. Making collections and mass production can serve the same purpose: according to Baudrillard, the arrangement of collection itself replaces time; it is a pastime, referring the subject to a false, imaginary eternity. This echoes Baudrillard's concept of imitation: in the age of make-believe, imitation results in the creation of simulacra, in non-differentiation of the symbol and reality, the original and replica, what has become crucial during a *linguistic catastrophe* [18]. The unreal becomes real via imitating a replica, and Man is doomed to live among copies, in the medium of signs, with blurred boundaries between the ethical and the aesthetic. [See also 40 — 42].

The idea of creating everyday life did seem to reemerge from the depth of the Baroque. It was transformed during the crisis and replicated by Postmodernism. In the created life, one supposedly could consider himself if not a sovereign but a small-scale controller of the eternity. It was only the scale that changed. The ruler in a totalitarian state was interested in redevelopment of his palaces and parks. A sovereign individual of Postmodernism acts in smaller dimensions, however the effect is much more pronounced, due to the sheer number of those involved in the process and aestheticization of the previously non-aesthetic things: power and politics (Zygmunt Bauman [29; 30]; Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe [240; 241], Boris Groys [130; 131]), experience and ways of cognition (Gianterio Vattimo 87; 88], Henry Nelson Goodman [133]) and social practices (Pierre Bourdieu [77; 78; 79]).

The demand for an aesthetic equivalent of the ethical meaning triggered the supply, and there appeared a global art market engulfing whatever could be used as a means to create an illusion of purpose. Any artefact, phenomenon or event could potentially be regarded as a work of art, the key success criterion of any aesthetic project becoming sales: everything that sells well is truly beautiful. Therefore, the major components of the art market environment are also markets, predominantly design and advertising.

Design offers a fantastic set of tools to aestheticize the medium that would acquire a demonic nature; the interior design industry seemed to develop into a powerful instrument for the aesthetically-tuned subject in Postmodernity. Sharp money makers in design industry pour onto the market all they could, including spectacular funerals, just to create an illusion that the unimaginable exists. Mass media are no less intrusive, trying to assure the public that a bizarre combination of Japanese gardens, Native American artefacts etc., would relieve stress. This was immediately used by the advertising industry, which is a special kind of art market promoting the idea that all what is imaginable can effect smooth recognition and in firm assuredness in happiness to be provided by this or that product. Both design and advertising began to be oriented toward those who want to feel nostalgic for the impossible, for an event that referred to the unimaginable inside the imaginable, while producing an illusion of individuality out of the de-individualized, as was already noted by Jean-François Lyotard [251].

In the mid-20th century, advertisement clichés were striving to give an illusion to those who had not experienced freedom, consciously or subconsciously. As if by a wave of a magic wand, there appeared romantic pictures with fairy-tale images and unrealistic scenes, new products with idols from the past in the background, unearthly images wearing strange clothes. However, the more people familiarized themselves with intellectual freedom, the less effective the *naïve* advertisements were. The industry had to turn to another tool, that of constant repetition appealing to the subconscious. Besides, instinctively sensing rather than estimating profits, art market made use of *the rule of exclusiveness* of surrealism. Instead of the obsolete illusion of God, surrealism invented another one: without self-cognition one can buy a mysterious image created by geniuses. The buyers became *the newest* aristocracy of the first wave; obtrusive repetitions produced the second wave. They are as different as Dali and Warhol: the former created exclusiveness of the unimaginable expressed in an *expensive masterpiece*, whereas the latter produced exclusiveness of life, based on consumption of mass products.

This helps understand the meaning of the well-loved word *brand* [86; 175; 209; 239; 396]. Its designers use a picture, due to which a successful brand performs its most important function, i.e., it gives the illusion of carefree life. [285]. Means that make the picture are easy to see. First and foremost, it should represent the standard of the *proper* lifestyle in a very special interpretation [365]. Joy, happiness and wealth, and in a broader version, purposeful and integral existence as well, can be easily gained by wearing the clothes, shoes and jewelry, driving a car and using a washing machine of well-known brands, as well as using the services of particular insurance companies, law firms and designers.

The brand ambassador is of particular importance. Now it has replaced the main character of the meta-narrative. The face of a brand always exudes happiness; the people are always in a comfortable atmosphere, they do not seem to have any problems, they are super-humans, only because they are wearing or using something, that if purchased exempts one from the need to think about the meaning of life. The fact of possession of exclusive objects makes people on the picture carefree. What should others do? The same, that is to buy what the brand ambassadors have. Then there will be no ethical difficulties or moral discomfort. As the major yet inexplicit principle of any brand claims, "Give us your money and we'll tell you how to make your life meaningful".

This happens to be an outstanding response to the current situation: while subconsciously feeling the uncertainty of freedom of the meaning, they create the demanded illusion of it on a glossy page of a magazine. The illusion is fascinating: it evokes faith in omnipotence of money that one must earn to buy the meaning of life. At the same time, it is *a kind of narcotic* synthesized from false images promising only an illusorily smooth way to obtain the purpose of life.

A brand is a modern analog of the old meta-narrative in miniature, with dominating direct connections between the type of sexuality manifestation and culture [224]. A brand is designed according to the same rules, though considerably modified. The medieval God creates the whole

world from nothing, together with its meaning. *Deities* of the brand make profitable business based on people's desire to delegate the prerogative of the meaning at any cost, as long as they do not have to tackle it themselves. The *proper* interior designer will decorate houses, the *proper* tailor will make clothes and the *proper* beautician will create images, while the rest will obtain the meaning of life when buying their services. The creators of brands are so successful, the faces representing brands look so happy — it is here that one should find the truth woven in the fabric of their product. No matter how naïve it may sound, they do not know the meaning of other people's life.

Do brand products really cost that much? Certainly not; for there is nothing special about them. Then why people are ready to pay three times their price? The answer is obvious: the extra money is paid for narcotic relief of longing for the non-cognized meaning of life. It is sometimes easier to pay for the picture; however in the end, Man will inevitably face lost expectations and disappointment, since the brand has no other goal except sales growth. And people are being deceived, only because they have been asking for it. The only thing to counter-pose it is the will to control the creation of a person's own meaning.

Therefore, the often-heard sad statements about the overall involvement of people, rather than objects, in the art market, are hardly surprising. There seem to be no more arguments to disprove the assumption that objects creating a person's fate also make the personality become an object, cultivated in the process of its aesthetic and completely senseless formation. It is a special kind of the all-for-sale atmosphere, with the updated motto *Carpe diem*. Everything what the purpose-deprived postmodern person would buy must be immediately offered for sale, for it is only money that matters. On the other hand, for some unknown reason, theoreticians and players of the art market continue to act without thinking about the future, as if they were to live and play by the same rules forever. And, for some reason they push to the periphery of our mind the thought, that however perfect may the interior designed in full accordance with trends of art market be, depersonalized culture will inevitably bring about the feeling of homelessness, the reverse side of the 21st-century cosmopolitanism.

Some scholars suggest that, as a result of the movement towards demythologization of European culture begun during the Age of Enlightenment, the *I* has lost its ability to obtain identity and may in fact become anything, being absolutely empty in and for itself. The aesthetic revolution striving to restore life integrity through the fusion of the aesthetic and the existential has resulted only in *evaporation of meaning* as a form of losing touch with reality. The project of Modernity sought to eliminate the ambivalence of existence; however, its implementation yielded unexpected results. Inevitable reflexive undermining of traditions and demythologization have led to the society, in which *reality*, deprived of the Real, is constantly produced and reproduced via combinatorial models, and becomes its own myth itself [374].

However, there is a plain fact that tends to be overlooked. In fact, the crisis concerns not only with the disappearance of the Real, the loss of the global meaning or culture becoming depersonalized and mass-oriented. The crisis has also created conditions for cultural objects to become a means of creating an aesthetic equivalent of meaning, but the post-crisis cultural space is not a mass copy of its events. On the contrary, its real significance consists in personality obtaining the freedom to obtain the purpose of life. However, the uncertainty about transformation of the personality structure is quite alarming. Poorly thought-over interpretations of freedom that were articulated in the philosophical concept of the existential revolution counterintuitively did not become part of common thinking. The crisis of the *quantum* identity of the *M* center in the personality structure still seems to be unbearable. At the turn of the 21st century the most critical problem of the post crisis time became even more pressing — to bridge the gap of *Nihil*, at least with some picture.

By saying that the lure of transcendence was replaced by that of the environment, Baudrillard made a very important observation. The non-cognized quantum freedom has to be stabilized by something or otherwise, unawareness will result in arbitrariness and consequently, in self-destruction. The need for self-preservation, like everything related to the *P* center, has turned into a *miracle pill* for *moral* tranquilization. Is it correct to say that having a replica of Venus de Milo in the bathroom is not good? Is there anything bad in big museums selling copies of their masterpieces? Do Warhol's Coca-Cola cans pose a threat to human spirituality? In fact, no.

However, when Man cannot bear any longer the care about freedom of the *M* element of identity in all its elusive, coming and going, ever-changing forms and manifestations, all artefacts indifferent to it will be used to create a screen protecting the personality from the scary distance of the

free travel to the unexplored cosmos of Nihil. All imaginable means of civilization become involved in the creation, first, of a semi-transparent cocoon, then a solid impenetrable shell, with the heart of intellectual freedom beating silently inside. What comes is not an existentially changing myth about the meaning of the world but an empty, though skillfully made, picture containing all material objects available so far [374]. Alexander Pogrebnyak notes that a candidate for modern person's target seems to be opulence. Attachment to it has become an analog of rescue, "that is paid for by turning into garbage." [331: 123].

The situation is paradoxical: Man remains free; however he protects himself from freedom with an advertised lovely envelope masking the ugly-looking center of intellectual freedom. The free myth about the world maintains the boundary between freedom of self-expression and arbitrary self-presentation, but the shell made of copied artefacts of civilization almost never does. It cannot pass unnoticed or at least not sensed that the colossal aggregation of interior components, cars of prestigious brands, expensive clothes, luxury holidays, yachts, original paintings or their copies and hairstyles, everything that Man turns into his own aesthetic project of self-presentation, rather than identity, hide something that is not cognized and startling.

However Man, with enviable self-denial that is worth of better use, goes along the way making an installation of his life out of everything he can get from it, e.g., garments, precious metal, marquetry woodwork, all sorts of plastic, paints and perfumery. The created piece of art is proudly demonstrated to others. Those who have managed to get onto the pages of glossy magazines are the most fortunate; their exposure is much greater. Those who create the installations and those who savor them, those who display and those who watch them, who sell and who buy, producers of advertisements and consumers of the advertised products constitute a gigantic, ever-growing art market, whose hustle and bustle makes us forget about awkward questions. Generally, the aesthetically-minded postmodern milieu appears to be uninterrupted, though aestheticized continuation of the *will-for-wealth* metaphysics that emerged during the cultural crisis.

Those who inwardly feel senselessness want to comply with the demand of art market and to look gorgeous and successful. The aestheticized project of the personality carefully hides from others and even from oneself the nervous feeling of emptiness and homelessness. However, this may serve as a *sentimental* touch to a person's image. The desire to confirm a person's identity in the eyes of other people makes one think of a self-performance; however its success will bring only imaginary relief. The inability of self-portrayal in the interpretation of the personal myth about the meaning of life makes one mask the emptiness with a socially-demanded installation. As a compensation, if the latter is evaluated positively, one may only be sure that he meets social requirements. Thus, the price to pay for the success or failure of self-presentation will be destabilization of the personality.

The quantum *M* element of identity does not find in art market anything to confirm the proper way of its formation. According to Grigory Tul'chinskij, freedom, as absolute potentiality, is transcendent [407; 408]. According to Schegolev, the free individual who cannot exercise his freedom and is hiding from it behind an aesthetic screen made of many thousand artefacts, is approaching the collapse of its visualization or becomes neurotic.

Ways of aestheticization of the morally empty meaning originating from means of subsistence lead to an inner conflict based on the contradiction between the components of a person's inner world. Non-cognized ethical meaning represented incorrectly through exclusive means of subsistence is irrationally rejected, the comfort of the latter being a prerequisite for both survival and other people's approval. Therefore, a subconscious protest against any conditions constantly arises and is every time suppressed. This brings to memory Schegolev's thought about a infantile neurotic who wants his father to die. A nervous disorder of the kind is the legacy of the *forgotten* crisis where pragmatism, the longing for the understandable past and aestheticism have combined for the first time to produce a bundle of contradictions of non-cognized freedom. However, people often tend to ignore Ivan Karamazov's words in Dostoevskij's novel that bear direct relevance to them.

In any case, it is getting more and more obvious that Man is free to define the meaning of life himself. It is unknown when it will be ultimately recognized, but when it happens, Man will see that art market is not a self-sufficient demonic structure, produced by infernal forces that enslave personality, and that its creators are not omnipotent. Man makes his own decision about the level of his involvement with art market. It is only within the personality structure that one can always find a subjective boundary between the freedom of realization of a person's own purpose and clinging to

material objects. Once felt, the boundary will enable Man to recognize that personality is not meant to dissolve in things. The global scale of art market suggests that anyone can overcome the fear of losing attachment to material objects and obtain the freedom of meaning making. To a certain extent, it is already happening. It is no use speaking about aestheticism enslaving the postmodern subject, for everything that belongs to the scope of personal freedom remains hidden from the eyes of the auctioneer, designer, sociologist or philosopher.

Coordinates of freedom can also be marked out by material objects. In that case what they indicate will constitute the space of Home belonging to personality, with the flickering light of the unraveled mystery of life. It is up to Man to decide where he belongs, Home or its depersonalized but comfortable copy. Man may lose his Home and suffer, as if being in an exile; however the light will be rekindled in his heart. Vice versa, Home abandoned by its owner will be empty. The loss of a Home copy leads to annihilation, self-destruction of personality left without continued corporeality as a prerequisite for existence. On the other hand, disappearance of a person will pass unnoticed where material things have replaced human relationship, like a figurine that has vanished from a designer's studio.

The process of identifying the boundary is beyond manipulation. It can be overlooked or deliberately ignored; one may also try to purposefully ignore it and nothing will change. As Gilles Deleuze has shown many times, the difference becomes one of the main events in a person's existence that determine the understanding of justice, forgiveness, gift, and friendship... [161; 162]

Mankind is inexorably moving along the path to maturity. Potentially, personality is already oriented towards obtaining identity and the discovery of a way of self-cognition. Nobody knows when and how this is going to happen. However, the recognition of freedom of identity and, what is more important, responsibility for it, has been predetermined by the luring realization of the mystery of life in the depth of a person's inner world.

3.3. Towards the Ethos of Responsibility

Some optimistic scholars believe that in today's circumstances, the notion of *responsibility* and *irresponsibility* are fairly relative because "the subject is always involved in responsible decision making" [324: 97]. However, we entertain a different view. Since ancient times the basics of the ethics of responsibility have pervaded practical philosophy and described primarily a personal trait of those building social relationships. The essence of the notion was formulated by Aristotle as the best Man is not he who exercises his virtue towards himself, but he who exercises it towards another, for it is a difficult task. It is important that Aristotle established the continuity and parallelism of an individual subjective interpretation of responsibility with regard to the objective interpretation that is based on interests of society. Moreover, according to Aristotle, activity in the moral sphere presupposes not only socially required deeds but also the related motivation, intentions and *state of mind*.

The performed action is an end in itself; however, the actor must firmly adhere to certain principles in his activity. The approach remained largely unchanged in the course of subsequent development of ethics: it is inseparable from the understanding of uniqueness of what is ethical. It is always both the achievement of the desired result and the performance of a person's duty that may turn out to be contrary to the individual's opinion about what is useful, as it was demonstrated by Socrates' life, doctrine and death.

Following Aristotle, scholars have traditionally associated responsibility with the freedom of choice that constitutes the core of morality as a means of social regulation. A Man is free in his deed because his character in the time of the deed depends on himself: "Both virtue and vice depend on ourselves ...if it is in our power not to commit a great deed, it is also in our power to commit a shameful one" [17: 105]. Because virtue is always a result of complex training, exercises, education and individual experience of constant strenuous self-cultivation. In such area of the ethical as social relations, free will is not a natural component, whether anthropological and sociological, of a person's existence. Nor is it a supernatural prerequisite for morality, but a phenomenon arising within morality as a way of human activity.

Aristotle was more than two millennia ahead of his time, and maybe ahead of ours too; his view of the freedom of choice is still perceived as not fully matching the reality. The latter, whether it

is insurmountable circumstances or inborn personality traits that cannot be changed, serves as an argument to justify a person's own actions in certain situations and exempts the individual from the duty of incessant self-improvement on the way to the truth (e.g. "don't let your mind ever rest"). However, for those "who let themselves use their own brains" [400: 128], "the overall ineradicable awareness of moral responsibility suggesting freedom contradicts absolute determinism" [381: 62].

The type of responsibility described by Aristotle primarily refers to the political and academic activity of free citizens in an ancient Greek polis. The availability of some property to ensure decent living standards is evident. In this case, the public opinion of free citizens is an evaluation authority, a key component of moral decision-making and responsibility. There is nothing mythical about it, with Greek gods on their thrones only gazing, and not influencing social practices. A citizen of a polis finds his own space in decision making, and Aristotle tries to specify the direction and measure for best decisions, i.e., the middle between the two extremes. It is a measure of the moral duty in Man's deeds that is the crucial factor determining his responsibility. However, why has it become one of the major types of responsibility in the formed culture?

What is this all-too-common moral duty, without performing which there is no question of responsibility? Duty to whom? "To oneself and to the state", answered Aristotle. He had summed up Plato's numerous dialogues, thus restoring the original purity of their sense and showing the substance of the ethical that runs through them.

What should Man do to perform the duty? According to Plato, Man should be born for a second time. What does it mean? It means to begin thinking about himself, his duties, the foundational principles of his existence, his position in the world and the status of humanity in general. Man should think, be engrossed in thought, feel ecstatic from thinking, while escaping from everyday reality and, blinded by thought, stop dead in his tracks like Socrates *got stuck* in the entrance hall when going to a party with other people (*Feast*). Why should Man think? What is the purpose of the arduous process as exhausting and consuming as a rough labor? The very first pages of *Nicomachean Ethics* provide a clear axiom-like answer: to find the good, that is the aim of all aims. However, it is not the good in general, but a doable good what becomes the purpose of human activity. It cannot be a sum of many, but it makes life desirable and purposeful.

The idea of good is a supreme genus that precedes everything and "makes everything be what it is. From the good of supreme genus, from which every other birth expects meaning for itself, up to simple living reproduction. Without the supreme genus, the good, no birth, biological or artistic is no good in itself, for every newborn there is a long way to the good leaving the evil behind to which everything purely technical can serve. In Plato's genera not all *creativity* is good. It must be either the absolute good or nothing" [61: 261–262].

The idea of good presupposed striving for happiness, for the latter "is the best of all what is good for a Man" [17: 68]. Of course it can be given to Man by gods, but only by accident. "At the same time happiness is something common for many, because thanks to certain education and hard work it may belong to all those who are not cripple for virtue" [17: 58]. Only ethics, that is practical philosophy, can teach this. Later Dante would formulate the idea of his *Divine Comedy* as follows, "To take those who live this life out of their poor state and bring them to healthy condition. The kind of philosophy to fulfill this is moral action, or ethics" [61: 108].

Thus, philosophy does not appear to be incomprehensible gibberish of idle Greek aristocrats, but a real activity. Those interested in it discovered something mysterious in what used to seem clear and simple. If we, for example, begin to reflect about the familiar concept of Becoming we notice that Becoming is not Being, however it also is, it is the unity of Being and Nothing, and we may be surprised with the big difference in this simple concept, wrote Hegel over two thousand years later. The main issue of post-Socrates philosophy will be discovery of hidden elements of human existence and human situation in general. A priori, pre-experience and non-observability are necessary conditions for our everyday experience. Such a priori condition and a fundamental prerequisite for communication turn out to be responsibility: we would not be able to communicate if in starting points of communication (I and You) there were no continuity, if *I* were not responsible for that fact that it is, first, reliable on the whole, and second, recognized in You the same independence and freedom (Habermas) [443].

The essence of the "qualitative leap in the development of European humanity" [104], exhibited in political life in the Greek polis can be illustrated even better through a comparison. In

history, the antique interpretation was preceded by another idea of responsibility [99] typical of some primitive communities. During their long historical development they reach a certain level of dominance over natural and social processes that makes this way of living the most expedient. The fact is reflected in the strict code of traditions that other people may see as hardly understandable and complex. Most traditions are based on myths and the only *decision* left for Man to make is to strictly follow them. Punishment for offence can be very severe, including the exile from the commune. In this case the evaluation authority is based on the code of traditions. While reflecting the achieved superiority over animal forms of life and protecting from misfortunes, accidents and *unpredictability* of life, the unquestionable stability of the code does not allow the social commune to develop.

In other words, this kind of responsibility is aimed at conserving a certain way of living, regulated with the help of expedient and functionally simple decisions. Based on research by Claude Levi-Strauss, one can judge about the rationality of this type of responsibility. The scholar notes that such structures of thinking are wide spread in social enclaves and confinements that still exist within ever-changing social formations; he refers to them as closed complexes of traditions. Moreover, social groups that isolate themselves, turn instinctively to modified versions of this particular type of responsibility.

Practices in ancient Rome produced another type of responsibility, having for precisely formulated the first time the mutual impact of free personal decisions and duties with regard to a person's partner. Thanks to the clearly specified goal, Man could easily check if decision-related actions and their outcome matched duties, with a tertiary authority as a judge to resolve arising issues. This is when the ethical and legal thought, moral and legal activity, appeared to have a chance to combine. Like Roman law, this type of responsibility corresponds to the economy with developed production of goods and diverse forms of exchange. The advantages of this type of responsibility include opportunities to clarify the subject of the decision, together with related mutual obligations. The court that is a necessary component of this type of responsibility, guarantees finding the legal truth while connecting a person's personal moral decision with that of the third person in a disputable case.

It should be noted however, that the Greek and Roman world creates a *civil idea*, based on the belief that only a certain community of duly educated people and a certain social form can bring Man closer to ideal society on the earth. In this respect, the Roman concept of the state clarifies the purpose of democratic law, which is law in itself, rather than the achievement of specific results result in each case or in the majority of cases. We will refer to it as establishing the procedure for *acupuncture* of the legal truth.

In reality, the truth is not always established, for the margin of error due to Man's weaknesses and limitations it fairly high. However, this does not constitute sufficient grounds for the *impatience of opinion* (as Hegel puts it) that declares the absence of law as such, because the latter "is creation of a situation for the search of law with legal means" [268: 329].

According to documents about the history of morality, the idea of initial equality based on the famous legend about the Golden Age had been passed on as the guiding principle for a long time from generation to generation. The thought about equality and justice was also associated with the duty to work that is the same for everybody [257; 256]. It is clearly expressed in the statement about Christian equality before God [247] and in Saint Paul's second letter to Thessalonians *He who does not work, neither shall he eat*. However, Saint Paul strongly advises not to oppose the rulers and treat them with due respect.

The same controversy runs through the further course of history: if the evaluation authority in the ruling religious and feudal ideology was God [63; 64] and upper classes, including landlords, then magic and breakaway from the official church, later Protestantism, can be regarded as movements in another direction. With the growing early-capitalist economy, the power of evaluation is increasingly delegated to communes and individual conscience. Moral freedom, achieved in this way, provoked a pivotal decision to participate in secularization of immune church property. And the greater was the role played in it by property- and power-related interests of bourgeoisie during early revolutions, the more did the commune in Protestant interpretations give way individuals possessing property and power, what was reflected in the works of humanists at the turn of the 16th century.

All this created a foundation for a new type of responsibility that was a moral standard for owners and sustained ideologically the development of capitalism. Progressive traits of this kind of

people are understandable: self-determination, bravery and persistence in maximizing the added value — those were real virtues. Additionally, this type of responsibility could not have formed if not oriented towards Man's dignity and strength, creativity and personal responsibility. The latter, combined with available capital and sufficient labor force, reformed the world rapidly, changing the signs of many values.

The *moral code*, determining the register of virtues, matched that historic breakthrough; it is well known from literature of various genres. In its concentrated form it can be found in works by Benjamin Franklin, *the first bourgeois*, the Man who took away the scepter from tyrants, and lightning from God. His life principles were "You have an obligation only to yourself" and "Work for this world". It is here on earth that one needs success and the latter does not due to inherited privileges but to a person's own entrepreneurship and cleverness, and this is particularly satisfying. The ideal of Man is formed based on three main virtues: hard work, fulfillment of financial obligations and thrift. However, one cannot help mentioning his most famous maxim "Time is money", that outmatched all the previous ones. Behind the magic formula stands the call for a faster turnover of capital, rather for miserliness of a Man of independent means. According to Marya Ossovskaya, "Franklin was not the first to ask others to enrich, ... however, his conversion of time into money, his concern not to waste a minute and to make the approach common for all — this was new and helped to form the ethos that distinguished Europe and the US from Asian cultures" [320: 246].

Following the Polish scholar, we would like to consider the statement seriously, as a piece of conventional wisdom in the history of culture. According to ancient authors, the most important in a person's life is striving for independence. Stoics would achieve it by viewing everything in life as insignificant, except their own virtue, while Epicureans would rid themselves of fear and go to discover the joys of life. In both cases, it is about human spirit. The forming capitalism suggested independence obtained in a completely different way. Thanks to Franklin, it is ingrained in American mentality that anybody is capable of doing this. And the instruction "How to make everyone rich" supplies a simple recipe.

In a sort of catechesis of an average American, virtue will later be unquestionably associated with use, the citizen's main duty being to get rich. That is the meaning of responsibility and duty to oneself, a person's family and society. Those unable to do it, which seems to be the only reason why some become teachers or priests, are treated without respect. It is curious how all this affected the style of the literary genre of *instructions*. The slow, measured speech of the past was replaced with the short and obvious one of innumerable recommendations that began with the magic words *how to*. Their popularity reflects the process of people turning into one-dimensional creatures for whom life means acquisition.

"Enrichment as mission" is a specific feature of the Puritan ethos, formed in Protestantism. It is one of the main subjects of Weber, who used Franklin's maxims to illustrate his own statements.

The bourgeois type of responsibility claims to ensure progress of humanity. However, the French Revolution marked another trend that questioned the concept of progress and looked back at earlier types of responsibility. The trend persisted in the 20th century, first and foremost in fundamentalist ideologies, regardless of their basis (nationalist or religious, or both).

In today's world there can be observed several types of responsibility. In traditional societies with their strict codes, there is the primitive type, though somewhat modified. In neo-liberalism one comes across the classic bourgeois type, etc. The same refers to Russia. It should be noted that none of the types claims to be *absolute*. Moreover, one cannot speak only about the modern social *stage*, pluralistic play, or *an ensemble* of various types of responsibility being *harmonized*.

In modern societies, Man faces an absolutely new type of responsibility. Let us look at the word from another angle. *Omeem* [otvet] in Russian means *reply, message, answer* to math problems, that has been familiar since childhood, and it also means *responsibility for a person's deeds*. The Russian prefix *om* points to a completed action; it means that something important has been done properly. The action is performed so as to plan, polish and complete the task assigned. *Отзыв* [otzyv] is a response, an answer, an echo, a statement and an opinion; there is also one more meaning, long forgotten and found only in 50-year-old unilingual dictionaries, that is a counterparole, said as the answer to a password, to identify friend or foe.

The prefix *om* is also about something *going or flowing from*, *от — зывичивость* [ot — zyvchivost'] as reaction to another creature's call, sound or voice. However, the latter meaning is

hidden so deeply in the word *ответственность* [otvetstvennost'] that the usage may seem strange. At the same time, in modern English, where *responsibility* is a Latin borrowing, *response* can mean *feeling*; besides, there is also the word *responsive*, all derived from the Latin *responso*.

In terms of etymology, the root *вед* [ved], of Greek origin, is the most interesting. It juxtaposes what is visible or audible (perceptible) and what is understandable, or contemplative (a phenomenon and a noumenon, as we divide them). In Old Russian, derivatives from *вед* seem to be close to those from *вид* [vid] that means to get visual information, a synonym to *ведать* [vedat'] being *слышать* [slyshat'] *слышати*. In contrast to knowledge denoted by the root *зона* [zona] that refers to *the supreme sphere; wisdom*, *ведение* [vedenie] belongs to the earthly, mundane sphere, the difference being preserved in the modern literary word *заведовать* [zavedovat'], that means to control («он ведает хозяйственной частью»).

Since Old Russian times, the root *вед* had merged with *вет-* [vet] (meaning *notification*) due to its semantics and form, to produce the Old Russian and Slavic *vetii* (*speaker, preacher*), *вет* (*advice, decision*), *вече* (*public meeting*) and so on. In the 12th century Russia, a poet was called *ветия* [vetiya] (the poet Boyan in *The Song of Igor's Campaign* is described as *вещий* [veshiy] [See 390]).

The Russian word *ответственность* [otvetstvennost'] makes one think of the Latin *veto*, although linguists may disagree. In a broad sense, the latter means a ban, in a more narrow sense it is about the right to suspend or cancel decisions of legislative bodies. Personal responsibility is unthinkable without self-limitation; whereas legal responsibility presupposes rights and obligations related to property. Property relations are fundamental, being connected with the ethos, ethics and culture; they directly reveal themselves in responsible or irresponsible political decisions.

It is not only in the 20th century that Russia experimented with property. However, one does not always become wise through experience. As a thorough analysis shows, “to understand that in manipulations with property everything turns out to be far from simple, one should only look at the word *собственность* [sobstvennost'] — *property*, to see *собственное* — *само* [sobstvennoe — samo]. It is not a whim of the language and it is by no means accidental. Any property is originally destined to find out its own essence. What some may consider as annoying polysemy and merely a lexicographic issue is in fact the tip of the iceberg. It is not for the sake of lexicology that we would like to study the mysterious repetition of *собственное* as *свое* and vice versa. This used to irritate Vladimir Dal'; he regarded it as superfluous ('not Russian'). We do not see any contradiction when a notary public formalizes our property right for something that is our own. Thus, our wish to specify and formalize is unobtrusively presented in the vocabulary and explicitly in law” [60: 41].

The word *ответственность* is a similar case, however the tautology does not seem mysterious. The owner of property bears responsibility. However, it describes a particular personal trait that would help preserve and increase the property for the sake of the world. Property, or ownership, makes one responsible for it. The Latin *re-spondeo* means not only *answer*, but also *appear, pay, correspond, comply, reflect, respond, be on the opposite side, be in order and act normally*.

Formalizing the ownership right (the Roman Law) makes property private. In Russia, this was preceded by oprichnina and Stolypin's reform of *otrub* farms. In both cases, the property was originally common, then it had its parts cut off and given away. Thus, history has been preserved in the language. The Russian word *прочь* that had produced *опричник* corresponds to *приватный, приватизация*. *Otrubs* are isolated plots of land that had been cut off from the peasant community's lot and given to individual owners, so as to form rural bourgeoisie.

In Vladimir Dal's dictionary, *отрубной* means *individual, separate and integral*. Bibikhin noted, “What an astonishing definition. It naively combines two poles of *property*. On the one hand, the essence of *otrub*, or *private*, is privative: some property is taken away (*прочь*), extracted out of the old dragnet of the commune. To move peasants to *otrubs*, make community members become private property owners, like in the West, was the aim of Stolypin's privatization, initially supported and later disapproved by the Tsar <...>. The old, dark force of the earth, whose involuntary agents (restorers) were Bolsheviks, could not stand land lots being given out to private owners <...>. Nor can it now: today's hesitant privatization has already brought about murders. Is it because the lagging-behind, inert system rejects what is new and progressive? Or, to be more precise, the active and self-confident

neo-European revolutionary consciousness, together with its rational project for land management, has in fact intruded in the depths so impenetrable that human mind can hardly even guess?" [60: 119].

Lightness of thinking, typical of Russian mentality, had affected the definition of *отрубной*. On the one hand, it means separate, cut-off, while on the other, it is integral and independent. It is like Manilov's dream: what is private, *частное, опричное* [chastnoe, oprichnoe], individual may some day in a mysterious way reappear as integral and independent, and then produce multiple smaller entities. The idea of what is cut off, thrown away always goes hand in hand with the concept of private, that is separate, cut-off, or in Latin translation, private. Cut-off from what, it may be asked. The answer would be from the commune, both in Rome and Russia. Without going into a sociological analysis, one could think of its old name *mir*. We would not try to deduce from the latter some characteristics of a commune and would like to note what is obvious: it does divert us; it does hamper our understanding of the commune and connect it to the most complicated problem of all! ("Die Welt, Die Welt, ihr Esel! ist das Problem der Philosophie, die Welt und sonst nichts" "The world, the world, you stupid, is the problem of philosophy, the world, and nothing else". A. Schopenhauer). "Private property is what has been cut off from *мур* (the commune), of which we know little, we have no idea in what meaning the word is used here. However, neither former nor modern revolutionaries have time to bother about it — where private property comes from. They have planned privatization and are in a hurry to complete it" [60: 42].

Blessed with the gift of foresight, Nikolay Gogol managed to describe today's type of Russian businessman, who makes money appear out of thin air: now instead of *dead souls* there are privatization checks, with Christian humility paid for by many million people, rapidly sliding down into poverty. Ironically, the names of the leader of the Russian privatization project and Gogol's main character begin with the same letter.

As a philosophical analysis shows, *private* property, even when notarized, does not become truly a person's own. To give it a name is not enough. If a newborn girl is called Love, it does not mean that the child will embody all the meanings of her name. The latter may not materialize, and later in her life she may have the character of a wicked witch or a Pandora brining misfortune. Her name will remain hardly anything more than a combination of letters reminding of her parents' will. In Hegelian words, property must come back to itself. That is to say, it must develop and be consecrated not only with righteous work but also with a coordinate of values that corresponds to it. Weber's analysis of the nature of capitalism is indisputable, because he connected the latter with Protestant ethics. He suggested that the development of capitalism was possible due to the fact that the private affair had become a kind of secret act embodying the endless and the divine, combining Man with the rest of the world. The utmost *commitment* of a shoemaker, a merchant, a worker or a tailor to their business also comprises their utmost responsibility for it. Therefore, the *real, actual* ownership, in contrast to formal, only-entitled ownership, forms not only in the *process* of work, but also in the related sphere of mentality, in the depth of Christian culture. Only after having passed all stages of formation of property, one becomes a real owner.

The property gained as if by magic and not sent by God, but grabbed, is formal ownership, with an *empty*, though proud owner, whatever official papers the latter may have. The statement about labor that had transformed ape into Man has not become a necessary truth, although we have been hearing it since childhood. It is quite predictable, because its social context is incompatible with the idea of free labor. Although the saying that humans are descended from apes may now sound ludicrous and the thought about the role of labor a caricature, it is hardly questionable that labor makes Man, whereas idleness triggers the reverse process, with Man ceasing to be fully human.

The above said is not for those seized by the *impatience of thought* who in *madness of self-esteem* are in a rush to register their ownership title. "When Bolsheviks, rising against property owners, stopped to understand the mysterious and profound meaning of ownership, they robbed themselves of the very thing, of its significance. Nor today's privatizers, with hopes to restore private ownership legally, try to understand its roots in the world (в мире. — translator's note) and its significance, while thinking that just to name it would be enough" [60: 43].

Let us not analyze the word (*мур/mir*) now, it requires special consideration. However, it should be noted that however difficult the analysis is, when thinking about the world, we end up with language, because it is the latter that "characterizes the existence of our world, its limits and conditions" [372: 13]. The boundaries of the language "are the boundaries of my world"

(Wittgenstein). If “to think, to know is to correlate oneself with everything, with the tradition” [268: 193–194], then we will inevitably arrive at a bitter conclusion that the world reflected in our speech, that is becoming increasingly poor, is rather patchy. “Do we really speak worse and worse, or is it our language denying us the right to speak it?” [222: 147].

In the question, we would prefer *because* instead of *or*. Language *resists, rebels and withdraws itself*, with the ever-growing gap between language, with its objective system, and everyday speech that fully depends on our own free choice and intention to follow its norms or not. In the latter case, there will be new awkward words, like ООО (общество с ограниченной ответственностью — Ltd. — translator’s note). It can be argued that the collocation *limited liability* has a legal meaning, and it is only an abbreviated form. In English it is *limited ownership, ownership with limited liability*. In Russian, the word *ownership* is omitted, so the whole thing looks absurd. For those who familiarize themselves with the Russian language, the word *liability* in the moral sense has disappeared, the full version being replaced with the abbreviation ООО seen on receipts, labels and even in the Academy [399: 442]. We are all responsible for the status of the language in which we think, talk and write; if we do not feel it, it is a sign of barbarism that takes us further and further away from the status of civil society.

We owe language as “the articulated space of thought” that includes people’s wishes and emotions, to ancient Greeks [268: 313]. The latter have an *agora*, the city square, the place where people understand that they are humans only when they have the space that mediates a person’s feeble attempts to reveal the mystery of human nature and enables them to formulate their own considerations on the subject. When facing the inconceivable complexity of everything around, including the process of thinking itself, one concludes that although the thought has no power over reality, it is so heavily charged when precisely formulated, that the Man who obtains it may be accused of sorcery and sentenced to death.

It is the thought that turns out to be a battlefield for those who think they are responsible for conservation of the current social system, morality, and traditions or for reforming them. And only those who are aware of it are capable of realistic thinking and setting feasible objectives without falling into utopia. Moreover, words themselves, when uttered, become absolutely serious, although we may not know their implication. Word and responsibility appear to be inseparable. Irresponsibility results from lack of culture and *virgin soil* of thought that fails to see the serious status and tries to explicitly express something that cannot be understood straightforwardly.

“We can and we must teach Russian people to cultivate sun-root or to construct roads; however when it comes to their mental instincts we can only admit that we are part of the latter and follow them. It would be pointless and hopeless to try to correct something. It is them, not us that have created the Russian language, Russian history and the Russian Empire. Our generation has had all this ready-made, we have improved nothing and spoilt a lot, so what we can do is the following:

- go back to the spiritual sources of all Russian creative activity in religious, political and social areas;
- not use someone else’s recipes; build the Russian home to Russian design verified by eleven centuries of our history” [383: 66].

The depths of Russian culture may also hold the key to the understanding of the type of responsibility that is currently going through a crucial stage of its development. Its details become clear through a thorough analysis of the word *courage*. In this connection, the image of Saint George as a cultural symbol would be particularly illustrative. Its careful study will show it to be poly-functional and poly-semantic; it confirms that the content of the genuine symbol always correlates with the concept of completeness and perfection of cosmic and human *universum*. [31: 361]. While immersing the concrete phenomenon in the elements of the *arche* of existence [See 3: 62–64], the symbol presents via the phenomenon an integral image of the world structure and Man’s place in it. Hence the constancy of some cultural symbols; through them culture *plays* fundamental and universally-conceptual scenarios of beginning to be Man-in-the-world, according to Anatoly Akhutin.

A symbol cannot exist without an image and vice versa, the latter always has some traits of the former. However, in the symbol the image seems to transcend the boundaries of essential self-congruence and points to the presence of meaning indissolubly connected with the image. When becoming a symbol, “the image becomes *transparent*, because through it one can see the meaning that is given as the depth of sense, a sense perspective that does not easily reveal itself”. The meaning of a

symbol cannot be decoded merely through a mental effort. One should make it his own, because the meaning of a symbol does not exist as a certain rational formula to be put into the image and then taken out of it. "Here lies the borderline between academic knowledge and the humanities, the latter being concerned with interpretation of symbols, i.e., asking about *humanum*, about human essence not materialized but symbolically realized in material things" [3: 156]. This constitutes the fundamental difference between the humanities and sciences; *precision* of the latter can only partially clarify the issue.

As Gabriel Marcel figuratively puts it, in the course of academic discussion the object of studies is, as a rule, *washed with thought*, so to speak. Like an island that seems accessible for observation from all sides, the analyzed object hides its inner relations and connections with the hypothetical basis of things. When attempting to *reduce* or *demystify* the meaning of a symbol, one faces something that does not lend itself to academic analysis and will disappear if analyzed, for the secret of its resistance lies in its *numinosity* [231].

Science can study social conditions and relations as the *habitat* of a symbol, with its logic and semantics. One can draw a parallel with art criticism: all careful studies of a masterpiece and in-depth analysis of its extra-artistic context by most up-to-date methods do not replace the direct unique impression from it.

Similarly, one can describe the meaning of courage and dignity, perform a phenomenological and most accurate semantic analysis and with a finely tuned ear of a linguist detect the same root in Russian words *достоинство* [dostoinstvo] and *истина* [istina] (Vladimir Nabokov). However, this would not help explain the mysterious power of courage and dignity that drives people.

The concept of Ivan Il'in deserves special attention, for the ethical legacy of Russian philosophy of the late 19–20th centuries has not yet been thoroughly studied. The enthusiasm that we felt reading at last what had been unavailable and locked in restricted-access repositories, gave way to skepticism and indifference. As usual, we turn to the West for wisdom and find there a program to study the unknown as our own and vice versa, as a special kind of relationship, an event that is also a deed. And we tend to forget about our own intellectual resources where, with a certain mental effort we could find both *philosophy of the deed* and a detailed theory of its realization. It may also be the reason for another trend in our life: some Russian intellectuals and intelligentsia would like not only to assume the Western lifestyle, but also go to live in the West, which means to live not-their-own life, dissolve in it, while forgetting the genuine roots of their ethos.

According to Il'in, an analysis fails to convey what is experienced only as a characteristic of a person's own existence (life, emotions, a person's *self*). If one does not have it, he is unreceptive to the moral foundation of life and indifferent to the lack of it. What is more, it shows that a person's moral experience is flawed, which hampers a person's understanding of the symbol. To comprehend the meaning of the latter requires a substantial effort of a person's intellect and emotions, which is only possible through a dialogue, turning to a wide range of interpretations.

As for the symbols on the famous icon *The Miracle of Saint George*, one can concentrate first on the idea of victory over the evil as the idea of the world order. An alternative view would be to accentuate the idea of self-perfection, self-victory and the victory over the evil in oneself. The meaning cannot be comprehended with the use of a straightforward mathematical formula, by substituting values and getting the right answer. There can be no such equations; the only way to understand the meaning would be to study the entire range of its interpretations provided by culture, as was done in the book *On Resistance to Evil by Force*, by Il'in.

The work presents an example of fundamental interpretation of the image of Saint George, where the center of the multilayer composition is the key human intention, i.e., striving after Good. This became a matter of heated debates among Russian *émigrés* in the 20th century, because fighting evil would always evoke the question about the ways to implement Good and, consequently, to oppose Evil.

The important dual problem has brought together some other ones into a logical bundle. "May a human being who is trying to achieve moral perfection resist evil by force, using the sword? May a human being who believes in God and accepts His creation, and who knows his place in this created world, not resist evil by force, using the sword?" [193: 7]. The philosopher's answer was quite straightforward: "to restrain evil by force can be Man's religious and patriotic duty". The conclusion leads to "a profound and important complication", that is, further questions. Is the assumption morally

right? Does committing a murder harm a person's *moral perfection*? Can a person's conscience consider a murder as a righteous deed regardless of the circumstances? That is, does *blood on the conscience* exist? Is it morally right to turn to state institutions for help, should the need be? Or is it only non-violence that is justified and that is incompatible with the use of force?

Il'in discusses the questions in the context of sharp criticism of Lev Tolstoj's doctrine: "Generally speaking the terms *violence* and *evil* are used as synonyms, so that the issue of non-fighting *evil by force* is sometimes formulated as non-fighting evil by evil or retribution of evil for evil; that is why violence is sometimes compared to Satan, and using force is considered as the Devil's way..., thus one would rather die or be killed than use force...". As opposed to this, Il'in, who was against abstract moralizing, suggested that it is Man that is the home of good and evil, "however, not the human body, in all its states and manifestations as such, but the human spirit, the inner world" [193: 13]. According to the philosopher, evil is "an inclination of human mind, typical of us all; it is a sort of irresistible urge to unleash the animal, the urge that seeks to extend its power and tighten its grip" [193: 10]. In the fight with evil, the winner will be the one who has chosen the path of moral perfection and is capable of providing ethical education to others and would be able to use force and the sword, if other means happened to be ineffective.

In this connection, moral perfection is of key significance. It is not something bestowed on or easily available for people in their life in this world. According to the New Testament, *perfection* is a long stairway of arduous ascension, "like a call from above and a willful source of conscience in a person's soul, but not as a merciless judge, always putting the weak soul into the pillory or pedantically demanding to be constantly impeccable". It is worthwhile to note that according to Il'in, morality has nothing to do with ethical radicalism. "Conceived in sin and grown in sin..., surrounded by people like himself and bound with them by the overall interaction in evil, Man can hardly pose practical questions of absolute standards and the goal of instant absolute moral purity. On the contrary, the deeper he withdraws into himself, the better he sees the secret hiding places of his instinct and passions... the more modest he becomes, in assessment of his own strengths and capabilities and the more forgiving to his fellowman's weaknesses" [193: 443].

Therefore, the attitude to evil is in fact the issue of Man's moral self-improvement, duty and ethical choice. According to Il'in, "Man is only given two options: either passive connivance towards evildoers or physical resistance". Neither Tolstoj, nor Russian philosophers or columnists sharing his ideas formulated the issue in this manner. Moreover, Il'in believes the doctrine of non-resistance to overemphasize a concrete situation, while passing it off as universal. However, there are cases when force and violence are necessary, for the benefit of Man and society.

While not accepting Tolstoj's doctrine of good and evil, Il'in disapproves of Martin Luther's attempts to absolutely justify the sword. Luther thought that "the work of the sword (war) is the work of love, excellent and Divine"; that the killing hand itself "is no longer Man's but God's; it is God, not Man, Who hangs, breaks on the wheel or decapitates". According to I. Il'in, the simplified interpretation of the disposition of Providence had been inspired by Judaist traditions of the Old Testament: Luther makes the earthly fight with evil God's problem, while eliminating the boundary between legal consciousness and conscience between what is expedient and what is perfect.

Taken out of the context, Il'in's thoughts may seem to be a kind of idealization of violence. The philosopher himself emphasized many times that the use of force was not a virtue and could not become it. Evil must be fought by love, in other words, non-violent actions, through a person's own moral self-perfection and educating other people's hearts and minds. Only if all these fail, may the use of force become righteous. The final paper on the issue that cleared up all misunderstandings was the essay *Axioms of Religious Experience*; its last chapter *Tragic Problems of Religious Experience* deals with evil and resistance to it.

Sometimes an evil deed cannot be prevented; then the problem becomes a tragedy, and to resolve it, one needs courage. It should be pointed out that according to Il'in, a spiritually minded person "cannot find a righteous solution in this case"; he will have to either get involved in fight with evil or abstain from it, however the latter would be an illusion. Il'in believes that "...the answer to the key question that is inevitable for all human culture, the proper solution to this tragic task consists in the necessary resistance to evil by force, with responsibility for the decision and action. This must be followed by moral purification during the whole life". Quite predictably, "he who oppose evildoers by force or with a sword, should always be higher and purer than the fight, otherwise the hellhole that

lurks in any, even the most disinterested compromise, will swallow him. His sword must be like a prayer, and the latter must have the power of the sword. And the better his prayer, the less often he will have to use his sword" [192, 443].

Il'in's moral philosophy introduces today's reader, often far from being religious, to the unexplored depths of obtaining the meaning and purpose of human life, of tapping into particular spiritual experience as a way of existence. By spirituality Il'in means a special tuning of the soul and the corresponding way of living, when the human mind and all human culture acquire higher measure and significance, together with true integrity and value. Il'in follows the tradition of the Russian school of thought, with its orientation towards "fires of personal spirit". In other words, "morality cannot be learnt or depicted through abstract constructs or speculations"; one needs moral human experience, including love, passions, decisions and deeds. It also means that the moral measure of people and things opens itself only to those who are capable of "experiencing the magnificent, both restricting and releasing, enrooting and purifying power of the act of conscience".

When Vladimir Solov'ev considered shame to be the basis for morality, it was not an arbitrary assumption at all, for the significance of this moral phenomenon was obvious. *Living in shame* really was a state of mind for the philosopher himself and people close to him. Today it would be hard to view it as an irresistible, omnipotent drive, as it would be difficult to appreciate Russian philosophers' hot discussion about the intelligentsia and their responsibility for all what was happening in Russia in the early 20th century. Was something missing from ethics as moral reality, by the end of the century? Is it not the consequence of the way of living that in terms of morality can be described as *lack* of honesty with self, the quality being a prerequisite for obtaining the truth? As Metropolitan Anastasy of Jerusalem, head of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, accurately and straightforwardly puts it in his letter to I. Il'in in 1925, "The overall spiritual weakness of our intelligentsia is also reflected in their way of thinking: their analysis of major questions of life, specifically ethical ones, lacked scrupulousness".

The intelligentsia, except for Solov'ev and some others, "has merely touched upon the issues, without bothering to think them over, as if they had been afraid of making conclusions from their own assumptions and always wanted a way to retreat. It is hardly surprising that their worldview was littered with a whole host of «*idola*», that they have not been able to dispense with up to now. Almost all errors of human mind result from its cunning resourcefulness, rather than shallowness what makes it an obedient instrument of our passions and prejudices" [335: 252].

It is the moral component that is beyond the power of "merciless time", with only one reservation: unless the coming millennium brings another type of culture with different values in which there will be no room for the traditional European code of virtues. However, while the latter is still in effect, we can speak of what has been considered a major virtue since ancient times, that is, courage.

All the attempts to define it throughout many centuries of cultural experience have always revealed a connection with the general understanding of Man's world, its values and their structure. Moreover, in this respect, courage turns out to be the basis for human life. Plato's famous dialog *Lachetes* and Paul Tillich's no less known treaty *The Courage To Be* confirm it. In other words, the question about the nature of courage will bring Man to that of existence in general, and human existence in particular.

Quite predictably, it was not writers or philosophers that coined the concept of courage. They only looked for suitable words and expressions in the language to describe it. Its understanding may start with reading myths and legends, poems and tragedies about heroes. The latter were borrowed from real life, from battlefields, from situations of opposition and from one-on-one fights (*гляза-в-гляза*). Hence the Russian combination of sounds *зр* (*zr*), that makes the core of such words as *зрак* (*eye*), *возраст* (*age*), *зрелость* (*maturity*), *зреть* (*to mature*). "The Greek word *andreia* and the Latin *fortitude* that mean *courage* and *bravery*, point to an additional connotation of the word *courage*, something that pertains to the warrior" [397: 10].

Courage as self-victory, overcoming Man's own fear and the urge to flee from the battlefield, so as not to get involved but to survive. Courage as a constant *contrary to*, saying *no* to all this. Courage as acting in the regime of *opposition*. Courage as a condition that will give no second chance, there will be none; as a concentrated experience of the state between life and death, of highest risk, when life is at stake. Courage as a symbolic expression of pulsation and transcending of the very

existence. Courage as something that enables one to feel time (eternity) as an instant, here and now; at the same time a sudden end, death, becoming nothing, going to nowhere, to eternity, to duration, like the Present Continuous Tense, consisting of tense moments.

Courage is in the ability to keep the instant under strain and to be in control over the instant as well as in the ability to *keep a pause*. Courage as the absolute experience of wholesomeness of life, as the ability to be completely adequate, to accept life as fate and be ready to sacrifice. Courage as a state of Man's concentrated fundamental power to oppose *the animal* within himself and other people's wish to spur *the animal*. Courage as constant effort to live and self-actualize in history.

Courage brings Man to moral decisions. That is why it is almost the only remedy against the modern epidemic of aestheticization. It will never let the aesthetic project of self-presentation win over a free judgement about the purpose of life. On the contrary, it will provide the person with a firm support to draw a boundary between *the will for wealth* and *will for meaning*. It makes one feel cramped in the envelope made of mass-produced artefacts of civilization. Courage gets Man to the open space of freedom of self-portrayal in the meaning-related interpretation of the personal myth.

Finally, courage is one of prerequisites for the kind of moral responsibility proceeding from the condition of Mind that predetermines intellectual freedom. Arbitrary formation of basis for deducing the existential sphere of meanings may have negative consequences caused by escape from freedom. The specific content of the dynamic system of Man's meanings will only be positive if the person assumes responsibility for its formation. And this can be done only through multiple efforts of self-cognition and recognition of a person's own essence fraught with dignity.

The significance of the new type of responsibility can be understood through the concept of dignity that appeared in the unprecedented conditions of intellectual freedom. It would have been impossible in the antique version of responsibility before self and the state. The former is about self-discipline that is determined by myth. Responsibility before the state is concerned with absolute social norms. The medieval personalistic responsibility is also different, being represented through religious institutions. Nor can the bourgeois responsibility for a person's fate in pragmatic coordinates of intellect fit the new type. Nor does the personal responsibility for maintaining or eliminating traditions not suit it.

The feeling of dignity presupposes a non-codified rule, the awareness of a person's personal value, not to be impinged by anybody. It is akin to Man's right to experience personal emotions in a crowd, a priceless characteristic of the new type of freedom. This in turn is possible, provided one has self-respect and respect for others. And, all this does not require reference to constitution, civil law, or something else *imperially approved* [418; 419]. It all goes without saying, it is there, being present on its own behalf, what has already become possible with the so-far-undisclosed social consensus.

The authoritarian mechanism of globalization, still controlled from New York and Washington, ignores by default the real significance of the supreme type of freedom. The machinery to suppress personality revealed already by Frankfurt School has permeated Western social and political institutions, including education and mass media. Decisions made by the *control center* are authoritarian and destructive; they serve the goals that do not consider, even to the smallest degree, the importance of the existential revolution, the new concept of intellectual freedom, human dignity or self-respect. Needless to say that ignoring all this is fatal, as it has been for the Nazi and Soviet regimes.

Nevertheless, in the course of his existence, Man has gone beyond an invisible line, opening the horizons that are still not understood or even recognized. A fully formed personality does not need instructions from the outside about what is ethically right, but not because it does not want them. To a certain extent, the person knows it better than someone else. However, it is possible, provided three *new* basic conditions are met. The first is about the main principle of intellectual freedom: the only denotatum of consciousness in the issue of the meaning of life is the free formation of the theory itself, rather than demonstration of objective reality of the origin of meaning. Second, Man explicitly or implicitly recognizes the responsibility that originates from transcendental structures of consciousness, for the development of the personal system of meanings. Third, the latter occurs based on a person's dignity, what today has become a moral maxim.

However, can Man be informed of his responsibility for his own dignity without his liberty being infringed? What are responsibility criteria? Who is to formulate them? Is it really necessary, or they may become a means to suppress freedom? The questions have not been answered yet, and this

contributes to the modern crisis of educational institutions [109; 234; 281; 317; 375; 519; 529; 531; 550; 570].

As before, social and occupational normativity turned into a dogma of meaning, as well as religious dogmatism, tends to suppress freedom, rather than give it space. None of the three can help to form freedom of the ethical meaning, since its *space* has long gone beyond the coordinates set by them. Marking the boundary is a real task that can be performed when one is talking about it. "Insight is necessary <for humanity> as sympathy that amid awareness of pressing questions will sink in the endlessness of what is worth asking and in whose illumination the sympathy will cease to be a question in due course and become a mere narration"[445: 253]. In these circumstances, society has a new prospect, thus far unclear. The understanding of intellectual freedom is undoubtedly an area of personal competence; social institutions can only channel Man towards it, with non-imperative narration about what has already been comprehended in this respect. In any case, recognition of intellectual freedom is the only way to a new turn in the development spiral of democratic social institutions.

Western civilization has largely exhausted the potential of the Enlightenment project. However, only one of its components has been fulfilled that is oriented towards the abilities of intellect. That is why the signs of exhaustion in the withering of the consumer society look pathetic. Money has triumphantly replaced the purpose having lost its proper role of a means. However, when the Enlightenment is blamed for the fact that the appeal to Mind as the ultimate authority was a failure, it is usually forgotten that it is only reason. To break through and reach a new level, it is necessary to consider from a new perspective the capacities of Mind, whose glowing light still gives us hope to obtain courage, dignity and responsibility and make a moral decision related to the meaning of our existence.

Conclusion

In the second part of 20th century the USA and other developed countries moved to the *information society*. There came the Post-industrial era, called by a futurologist Alvin Toffler *The third wave*; the scholar believed the era is naturally determined as was the first one, the transition from hunt to farming, and the second one, that from farming to industrial production [401]. However, it is obvious today that the analogy is somewhat premature.

The globalization of the information societies has already provoked and still does the resentment feeling in numerous world cultures. There is a bunch of reasons explaining the phenomenon. The ambivalent nature of resentment becomes utterly malignant, i.e. pathogenic, in the conditions of bourgeois relations and in bourgeois morality, which calls white black, pretending to be universal. The priority of usefulness over the life values is among its fundamentals, which does not necessarily match the ethos grounding each culture.

If capitalism is becoming universal, then the question arises, whether capitalism is the only economic system imaginable on earth? Should it be modified according to various world cultures? With regard to Russia, this implies the most involved dilemma, the search for a compromise between self-isolation and *dissolution* of the ethical cultural code in pragmatic rules of globalization.

The words of John Maynard Keynes, a well-known English economist, are categorical who foresees that we will have a chance to go back to some most obvious and indisputable principles of religion and traditional virtue stating that greed is a vice, that usury is indecent for Man. We shall value the ends higher than means and prefer good to use [221].

The historical dynamics of personality structure at a certain stage brought to a would-be refusal of ethical principles formed centuries ago. The *supernova* Man claims himself a sovereign regarding the world as the place to survive. However, this attitude, which the Enlightenment greatly contributed to, seems a wobbling one. The uncertainty in the sphere of existential meanings makes the humanity reexamine the would-be straight road to globalization.

Before the Supernova era there was an ultimate question which Man addressed the ultimate denotatum, viz., Absolute whose true form of being naively disclosed as unambiguous and indisputable. A similar belief into the limit of questioning was the condition for stable deduction chains from the denotatum of denotata if all the field of postulation of the meaning of human, i.e. of humane in the broadest sense of the word.

The problem examined retrospectively shows that the today's uncertainty as the reverse of the freedom of meaning-making has not appeared from the thin air. Even the eras which are considered anti-human as related to the modern status of humanism *knew* what is human in Man. The Middle Ages, which looked bleak in the mirror of the Enlightenment, could nevertheless say their say on the subject. The naïve idea of the clear way to salvation would give the adepts the unshakeable coordinates on the perspectives of humanity, which even the nightmares of inquisition could not blur. The belief into the Last Judgment as the highest justice exhaustively explained the meaning of both the Universe and Man in it, determining the perspective of the human even after the Apocalypse. However, these notions changed after Abelard's formula about personal responsibility before God was articulated.

On the dawn of new time *the medieval person* gained a foothold in what Descartes defined as consciousness self-sufficiency. Its admittance became, according to Heidegger, "the new of the new time" and was supported methodologically by Kant's principles of transcendental competence of reason. Essentially, the ideals of the Enlightenment, 19th century academic positivism and even Marxism, were constructed on the assumption of rational possibility to determine *exactly* the denotatum of dicta about humanism in the *ultimate* and *undisputable* form. Concurrently, Schopenhauer articulated seemingly inevitable consequence of reason competency, to wit: reason supported solely by itself had to concede itself as paradoxical and meaningless result of the will for life.

Schopenhauerian perspective points at the only true impulse of reason under such circumstances, namely, at the necessity of destruction of the instinct of self-preservation. But the point of the perspective — the *death of God* incontestability and seeming collapse of the human — showed the inevitable alternative for the passion to self-destruction in the instinct of self-preservation only. This Schopenhauerian paradox has still been unresolved. However, the Nietzschean *everything is false* cleaned the road for the next admittance to follow: everything is true in the words of humanism but nothing is postulated as such. This very acknowledgement is the quintessence of the historical moment of qualitative advance to intellectual freedom.

Both existentialism and the critical theory of society indirectly articulated the allowance for Self-Consciousness to freely endow even absurd with subjectively formed meaning. At the same time, although this statement nullifies both the legacy of medieval dogmatism and Schopenhauer's heritage it does not expose freedom of meaning-making as full-fledged academic category. Neither psychoanalysis, nor postmodernism appealing to Marx, Nietzsche and Freud as *authorities* did that.

Heidegger's interpretation of uncertainty as related to God and divinities, Fromm's question of freedom and *escape* from it, Frankl's positing freedom of *logic of meaning* is integrated by common denominator, to wit: the true denotatum of the questioning about the meaning of the human is non-cognizable to anybody. In subjective-personal variant this admittance turns into conscious or unconscious questioning about the origin of conscience. Now 21st century endlessly reiterates the repeatedly uttered Camus' question: how to become a saint without God? No people, no shepherds, no scholars are capable of giving the universal key to solve the question about trustworthy spiritual salvation in front of their own mortality.

The new of the Modernity was established as the admittance of self-sufficient ground of Self-Consciousness which lost the trust to the *denotatum of denotata*. Thus the symptoms of the emerging Self-Consciousness are traced in the history of philosophic thought, which provided the condition of *intellectual freedom*. No one of the discourses of the human knowledge regulates the details of this condition. So any state claiming the supernova status is apriori obliged to legalize intellectual freedom.

In *The Ideas to Experience Determining the Boundaries of the State Activity* Humboldt noticed: "The exploration of the boundaries of the activity of the state should, which is easily foreseen, lead to higher freedom of forces and to greater versatility of situations. The possibility of higher degree of freedom always requires equally high degree of education and the lessening need to act within homogenous bound masses; it requires greater force and greater natural gifts of acting individuals. So if the modern era enjoys some advantage in education, force and wealth, it should be endowed with freedom which it claims for with good reason. If in some cases the ruler's power is limited with the bare sword of the nation it is enlightenment and culture that vanquish his will and ideas" [137: 25 — 28].

In order for enlightenment and culture to overcome the ruler's will and ideas he needs the understanding of the fact that the linguistic individuality most spiritually reveals itself in the language of philosophy where the objective truth is borne from the noblest subjective world in its harmonious movement. Where by good fortune the mankind in the person of some nation achieves the heights of progress and the language has the ability to intertwine objective and subjective, and the supremacy of the first does not infringe upon the latter's rights, there the beautiful flower of human communication blossoms [1]. As Mamardashvili noticed prophetically, "if the issue on clearance the linguistic space in general and the philosophical one in particular is not resolved we will not move any further" [268: 168].

The above said means nothing but the inevitable new phase of the Enlightenment. Modern societies are literally on the threshold of the new qualitative leap whose main goal is the transition of the intellectual freedom from *de facto* state to that of *de jure*. Frankfurt School admitted the autonomy of the inner world of Man. Under the influence of classical psychoanalysis its direct studying was associated rather with biological and social in a human being than with the sphere of intellectual freedom. Nevertheless, a new perspective defining the independent axiomatic of meaning followed the statement of individualization ultimate, the formulation of the problem of intellectual freedom, reflections on the space of loneliness and solitude.

The uncertainty of meaning echoed in the personality structure presumes the freedom of personal formation of ethical judgment about the world. No artefacts of the social reality, including social norms, apply this judgment. Thus, critical theory stopped by a new methodological frontier. For the first time Frankfurt School determined where freedom is absent, namely, in the natural law and social regularity; moreover, it formulated the idea of freedom rooted structurally in the inner world of personality. Indirectly the case is about that part of the dynamic system of consciousness meanings which is *a priori* exempt from any outer regulation. The discovery in question is methodologically significant for the Enlightenment perspectives in the sphere of the global transformation of the democracy ideas.

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